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Cert to Cal. Ct. App. Summer List 23, Sheet 1 
No. 79-97 (Reynoso; Puglia, Evans, cone.) 
California Association 
v. 
Mid cal State/Civil Timely 
Petr contends that Calj fornia court s wrongl y 
h ld h H . d 1 . . h . .. e t at a state-sanct1one resa e pr1ce ma1ntenance sc erne for w1ne 
:;;z:::. 
( 1) does not fall within the state action ex emp tion to the Sherman ----
2. 
2. FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW. California law prohibits the 
sale of wine from licen'(ses to retailers at . a price different from 
the price contained in a posted price schedule or in a fair trade 
contract. Calfironia law also prohibits the sale of wine to consumers 
at a price below the price set in a price schedule or in a fair trade 
contract. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, Div. 9, Chap. II §~ 24682, 24866. 
Resp sold a retailer 27 cases of Gallo wine at a price less than the 
posted price schedule, and sold other wine to retailers without the 
existence of a fair trade contract. The state Department of 
Alchoholic Beverage Control alleged that resp had violated state law 
and sought a suspension of resp's license or imposition of a monetary 
penalty. 
The state court of appeal declared the state regulations to 
be violative of the Sherman Act, and stated that the state's 
authority to regulate alchoholic beverages under the Twenty-First 
Amendment was insufficient to support the regulation. The Twenty-
First Amendment provides in part that "[t]he transportation of 
importation into any State, Terri tory, or possession of the United 
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in 
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. The court based 
both of its holdings upon the state supreme court decision in Rice v. 
Alchoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board. 
In Rice the court declared that similar state regulations 
controlling the sale of distilled spirits were invalid under federal 
law. The court found that the retail price maintenance operation was 
an invalid restraint of trade pursuant to the Sherman Act, a point 
not contested by petr. The court further found that the regulations 
3. 
could not be sustained under the state action exemption established 
in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 ( 1943). See Bates v. State Bar of --- ----- -- --- --
Arizona, 433 u.s. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 
579 ( 1976) ; _ Goldfarb v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 773 ( 1975). The court 
I 
noted that in Parker and Bates state action immunized conduct that 
otherwise would have violated the Sherman Act. In Parker the state 
adopted a plan to regulate the sale of raisins. The plan allowed a 
given number of producers in a geographical area to petition for 
establishment of a marketing plan. If a satate commission approved 
formulation of a plan, then a committee of producers set a price. If 
the commission approved or modified the plan, it would be effective 
upon the approval of the area producers. In Bates a rule of the 
( :- ' Arizona Supreme Court prohibiting attorneys from advertising was held 
to be within the state action exemption. The Court noted that the 
state court was the ultimate body wielding state control over the 
practice of law, that the rule represented a clear articulation of 
state policy, and that the rule was subject to "pointed re-
examination" by the state court in enforcement proceedings. It was 
deemed significant that the state policy "is so clearly and 
affirmatively expressed and that the state supervision is so active." 
433 u.s. at 362. 
The state court emphasized that in Parker the prices were 
set by a state commission, and that in Bates the rule was subject to 
"pointed re-examination" by the state ·court. Because the substance 
of the California regulations, that is the prices for alchoholic 
•1 bev erages , were set by private parties the court believed the 
regulations differed sufficiently from Parker and Bates to bring them 
4 . 
outside of the state action exemption. 
The court recognized the state's authority to regulate 
alchoholic beverages under the Twenty-First Amendment, but held that 
"[w] hen a statute enacted pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment 
conflicts with an enactment based on the commerce clause, we must 
balance the policies furthered by each in order to determine which 
should prevail." In support of its use of a balancing test, the court 
relied upon its own precedent, see Sail'er Inn Inc. ::.:._ Kirby, 485 
P.2d 529 (1971), and upon this Court's decisions, see Craig~ Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976)("the Twenty-First Amendment does not pro 
tanto repeal the Commerce Clause, but merely requires that each 
protection 'be considered in the 1 ight of the other, and in the 
( " context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.'" 
'--"' 
(quoting Hotstetter v. Idewild Liquor Corp., 377 u.s. 324, 332 
(1964))). 
The court found that the state regulations inpinged free 
competition as guarenteed by the Sherman Act because it allowed both 
horizontal and vertical retraints of trade. The court specifically 
noted the remarkable similarity in the prices set by competing brands 
as evidence of the potential for price-fixing based on the posted 
price schedules. The court examined evidence showing that the state 
regulations served neither of the purposes behind the statute--
promoting temperance and protecting small businesse from predatory 
competition. 
3. CONTENTIONS. Because the court of appeal decision relied 
so completely on the decision in Rice, petr has directed its 
arguments toward the two grounds supporting that opinion. 
( . 
5. 
Petr contends that Rice construed the state action exemption 
too narrowly. Petr argues that Parker itself was a case where private 
parties exerted considerable control over the content of the 
regulation, since producers both initiated proceedings and had to 
approve the commission's decision before it went into effect. Petr 
emphasizes that the state regulations sanction the price maintanence 
of wine, and that the state enforces any violations. Because the 
conduct of resale price maintenance is required by state law, petrs 
conclude that the regulations fall within the Parker exemption. 
Petr also argues that use of a balancing test is incorrect 
in the circumstances of this case. First, petr argues that balancing 
is only appropriate when, as in Craig ~ Boren, state action pursuant 
~ to the Twenty-First Amendment conflicts with the exercise of 
fundamental rights. Second, petr contends that the Court's expression 
of a balancing test in Idewild is inapplicable because that case 
represented the attempts of a state to regulate liquor use outside of 
its territorial limits. Finally, petrs say that use of a balancing 
test has been expressly rejected in lower court case summarily 
affirmed by this Court. National Rai 1 road Passe nger:_ Cor12_. ~ Mill e r' · 
358 F.Supp. 1321 (D.Kan.) affirmed 414 U.S. 948 (1973). Under the 
rule of Hicks v. Mir a nda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 ( 1975), petr contends 
that the case forms precedent inconsistent with the California 
decision. 
Petr also states that the issues are certworthy because the 
state decisions have created uncertainty and confusion. Petr says 
[ 
that the decisions have spawned needless litigat ion, the t they call 
into question the validity of similar laws in other states, and tha t 
6. 
they place licensees in the unenviable position of having to disobey 
California law or face anti-trust liability. 
4. DISCUSSION. The California court has cut a narrow line to 
avoid application of Parker ~ Brown, but the line is not directly 
inconsistent with this Court's precedent. The California court 
correctly notes that the state involvement in regulation was greater 
in Parker or Bates than in this case. In Parker, for example, the 
state commission could ensure that prices were not set too high. Here 
the state does not interfere with the privately chosen price levels. 
At the same time the state involvement here is greater than 
in Cantor or Goldfarb. In Cantor the court held that that the state ---- ----
~
action exemption did not protect the activites of a utility company 
that was the sole distributer of electricity and supplied consumers 
with light bulbs. The charge for the bulbs was included in the 
general charges for electricity. The rate was approved by the state 
utility commission and could not be changed without their approval. 
Nevertheless, the state had not required that the bulbs be provided, 
nor did it have an independent regulatory interest in the market for 
light bulbs. 428 U.S. at 584-85; 604-05; 612-14. In . Goldfarb the 
Court held that a minimum fee schedule published and enforced by bar 
associations did not fall within the exemption because the activities 
were not required by the state. 421 U.S. at 790-91. In this case, 
the activities were required by the state even though the state did 
not require or regulate the particular price levels. 
The state court correctly applied a balancing test to weigh 
the purposes of the Sherman Act against the ability of the state to 




Although the holding in Craig ~ Boren states that the Twenty-First 
Amendment does not alter the application of equal protection 
standards, the Court set forth in explci t dicta the standard to b e 
used when state action pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment runs 
afoul of federal acti0n taken pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The 
Court stated that the Amendment created an exception to the normal 
operation of the Commerce Clause, but it did not repeal it in this 
area. Rather the interesection of the two provisions demands that 
each be considered in the light of the other, with recognition of the 
interests at stake in any case. 429 u.s. at 206. Furthermore, the 
Court noted that that the state's interest in controlling importation 
of intoxicants is "transparently clear." In this case, invalidation 
of the state regulations do not affect its abii ty to control the 
importation of alchoholic beverages. 
This case would be a prope r vehicle for examination of the 
Parker issue. The parties have stipul a ted to all facts, and the 
state supreme court opinion entensively analyzes the purposes served 
by regulations of the prices of distilled spirits. Petr has not 
suggest ed that regul a tion of wine is distingui s hable from r egulation 
of distilled spirits . 
There is a response. 
8/24/79 Sal let Ops. in petn. 
JS 
To: 
Re: No. 79-97, CRLDA v. Midcal Aluminum 
1. QUESTIONS PRESENTED: (1) May a state compel private 
parties to comply with a retail price maintenance plan for the 
sale of wine under the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown? 
(2) May a state compel private parties to comply with a retail 
price maintenance plan for the sale of wine pursuant to its 
authority under the Twenty-First Amendment? 
2. DISCUSSION. 
A. The Evolution of Parker v. Brown. The state action 
exemption to the Sherman Act received this Court's imprimatur in 
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In that case, a California 
2. 
~te authorized the establishment of a program that would 
J\ 
restrict comQe~tion and maintain prices in the distribution of -
raisins. The state created an Agricultural Prorate Advisory 
Commission. If ten raisin producers petitioned the Commission 
for establishment of a marketing plan, the Commission could 
grant the petition and select a program committee, which 
included producers and processors. The program committee 
formulated a specific program which the Commission could 
approve, modify, or reject. A program approved by the Commission 
would go into effect upon the consent of 65% of the producers in 
the relevant aqricul tural area. The program would restrict the 
marketing of raisins and the price at which they could be sold. 
The Court held that the state plan could not be 
attacked as violative of the Sherman Act. The Court noted that 
the plan "derived its authority and its efficacy from the 
legislative command of the state," id., at 350, and that the 
Sherman Act "gives no hint that it was intended to restrain 
state action or official action directed by a state." Id., at 
351. 
In Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 
U.S. 384 ( 1951), however, the Court held that the Sherman 
price maintenance 
~~ 
Louisiana had a law that ~ 
a state 1 aw that required compliance with preempted 
plan for 1 iquor. 
enforced any price-fixing contract against all retailers in th~v~ 
state, both signatories of the contract and non-s iqners. The~ 
3. 
Court recognized that the Miller-Tydings Act allowed states to 
create resale price maintenance plans, but it held that the Act 
did not permit the State to force non-signers to comply with the 
plans. The Court cited Parker ~ Brown in passing, but it did -- \ not discuss possible application of the state action exemption. 
In Goldfarb~ Virginia State Bar, 421 u.s. 773 (1975), 
this Court held that the state action exemption did not protect 
a minimum fee schedule published by a Country Bar Association 
and enforced by the State Bar. The Court stated that " [ t] he 
threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity 
is state action ••. is whether the activity is required by the 
State acting as sovereign." Id., at 790. The Court found that 
promulgation of the fee schedule had not been compelled by the 
State acting through its Supreme Court. Although the State Bar 
was a state agency, the Court concluded that it "voluntarily 
joined in what is essentially private anticompetitive activity." 
Id., at 792. 
In Cantor~ Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), 
the Court considered a private antitrust action brought by a 
retailer of lightbulbs against a private utility which, in 
accordance with state-approved tariffs, distributed lightbulbs 
to its customers and included their cost within its general 
service charge. The Court emphasized that the State had no 
independent regulatory interest in the market for lightbulbs, 
and that the utility had proposed the tariff that included the 
4. 
cost of free lightbulbs. A plurality of the Court also stated 
that Parker ~ Brown was inapplicable to cases involving private 
defendants, and that there was no other reason to preclude 
antitrust liablity from attaching to the utility's actions. The 
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result, 
although each would have applied the Parker ~ Brown doctrine. 
You joined in Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent. Like the 
Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, Justice Stewart would have 
applied Parker ~ Brown. Justice Stewart's conclusion, however, 
was that the utility's distribution of lightbulbs fell within 
the state action exemption. Justice Stewart argued that the 
utility's proposal of a tariff was protected from the antitrust 
laws under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and that the utility's 
subsequent compliance with the tariff was protected under Parker 
v. Brown. Reviewing the legislative history of the Sherman Act, 
Justice Stewart concluded that the intent of the Act was "not to 
intrude on the soverignty of the States." id., at 635, and that, 
therefore, conduct which is compelled by the States is exempt 
from the Act. Because compliance with an approved tariff was 
compelled by the State, Justice Stewart believed that Parker v. 
Brown was applicable. In the course of his dissent, Justice ~ 
Stewart also comm~e~ on Schwegmann. He characterized that 
case as one in which Congress, by passage of the Miller-Tydings 
Act, had altered the scope of the state action exemption with 
respect to resale price maintenance plans. 
5. 
The Court unanimously applied Parker v. Brown in Bates 
v. State Bar, 4 33 U.S. 3 50 ( 1976). In Bates two young lawyers 
violated state disciplinary rules against advertising. The 
Court distinguished Goldfarb on the ground that the no-
advertising rules in Bates were required by affirmative command 
of the state supreme court. The Court distinguished Cantor 
because ( i) the real party in interest was the state supreme 
court, (ii) the State had an independent regulatory interest in 
the regulation of bar activities, and (iii) the no-advertising 
rules were are "clear articulation of the State's policy" which 
were "subject to pointed re-examination by ..• the Arizona Supreme 
Court . " I d • , at 3 6 2 . 
Finally, the Court applied Parker v. Brown last Term in 
New Motor Vehicle Board v. ~rrin Fox Co., 47 LW 4017 (December 
5, 1978). The Court reviewed a California statute which 
requires an automobile manufacturer to secure the approval of a -------------- ~---------~-----------------------------
state administrative agency before opening a retail motor 
vehicle dealership within the market area of an existing 
~
franchise, if and only if that existing franchisee protests the 
establishment of the competing franchise. The Court, in an 
opinion by Justice Brennan and joined by the Chief Justice and 
Justices Stewart, White, Marshall and Rehnquist, rejected the 
contention that the state scheme was violative of Schwegmann: 
"The dispositive answer is that the Act's regulatory scheme is a 
system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively 
6. 
expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in 
the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile 
dealerships. The regulation is therefore outside of the reach 
of the antitrust laws under the 'state action' exemption." 47 LW 
at 4021. The Court distinguished Schwegmann as a case in which 
"the State attempted to authorize and immunize private conduct 
violative of the antitrust laws." Id. You joined Justice 
Blackmun's opinion concurring in the result, which did not 
discuss Parker v. Brown. 
B. The~ Scheme Under Review. As described by the 
state appellate court, "[u]nder California Business and 
Professional Code section 24862 no licensee may sell or resell 
to a retailer, and no retailer may buy any item of wine except :::.. ____........ _...-.,.__, - -
at the selling price contained in an effective price schedule or 
in an effective fair trade contract. No licensee is permitted 
to sell or resell to any consumer any item of wine at less than 
the selling or resale price contained in an effective price 
schedule or fair trade contract. Under section 24866 each 
qrower, wholesaler, wine rectifier or rectifier must make and 
-- -
prices of wines." Petr for Cert at A-5. 
In Baxter v. Rice, in which the California Supreme 
Court struck down the state resale price maintenance plan for 
distilled spirits, the court emphasized that the price for 
distilled spirits was set solely by private parties. The court 
stated that the Department of Alchoholic Beverages Control "does 
not participate in determining the minimum price, but only 
enforces the price set by producers." Id. at C-9. The state 
court recognized that the Department has the power to excuse 
compliance with the resale price maintenance plan, but said that 
it had never been exercised, and that the Department did not 
have the authority to set maximum prices. There is "no 
significant difference []" between the provisons of the resale 
price maintenance plan for distilled sprits and for wine. Id., 
at A-4. ~ 
As Goldfarb stated, the threshold question in applying ~1~ 
Parker ~ Brown is whether the State, acting as sovereign, has 
compelled private parties to engage in anti-competitive conduct. ----------------
In this case it is clear that the State does compel! sellers of 
wine to engage in price-fixing. I do not think, however, that 
this threshold question can be the only question. In Schwegmann, 
for example, the State "compelled" nonsigners to comply with 
resale price maintenance plans, but the State law was 
nonetheless struck down. The Court's most recent reading of 
Schwegmann characterizes it as a case in which the State merely 
attempted to authorize or immunize private anti-competitive 
conduct. 
The necessity of looking beyond compulsion arises from I 
the perceived danger that a State could "repeal" the Sherman Act \ 
within its borders simply by "compelling" persons to engage in 
8. 
anti-competitive behavior. The Court has developed two methods 
of reviewing state action to ensure that it is not tantamount to 
"repeal" of the Sherman Act. First, as the Court in Cantor 
suggested, this Court could review each plan to see whether it 
actually serves an important state interest. If it does not, 
then the state action is not exempt. The difficulty with this 
approach is that it allows the federal courts to assess the 
strength of the state interest in economic regulation. 
Second, the Court has emphasized the adequacy of state 
super~ is~r state-sanctioned anti-competitive practices. 
This approach does not review the strength of the state interest 
in regulation, but it does ensure that state supervision has 
replaced free enterprise. That is, the Court recognizes the 
state authority to define economic areas inappropriate for 
market control, but also recognizes that state supervision must 
provide a real substitute for the effects of a competitive 
economic system. Other ise, state "immunity" may simply allow 
private parties to evade the purposes and policies of the 
Sherman Act. See Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law§ 213 (1978). 
I believe that the second approach is preferable, ~ 
because it respects the federalism principles that allow a state 
to decide for itself when anti-competitive practices serve the 
public welfare. This Court's cases illustrate the difference 
between adequate and inadequate supervision. In Parker, each 
aspect of the marketing plan, including price and supply, was 
9. 
approved by a state commission. In Bates, the rules had been 
promulgated and were subject to pointed re-examination by the 
state supreme court. Under Justice Stewart's view of Cantor, the 
utility was following a tariff that had been explicitly approved 
by a state regulatory commission. In New Motor Vehicle Board, 
the state reviewed each claim that establishment of a new 
franchise would cause economic harm. On the other hand, in 
Schwegmann, the State statute was struck down because it 
compelled nonsigners to follow the terms of resale price 
maintenance plans drawn up by private parties. The state 
compelled the nonsigners to follow the terms of the contract, 
but it gave private parties the freedom to decide under what 
circumstances state compulsion would be employed. 
~ 
This case is like Schwegmann because the coercive pow~~ 
of the state is employed to carry out the terms of private ~ 
~ bargains. Thus, the state has mandated a resale price 
maintenance scheme, but private parties set the price at which ~ 
sales can be made. I believe that the state's failure to set the~ 
price, as was done in Parker and Cantor, leads to the conclusion ~~~ ' ..., _, i~.f.Lc. 
that state supervision is inadequate to bring the plan within 
the state action exemption. 
Of course, Schwegmann can be read, as Justice Stewart 
read it in Cantor, as a case that does not directly effect the 
scope of the Parker v. Brown exemption. It would still, however, 
be relevant to this case. The alternative reading of Schwegmann 
1 0. 
interprets it as a case in which the Court deferred to Congress' 
specific decision to supersede the original intent of the 
Sherman Act through the Miller-Tydings Amendment. If so, then it 
can be argued that Congress' recent decision to end federal 
protection of resale price maintenance plans indicates that 
Congress does not wish such plans to fall within the state acton 
exemption. 
In the Miller-Tydings Act and in the McGuire Act, 
Congress espressly allowed fair trade laws. In 197 5, however, 
Congress repealed the federal fair trade exemptions from the 
anti trust laws. The legislative history of the 197 5 Act, as 
recounted in the Amicus Brief of the State of California at 23-
25, suggests that Congress expected the repeal of previous law 
to prevent manufacturers from settinqs prices under fair trade 
statutes. Thus, I believe that the 197 5 Act may be used to 
support a holding that Congress intends that fair trade laws not 
be exempt from the operation of the Sherman Act. 
C. The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment On the 
State's Ability to Regulat~ the Price of Alchoholic Beverages. 
The Twenty-First Amendment repealed Prohibition. § 2 of the 
Twenty-First Amendment provides that II rtl he transportation or 
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the 
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 
If the state regulation of wine is not exempt under the Sherman 
11. 
Act, and, assuming that the California price-fixing scheme is 
illegal under the Sherman Act, then it must be decided whether 
the Twenty-First Amendment precludes enforcement of the anti-
trust laws. 
The petitioner argues that the Twenty-First Amendment 
creates an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce 
Clause and limits federal intervention to those cases in which 
state regulation runs afoul of other constitutional provisions, 
or in which the state attempts to regulate liquor that is not 
consumed within state borders. The respondent argues, however, 
that the interests of the State must be balanced against the 
interest of Congress in enforcing the Sherman Act pursuant to 
its Commerce Clause power. 
The petitioner's theory has the potential for creating 
a rather large gap in federal law because it would hold that any 
state act regulating the distribution of alchoholic beverages 
would prevail over any inconsistent federal statute based on the 
Commerce Clause. Presumably this would allow a state to mandate 
that persons working in the 1 iquor industry need not be paid 
federal minimum wage. On the other hand, the realistic 
potentional for such conflict may be small. 
Review of the history of the Twenty-First Amendment is 
not particularly illuminating. For example, the Brief of Amicus 
Virginia Wholesalers Association argues that the Congress' 
rejection of a proposed section 3 to the amendment demonstrates 
\ 
1 2. 
the breadth of state authority. Section 3 would have provided 
that "Congress shall have concurrent power to regulate or 
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to be drunk on the 
premises where sold." Therejection of section 3 also is 
consistent with a narrower congressional purpose. Although 
Prohibition was to be ended, the Twenty-First Amendment was 
designed to allow each state to decide whether it would be "wet" 
or "dry." Section 3 was inconsistent with that principle insofar 
as it would have allowed Congress to decide whether alchoholic 
beverage would be sold within each state. Under this view, the 
essential purpose of § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment was to 
allow each state to decide whether alchoholic beverages would be 
imported for consumption within each state. State regulation of 
price, but not consumption, of alchoholic beverages therefore 
would be entitled to less consideration. 
The Court's recently has stated that "the Twenty-First 
Amendment does not pro tanto repeal the Commerce Clause, but 
' 
merely requires that each provision "be considered in light of 
each other, and in the context of the issues and interests at 
stake in any concrete case." Craig ~Boren, 429 u.s. 190, 206 
( 1976), quoting Hostetter v. Idewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 
377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964). Although members of this Court have 
expounded a more expansive view of the Twenty-First Amendment in 
the past, see United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 u.s. 





the interests that would be served by an 
interpretation of the Twenty-First Amendment that gave States ---.._._ __ _ 
the exclusive power to control the price of alchoholic 
beverages. Of course, a State like Virginia that controls the 
--.._., 
distribution of alchoholic beverages within its borders is 
acting within the central purpose of the Twenty-First Amendment. 
Assuming that a balancing of state and federal 
interests is proper when price alone is at issue, I would be 
reluctant to disturb the state supreme court 1 s view in Rice 
that state interest 1 s are not substantially furthered by the 
resale price maintenance scheme. On the other hand, it is clear 
that price-fixing of this sort runs afoul of the federal 
interest in free competition. Therefore, I suggest that the 
interests of the State in fixing the prices of alchoholic 
beverages in this context by the reach of the antitrust laws. 
3. SUMMARY. The state resale price maintenance program 
does not fall within the Parker v. Brown exemption from the 
Sherman Act because of the failure of the State to supervise the 
private choice of the prices at which wine is to be sold in 
California. Where a state controls the price, but not 
distribution of alchoholic beverages within its state, the 
Twenty-First Amendment demands that the state interest be 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 79-97, CRLA v. Midcal A1uminum 
The SG has filed an amicus brief, and petr has filed a 
reply brief. 
The SG contends that the state resale price maintenance 
(RPM) plan violates the Sherman Act and is not protected by ~ 2 
of the Twenty-First Amendment. The SG's reasoning on the 
Sherman Act question is similar to the analysis in my Bench 
Memorandum. ~he SG contends that the distinction between 
actions that fall within the state action exemption, as in 
Parker and Bates, and act ion that does not, as in Schwegman, 
turns on the existence of state supervision or control over the 
2. 
substance of the restraint. The SG argues that the state RPM 
plan does not exert sufficient control because it allows private 
parties to select the prices at which wine must be sold. The SG 
derives the requirement of control from the need to reconcile 
the purpose of the Sherman Act with the interests of the states 
in a federal system. 
the control of the 
Aggregations of economic power subject to 
state do not pose the same potential for 
abuse as private anti-competitive action, but state enforcement 
of private decisions allows private anti-competitive activity to 
flourish beyond the control of either the federal or state 
government. 
The SG argues that the purpose of § 2 of the Twenty-
First Amendment was to guarentee the States the power to 
regulate liquor in a manner that would otherwise interfere with 
interstate commerce, but 
powers 
which 
be 1 imi ted 
gives the 
more 
there was no 
than required 
States exclusive 
intent that Congress' 
by the langauge of ~ 2 
authority over "[t]he 
transportation or import at ion" of alchohol ic beverages. The SG 
notes that Congress passed the Federal Alchohol Administration 
Act two years after congess ional passage of the Twenty-First 
Amendment. The Alchohol Administration Act imposes federal 
labeling and consignment sales requirements. The SG states that 
the debate on that Act demonstrates Congress' belief that such 
federal regulation is consistent with the Twenty-First 
Amendment. Furthermore, a decision that the States have plenary 
3. 
control over all aspects of the liquor trade would allow States 
to insulate their liquor industries from the reach of such 
federal laws as the National Labor Relations Act, the Securities 
Acts, and the requlatons of common carriers under the Interstate 
Commerce Commission Act. 
I believe that the SG 1 s theory is slightly broader than 
my Bench Memorandum. The SG asserts that any State law that 
regulates liquor, but not its distribution, is preempted by any 
contrary federal law. I suggested that States have plenary 
control over the distribution of liquor, but that the State 
interests must be balanced against the federal interests when 
the State regulates other aspects of the liquor industry. The 
SG 1 s theory would be easier to aoply, and would not appear to 
constitute an overborad reading of federal power so long as this 
Court emphasizes that the States have exclusive control over the 
distribution of alchoholic beverages, and that States may 
prohibit the sale of liquor, regulate the number or location of 
liquor licenses, operate liquor stores itself, and levy taxes on 
alchoholic beverages. 
The petr 1 s reply brief adds little. On the state action 
issue, petr emphasizes that liquor distirbutors are required by 
the State to set prices. The petr disputes the SG 1 s 
interpretation of § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment, contending 
that the States have broad authority. The petr also notes that 
Congress, when it repealed the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts 
4. 
in 1975, expressly noted that States may enforce RPM laws under 
the Twenty-First Amendment. 
Resp raised the issue of mootness in a motion to this 
Court, although that issue was not discussed in resp' s brief. 
Petr explains that the California courts have struck down the 
RPM plan for spirits, and for wine sales to cunsumers, but had 
not, prior to this case, dealt with price retraints on the sale 
of wine from wholesaler to retailer. Thus the case would not be 
moot even if a previous state court decision could bar this 
Court from considering a constitutional issue. Because I do not 
believe that a state court can evade the command of this Court 
by claiming reliance upon an earlier unreviewed state court 
decision, I don't believe there is a real mootness issue in this 
case. 
September 24, 1979 
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TO: David DATE: Feb. 7, 1980 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
79-97 Midical 
I commend you first on the promptness with which 
you have prepared a first draft. It also reflects your usual 
quality of work. 
My comments are as follows: 
In the introductory paragraph, would it be helpful 
to identify Midical as a private wine wholesaler? Perhaps 
something along the following lines might do: 
"In a private state court action instituted by 
respondent - a wine producer - California's resale 
price maintenance and price posting statutes for 
the wholesale wine trade were held to be violative 
of the Sherman Act. The issue presented on this 
appeal is whether, etc., ... " 
Your part I is fine, although it might be well to 
identify Midical a little more specifically. 
Part II is excellent. I suppose we need not say 
that the California pricing scheme would be a per se 
violation of the Sherman Act. On page 7, where you cite 
Schwegmann (which, of course, is the most relevant case) I 
? think it would be helpful to cite additional Sherman Act 
cases supporting the invalidity of this type of price fixing. 
As you have pointed out, Part III - the 21st 
2. 
Amendment issue - is a bit more difficult. It is not easy to 
identify, on the basis of prior authority, a consistent and 
coherent line of analysis. You end up balancing competing 
state and federal interests. I can think of no better 
approach. 
Yet, I do have the impression that we may 
overemphasize the weight to be accorded state interest. The 
discussion begins on page 20. The first point made is the 
relative indifference of California to this particular case. 
O~ I really do not view this as significant. Our decision would 
be the same regardless of the the state's enthusiasm so long 
as it kept the statute on the books and enforced it. Perhaps 
we could move this reference to a footnote. 
You then rely primarily on the view of the 
California statute taken by California courts. This is more 
relevant, but again would not be controlling with me in terms 
of deciding whether the state interest is sufficient to 
outweigh the federal interest. Customarily, we look to the 
brief of the State Attorney General for the state interests -----served by legislation. I have not checked his brief, but if 
it identifies state interests you might rely on him for these 
and on the California court's rebuttal to show how 
insubstantial they are. 
While I certainly would not foreclose the 
3. 
possibility of state interests outweighing a federal commerce 
clause interest in a case involving alcoholic beverages, it 
is difficult for me to imagine such a case involving the 
Sherman Act and where the state action is not protected in 
any event under Parker v. Brown. 
In sum, take another "swing" at the final five 
pages (commencing at page 20 of the draft) with the foregoing 
thoughts in mind. 
Without rechecking the draft and accompanying 
notes, I do not believe you have been quite specific enough 
in making clear that under the 21st Amendment a state may do 
as Virginia does: exercise a state monopoly on the 
importation, distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages. 
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
I 
February 15, 1980 
Re: 79-97 - California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Association v. Midcal Aluminum 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~ltp't'mtt <lfcnrl cf ffrt ~~ ~ta.ttg 
~u~ ~. <!f. 2ll&J~' 
February 19, 1980 
RE: No. 79-97 
Dear Lewis: 
Please note that I did not participate in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
SIC 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!IERS O F" 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLAC KMUN 
.:iuprtntt <!fomt ~f t4~ ~~ ~htUs­
._Mlfingtlttt. ~. Qf. 2ll~.){.~ ' 
/ 
v 
February 19, 1980 
Re: No. 79-97 - California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Association v . Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 
Dear Lewis : 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
---
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.hpt-mu C!Jltltrlttf tlft~b .ihttt.s 
.. ulfi:ngLttt. ~. ~ 2llb''! ~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
February 20, 1980 
Re: No. 79-97, California Liquor Dealers 
v. Midcal Aluminum 
Dear Lewis, 






Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j;u.p:rtmt Qj:llutt llf t!ft ~tb j;~g 
~agfringbm, ;!0. Qj:. 2.0~,.$ 
February 20, 1980 
/ 
/ 
Re: No. 79-97 California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. 
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al. 
Dear Lewis: 
Although I voted the other way at conference, I shall, 
as Byron puts it "acquiesce" in your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the conference 
~ltp:rtmt arttnd ltf t~t 'J!Uritt~ ~btf.tg 
'D'aafrittghtn.19. ar. 2llgt)!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL February 21, 1980 
Re: No. 79-97 - Calif. Retail Liquor Dealers 
Asso. v. Midcal Aluminum 
Dear Lewis: 





Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE February 23, 1980 
Re: 79-97 - California Retail Liquor 
Dealers Assn. v. Midcal 
Aluminum, Inc. 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§u.prtmt <!Jlturlltf t4t ~tt~ .:§~atts 
•asfrhtgtltn, ~. <!J. 20~'1~ 
February 28, 1980 
Re: 79-97 - Calif. Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 
Dear Lewis: 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 3/1/80 79-97 California Retail Liquor 
Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum 
This case comes to us from the California Court of 
Appeal. 
California has a resale / price maintenance statute 
for wine. Under this statute, a wine producer may set prices 
through a fair trade contract. If this is not done, the 
I 
wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that 
producers brand. Wine merchants are required to sell to 
1\ 
retailers only at prices established in this manner. -
Respondent, charged with violating established 
prices, successfully challenged the ~~ California system as 
violative of the Sherman Act. We granted cert. 
The California statute was defended in this Court 
on two grounds: First, that its program is immune from 
federal antitrust laws under the "state action" exception -
an exception this Court has recognized since ~ae 194~ 
d. decision in~ Parker v. Brown. ~ lvt.f3 
" 
Secondly, it was argued that the 21st Amendment, 
that repeal~ the Prohibition Amendment, authorized the 
states to regulate traffic in liquor. 
For the reasons stated in the Court's opinion, we 
reject both of these arguments. Neither the state action -
doctrine of Parker v. Brown, nor the 21st Amendment, 
authorizes a stat~to delegate to private partiesj'the right 
to fix prices in a manner/ that would violate federal 
antitrust laws. We therefore affirm the judgment of the 
California Court of Appeal. 
Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
2. 
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TELEPHONE (415) 392 · 1122 
March 10, 1980 
MAR 1 4 1980t 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
United States Supreme Court 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Re: California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., No. 79-97 OT79 
Dear Justice Powell: 
This letter is written on behalf of my client, 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., respondent in the above case, and 
concerns a brief phrase that appears at page 12 of the 
slip opinion. With deference, we suggest that a modifi-
cation of that phrase may be appropriate to minimize any 
risk of misinterpretation of the scope of the ruling in 
the case. Mr. Rodak, the Clerk of the Court, informs me 
that the appropriate way to raise this matter is by letter 
to you, with copies to him and to the Reporter of Decisions. 
At page 12, the slip opinion contains the follow-
ing sentence: 
"The Twenty-first Amendment grants the 
States virtually complete control over 
whether to permit importation or sale 
of liquor and how to structure the 
liquor distribution system." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The phrase which is emphasized in the above sentence is the 
source of our concern. As explained more fully below, 
there is a risk that the phrase might be cited to attempt 
to obtain results at odds with the logic of the opinion 
as a whole and with the basic antitrust principles upheld 
by the Court. 
.. CABLE ORRICK., 
TELEX 3-4·0973 
ORRICK, HERRINGTON, ROWLEY 0. SUTCLIFFE 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
March 10, 1980 
Page Two 
At page 8, footnote 9, the slip opinion distin-
guishes and protects "the approach of those States that 
completely control the distribution of liquor within their 
boundaries ... The note goes on to cite two provisions of 
the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Code, §§ 4-15 and 
4-28. These code provisions deal with the operation of 
government stores for the retail sale of alcoholic bever-
ages. Footnote 9 leaves little doubt that the States are 
free to engage themselves in distributing alcoholic bever-
ages. 
Judging by the logic of the opinion and the simi-
larity of the language of footnote 9 ( 11 the distribution of 
liquor within their boundaries") and of page 12 ( 11 the liquor 
distribution system"), it seems to us that the language of 
page 12 emphasized above refers to footnote 9 type situations 
in which the State itself conducts various aspects of the 
alcoholic beverage business. However, it is possible that 
the language of page 12 could be read more broadly in an 
effort to defend situations where the cloak of state author-
ization is thrown over what are in essence private cartels --
particularly horizontal market division schemes -- in situa-
tions that are logically and legally indistinguishable from 
the price-fixing scheme struck down in the California Retail 
Liquor Dealers case. 
An example may help to illustrate our concern. If 
the States have "virtually complete control over • • . how 
to structure the liquor distribution system .. (in the literal 
language of page 12), could they simply authorize suppliers 
and wholesalers, under the guise of a franchise system, to 
divide the state up into territories in which the wholesalers 
would not compete with each other? This would harm someone 
in Midcal's position, if the effect was to prevent it from 
selling in new areas. Such a system would be a per se 
illegal market division conspiracy if engaged in without a 
"gauzy cloak of state involvement, .. and the analysis should 
be identical to the analysis of the conduct at issue in the 
california Retail Liquor Dealers case. Yet the language of 
page 12 of the opinion, referred to above, might suggest 
that such a market division scheme, if authorized by state 
statute, would be immune from antitrust inquiry. This would 
be a result that presumably was not intended, would impinge 
upon legitimate federal antitrust interests, and in any 
event was not an issue before the Court in our case. 
ORRICK, HERRINGTON, ROWLEY 0. SUTCLIFFE 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
March 10, 1980 
Page Three 
One alternative to clear up the problem discussed 
above would be to change the phrase "how to structure the 
liquor distribution system" to read: "over those aspects 
of liquor distribution within their boundaries which the 
States conduct themselves." Another alternative, although 
one I think might be less clear, would be simply to append 
a footnote to the end of the current phrase. Such a foot-
note might read: "See note 9, supra." 
Needless to say, I am very pleased with the out-
come of the case and with your opinion for a unanimous Court. 
I consider it a great privilege to have been able to argue 
the case before you. 
JBO/ljj 
cc: Honorable Michael Rodak 
Respectfully submitted, 
B. o~~ 
ck B. Owens 
A Attorney for Respondent, 
ideal Aluminum, Inc. 
Clerk, United States Supreme Court 
Henry Lind, Esq. 
Reporter of Decisions 
United States Supreme Court 
William T. Chidlaw, Esq. 
counsel for Petitioner 
Lawrence G. Wallace, Esq. 
Deputy Solicitor General 
George J. Roth, Esq. 
Deputy Attorney General 
State of California 
DOS 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David 
DATE: March 14, 1980 
RE: No. 79-97, California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn v. Midcal 
Aluminum, Inc. 
I hope that I am not responding to the Owens letter with 
instinctive "pride of authorship," but I do not think his point is 
especially well taken. The phrase at issue on page 12 states that 
"The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States virtually complete 
control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how 
to structure the liquor distribution system." (Emphasis added.) The 
letter's concern is that this language suggests that the State could 
delegate liquor distribution to private parties who would be 
authorized to engage in anticompetitive practices. The example 
offered is a market-division arrangement. Letter, p. 2. I have 
several problems with the proposal to rewrite the passage: 
1 ) I believe the passage correctly states the law. The 
language of the Amendment refers to the "transportation and 
importation" of 1 iquor. Both terms to me, at least -- clearly 
reflect the intent that the States control the methods of 
"--------
distributing liquor through mechanisms such as "blue" laws limiting 
2. 
Sunday or evening sales, sales of liquor-by-the-drink, licensing of 
1 iquor dealers, or sale of 1 iquor by the State. Such requlations 
cannot be challenged on Sherman Act grounds. Unless this 1 ine is 
drawn, I believe the Twenty-first Amendment will be reduced to a 
limitation on state liquor import taxes, and I think State control 
programs 1 ike that in Pennsylvania could be lost. That is why I 
resisted using the narrower language of the type proposed in the 
letter. Indeed, there is no direct need to protect the State-store ---'"'----
systems with the Twenty-first Amendment because, as the opinion 
observes in footnote 9, there is Parker v. Brown immunity for such 
arrangements. I would also point out that our reading of the Twenty-
first Amendment is considerably narrower than that offered in 
California v. LaRue in 1972, involving nude dancing in bars; the 
Twenty-first Amendment is not yet the toothless hag that the letter 
(and apparently Justice White) would have it. 
2) I do not believe that the dangers seen in the letter are 
very substantial. The language in dispute was drafted with an eye to 
the standard distinction in antitrust law between "structural" and 
"behavioral" features of a market. Although the fit is not perfect 
between that model and this case, the contrast I hoped to make was 
between market "structure" -- public v. private, saloons v. package 
stores -- and behavioral matters such as price-fixing and, to use 
the letter's example, market-division. The state's freedom to make 
structural decisions is relatively uninhibited, but there is no State 
power to authorize anticompetitive behavior. The market-division 
hypothetical does highlight a stress point in this analysis. Can't 
market division be viewed as a structural matter? My answer is 
3. 
simply, "No." Once the State has resolved to permit the sale of 
liquor by licensed private dealers, it has exhausted its unreviewable 
discretion under the Twenty-first Amendment. Further regulatory 
policies must be reviewed under the balancing approach that we 
outline in Part III of Midcal. The decision to authorize regional 
monopolies would be subject to that scrutiny. 
3) Finally, I believe that the general language and holding 
of the opinion make clear that the letter's reading of the phrase on 
page 1 2 is incorrect. Doubtless lawyers will attempt to twist the 
language out of context, but the same is true of any number of other 
statements in the opinion. 
Should you wish to proceed with some revision, I will draft 
some alternatives. I would emphasize, though, that restricting the 
statement to state-run 1 iquor stores is much more than a cosmetic 
change. 
LAW O F FIC E S OF 
WILLIAM T. CHIDLAW 
A PROFESSIONA L CORPORAT I ON 
March 17, 1980 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
United States Supreme Court 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
POINT WEST EXECUTIVE CENTRE 
1455 RESPO N S E ROAD, S UITE 19 1 
SACRAMENTO , CALIFORNIA 95815 
(9 16) 920-0202 
Re: California Retail Liquor Dealers Association 
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.; No. 79-97 
Dear Justice Powell: 
This letter to you is prompted by and in reply to a 
letter dated March 10, 1980, directed to you on behalf of 
Respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc. by its attorney. Upon 
inquiry to the Office of the Clerk of the Court, I was 
advised that Mr. Rodak had stated that a reply to that 
letter, directed to you, would be appropriate. The Clerk's 
office further referred me to your secretary to whom I 
relayed my intention of replying to the Midcal letter. 
Midcal seeks a substantive change in the language of 
the opinion which would have the effect of adopting the 
position argued by Midcal that the Twenty-first Amendment 
simply authorizes a state to prohibit or restrict the impor-
tation of liquor into its territory. This limited effect of 
the Twenty-first Amendment was effectively rejected in your 
opinion both by language in the text at page 9 of the slip 
opinion and the reference to legislative history, contained 
in footnote 10 also at page 9. The refusal to overrule 
earlier cases of this Court (e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves) 
and the rejection of an interpretation that would virtually 
emasculate the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on the 
power of the states to regulate liquor was made clear in 
that language on page 9 where your opinion analyzed the 
language of Section 2 of the Amendment in the following 
manner: 
" In terms, the Amendment gives the 
States control over the 'transportation or importation' 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAM T. CHIDLAW 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. 
vs. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.; No. 79-97 
March 17, 1980 
Page Two 
of liquor into their territories. Of course, such 
control logically entails considerable regulatory 
power not strictly lim1ted to importing and 
transporting alcohol." (Citing Ziffrin 
case with approval.) (Emphasis added) 
It is the position of the California Retail Liquor 
Dealers Association that although disappointed in the outcome 
of the case insofar as it specifically affects its members, 
nevertheless the opinion is clearly written, is consistent 
within itself, and is not subject to misinterpretation or 
confusion. The mere fact of change in the opinion in the 
manner suggested by Midcal would itself be misconstrued and 
misapplied and undoubtedly the significance of the change 
itself would be greatly exaggerated in any future applications 
of the Midcal decision to state court cases involving state 
liquor statutes or regulations. The purpose of this letter 
is not to presume to tell you, as the author of the Midcal 
opinion what you meant, but to simply support the proposition 
that the meaning is in fact clear, it was carefully thought 
out and it does not require interpretation. 
This Court has furnished guidelines for future application 
of this opinion in the language contained on page 12 of the 
slip opinion, and that complete paragraph, from which the 
sentence quoted in the Midcal letter is taken, is clear in 
its meaning. The complete paragraph reads: 
"These decisions demonstrate that there 
is no bright line between federal and state 
powers over liquor. The Twenty-first Amendment 
grants the States virtually complete control 
over whether to permit importation or sale of 
liquor and how to structure the liquor distri-
bution system. Although States retain substan-
tial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tions, those controls may be subject to the 
federal commerce power in appropriate situations. 
The competing state and federal interests can be 
reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those 
concerns in a 'concrete case.'" (Citing 
Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 u.s., 
at 332.) 
That the opinion as a whole is consistent with the 
LAW OFFICES OF 
WILLIAM T. CHI DLAW 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Re: California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. 
vs. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.; No. 79-97 
March 17, 1980 
Page Three 
above quoted paragraph regarding the states' control over 
"how to structure the liquor distribution system ... " is 
illustrated by the quotation from page 9 cited earlier. The 
opinion correctly recognizes that the states' control over 
the liquor distribution system cannot logically be separated 
from its control over importation and transportation of 
liquor. This is exactly what the opinion plainly recognizes 
in the above quotation from page 12 in connection with the 
reference to "the liquor distribution system." 
Midcal argues that the phrase "the liquor distribution 
system" refers only to those states that themselves "control 
the distribution of liquor within their boundaries" and 
cites the example of the state government retail stores in 
Virginia. It is implicit in Midcal's argument that the 
suggested change will "protect" those states which themselves 
conduct various aspects of the liquor business. The illogic 
of the contention is manifest when the whole opinion is 
considered. The opinion, in the first section on the meaning 
and effect of the "state action" antitrust immunity makes it 
abundantly clear that a state, like Virginia, which itself 
engages in the liquor business, is not affected by the 
decision. The earlier language of the opinion shows that 
the Court was well aware of the situation in states like 
Virginia and therefore the only reasonable conclusion is 
that the language toward which Midcal directs its suggestion 
is not the result of careless draftsmanship, but rather 
clearly defines the boundaries between areas to which the 
Twenty-first Amendment applies with full force and those to 
which the Amendment's role has been reduced consistent with 
the holding of the opinion. 
It is clear from your opinion that the Twenty-first 
Amendment retains vitality, especially in matters involving 
importation and/or restrictions or prohibitions relating to 
the sale, and in matters involving the liquor distribution 
system within a state. It is equally clear that in other 
matters, the Twenty-first Amendment still has viability 
insofar as bestowing upon a state the power to regulate 
liquor but that a state has a lesser degree of power than 
under the importation, transportation, and distribution 
categories. 
If there is any question, in a specific case, about the 
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effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on a state's power to 
regulate liquor it can better be resolved in a future 
"concrete case" than by the use of a hypothetical example of 
an alleged potential situation that has no relevance to the 
opinion in this case and as stated by Midcal at page two of 
its letter "was not an issue before the Court in our case." 
We would respectfully urge that this suggestion by 
Midcal for a substantive change in language be rejected and 
the paragraph referred to, on page 12 of the slip opinion, 
be left in its original form as one which artfully, carefully 
and accurately describes the future effect to be given the 
Twenty-first Amendment. 
WTC:bc 
cc: Jack B. Owens, Esq. 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Coun s el for the respondent in the above case, by 
letter of March 10, requests that we make a change in our 
opinion. Counsel for petitioner, in a letter dated March 17, 
opposes the request. I enclose copies of both .letters. 
Respondent invites our attention to the following 
sentence at page 12 of the slip opinion: 
"The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States 
virtually complete control over whether to permit 
importation or sale of liquor and how · to structure 
the liquor distribution - system;" (Emphasis added.) 
The critical language in the 21st Amendment uses 
the terms "transportation and importation" of liquor. These 
terms reflect an intent that the states control the methods 
of distributing liquor through mechanisms such as laws 
limiting Sunday sales, sales of liquor by the drink, 
licensing of liquor dealers, or the sale of liquor by the 
state (as in Virginia). Such regulations well may be 
insulated from the Sherman Act by Parker v; · Brown immunity, 
but they also fall within the protect1ons of the 21st 
Amendment. There may be a better way to make clear that the 
states have this sort of authority, although none has 
occurred to me. Moreover, I have thought that our opinion in 
this case was perhaps a narrower reading of the 21st 
Amendment than our decision in California -- v. -- LaRue. 
In sum, I am not disposed to recommend that we make 
a change. 
If there are no contrary views, I will ask Mike 
Rodak to advise counsel that the Court is not disposed to 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Coun~el for the respondent in the above case, by 
letter of March 10, requests that we make a chanqe in our 
opinion. Counsel for petitioner, in a letter dated March 17, 
opposes the request. I enclose copies of both letters. 
Respondent invites our attention to the followinq ~, 
sentence at page 12 of the slip opinion: 
'/ 
"The Twenty-first Amendment qrants the States 
virtually complete control over whether to permit 
importation or Rale of liquor and how to structure 
the liquor distribution system." (Emphasis added.) 
The critical lanquaqe in the 21st Amendment uses 
the terms "transportation and importation" of liquor. These 
terms reflect an intent that the states control the methods 
of distributing liquor through mechanisms such as laws 
limitinq Sunday sales, sales of liquor by the drink, 
licensing of liquor dealers, or the sale of liquor by the 
state (as in Virginia). Such regulations well may be , 
insulated from the Sherman Act by Parker v. Brown immunity, ~~J.~. 
but they also fall within the protections of the 21st ,.",,&::' 
Amendment. There may be a better way to make clear that the.~~ 
states have this sort of authority, althouqh none has 
occurred to me. Moreover, I have thouqht that our opinion in 
this case was perhaps a narrower reading of the 21st 
Amendment than our decision in California v. LaRue. 
In sum, I am not disposed to recommend that we make 
a chanqe. 
If there are no contrary views, I will ask Mike 
Rodak to advise counsel that the Court is not disposed to 
make a change in our opinion. 
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Dear Lewis, 
I agree with your recommendation that counsel 
be advised that the Court is not disposed to make a 
change in its opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
March 
79-97 California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal 
Dear Mike: 
I enclose a copy of my memorandum to the Conference 
of March 20, together with the letters from counsel referred 
to therein. 
' ' The request by respondent to make a change in our 
opinion was presented at the Conference today, and you are 
now authorized to advise counsel by letter that the Court 
l•' is not disposed to make the requested change in its opinion. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 19-97 
California Retail Liquor Deal .. ) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
ers Association, Petitioner, Court of Appeal of Califor-
v. nia for the Third Appellate 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al, District. 
[February -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge 
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting stat-
utes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is 
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act 
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 
U, S. 341 (1943), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
I 
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Profes-~ 
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, ,ti rectifiers must~~_...., 
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.1 If 
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con-
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that 
1 The statute provides: 
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and 
rectifier shall: 
"(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers 
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made 
by the person who owns or controls the brand. 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale 
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or 
consumers.' 
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producer's brands. ld., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine 
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price 
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair 
trade~ntract .... " Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979L.--...fTl 
or administration onne wme pricmg progra /[le State (jJ 
is divided into three trading area smg e fair ra e co -
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all whole-
sale transactions in that brand within a given trading area;. 5to.. M~r\s 
wM(e.s~ -ja., §§ 24862, 24864- 24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similarly,=th--e-t~~ -h..~ 
-===----~r-w-:-ii..:..,e..;..;,p_,n.._c-es-posted by a singiCt!" * "bu*"t' within a trading area 
bind all wholes.alers in that area. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. 
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 
( 1979). A licensee selling below the established prices faces 
' fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 24880.2 The State has no direct control 
over wine prices, and it does not review the reasonableness of 
the })rices set by wine dealers. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine 
· in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27 
cases of wine for less than the prices se.t. by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also 
alleged that Midcal s9ld wines for which no fair trade contract 
or schedule had be~n filed. Midcal stipulated that the allega-
tions were true and that the State could fine it or suspend 
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midcal then 
IV\ L-~~~~~~~-~l~·ftdaStat ' W8 ~iigiDg syi!t8nt , ii!h a writ 
of man a e the California Court of Appeal for the Third 
'=' .fVt_ :1Jlpellate Distric . 
o-.s i~ d..V\ rl- e Court o Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme 
1 "'Fdicn\. a.~r)S restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
-lk.. ~{"c:;._.JrQ's w-11-\l § 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rlrse 
~ ~'"\1Cl<Zw\ 2 Licensees that sell wine below the prices specified in fair trade con-
tracts or schedules also may be subject to private damage suits for unfair 
competition. !d., § 24752. 
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v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals~' 21 Cal.~31, ~ 
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court 
s uck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors. t-,~l& 
In t at ca , ~ourt that because e 
State played only a passive part in...-pricing, there was no 
rker v. Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state 
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The 
prices are established by the producers according to their 
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or 
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is re· 
stricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers. 
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the 
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are 
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486. 
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric-
·ing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors 
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that 
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over 
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion 
.of temperance and the preservation of small retail establish-
ments. The court emphasized that the California Jal!li!l!•r---+-_.___ 
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but 
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the 
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed 
at identical prices.8 Referring to congressional and state 
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main-
3 The court cited record evidence tha.t in July 1976, five Jea.ding bra.nds 
of gin each sold in California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and tha.t 
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either $8.39 or $8.40 a. fifth. 
Rice v. Alcoholic B everage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, a.nd 
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978). 
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or 
small retail stores. Sees;( , infra. 
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the 
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984, 
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price 
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade. 
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from. 
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion, an intervenor.5 The California Supreme Court declined 
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari 
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979), 
and now affirm the decision of the state court. 
II 
The threshold question is whether California's I r 1 for 
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled 
OQ.llSistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
----+---rt-:-r...:ia"'re-.""""'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. 220 U. S. 
373, 407 ( 1911), that sucfi arrangements are 
"designed to maintain pnces ... , and to prevent competition 
among those who trade in [competing goods]." See Albrecht 
v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United States v. 
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 ( 1960); United States v. 
~,] Schrader's Son, Inc., 452 U. S. 85 (1920). For many years, 
---....!..~._ .. ._.the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the States 
to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. The 
goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect small 
./' -
4 Tho State aJso did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v. 
"7!looholic Bevemge Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 492 ( 1979), which used the analysis in Rice to invalidate California's 
resale price maintenance scheme for retail wine sales to con umers. 
5 The California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association 
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retail establishments that Congress thought might otherwise 
be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters. 
But in 1975 that congressional permission was rescinded. The 
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, repealed 
the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation.6 Conse-
quently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance 
now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry or pro-
gram enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
'California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale 
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see 
Albrec t v. e er ld Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram&: Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. Parle & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the 
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices 
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out 
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competi-
tion among wholesalers and retailers as effectively as "if they 
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same 
restric ons ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 
oreover, there can be no claim that the California 
program is simply intrastate regulation beyond the reach of 
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 
supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
6 The congressional reports accompanying the Consumer Goods Pricing 
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that Wfepeal of fair trade autnonfy 
would not alter whatever power the States hold under the Twenty-first 
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94--466, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2 
(1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this 
case in Part III, infra. 
7 In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale 
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. , supra, 
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific nding in 
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld 
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance }rovisions were declared 
mvalid in Rice." Midcal Aluminum v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 
153 Cal. Rptr. 757,760 (1979). 
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in 
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust 
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 ( 1943). That 
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our 
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which, 
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as 
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, 
an unexpressed purpose to nulJjfy a state's control over its 
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 
I d., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the 
Sherman Act no purpose to nullify state powers. Because the 
Act is directed against "individual and not state action," the 
Court concluded that state regulatory programs could not 
violate it. Id., at 352. 
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul-
tural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organiza-
tion of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the 
raisin crop. 'The Court emphasized that the Advisory Com-
mission, which was appointed by the governor, had to approve 
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state· 
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate 
program. . . . [J]t is the state, acting through the Commis-
sion, which adopts the program and enforces it .... " ld., at 
352. In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court 
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such over-
sight, the result could have been different. The Court ex-
pressly noted , " state does not give Immunity to those who 
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, 
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ... " I d., at 351. 
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) , the Court 
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar associa-
tion were not mandated by ethical standards established by the 
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were not 
immune from antitrust attack. "It is not enough that . • . 
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as sovereign." !d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor 
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a majority of the 
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In 
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held 
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect[ed] 
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to pro-
fessional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examina-
tion by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in 
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
u. s. 350J 362 (1977) . 
.h-J Only last T~his Court found antitrust immunity for a 








new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehidle Bd. of Calif. 
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program 
provided tha+ '§ utemohila freno&iiite }lUhi!kel a~&irtst R J1ili••tl!lltllll"''l•••lllil••• the State would hold a 
hearing 'jll ... •=-•liii-111••*••~-----••e-
1~-~~~P'-' I d., at 103. In view of the State's active role, the 
Court held, the program was not subject to the Sherman Act. 
The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of 
the state policy was to "displace unfettered business freedom 
in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automo-
i e dealerships." I d., at 109. 
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immu-
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint 
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively super-
vised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.).8 The California system for wine pricing satis-
8 See Norman's On the Waterfront, Inc . v. Wheatley, 44 F . 2d 1011, 1018 
{CA3 1971); Asheville 'l'obacco Bd. v. FTC, 263 F. 2d 502, 509-510 {CA4 
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly 
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte-
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parlcer immunity. The State simply author-
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private 
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the r *1' 'f 
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does tll:iiJII§!!illl==----t---=--
~-t--.u.. regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State 
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed 
reexamination" of the program.0 The national policy in favor 
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy 
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private 
price-fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does 
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action 
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351. 
III 
1959); Note, Padce1· v. Brown Revi~ited: The State Action Doctrine After 
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 {1977). 
9 The California program contrasts with the approach of those States 
that completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries. 
E. g., Va. Code §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rcpl. Vol. 1979). Such comprehensive reg-
ulation would ·be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown, 
317 U.S. 341 (1943), since ll10 State would "displace unfettered business 
Jffcedom" with its own power. New Moto1· Vehicle ·. . 
\ ?~·rin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) ;fee State Board v. Young's 
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of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is 
hereby prohibited." The remaining question before us is 
whether § 2 permits California to countermand the congres-
sional policy-adopted under the commerce power-in favor 
of competition. 
A 
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focuse(o"n the language of the provision 
rather than the history behmd it. State Board v. Young's 
Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936):10 In terms, the 
Amendment gives the States control over the ."transportation 
or importation" of · liquor into their territories. Of course, .--e,_ 
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power$' 
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol. 
10 The approach J, supported by sound canons of constitutional 
interpretation demonstrates a wise reluctance to ~·-·-~....iL.:~:_:::_::~ 
the comp ex currents beneath the congressional resolution 
the Amendment and the state conventions that ratified it. 
sponsor of the resolution said the purpose of § 2 was "to restore to the 
States ... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting 
intoxicating liquors .... " 76 Cong. Reo. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen. 
l3laine). Yet he also made statements supporting Midcal's claim . that 
the Amendment was designed only to ensure that "dry" States could not 
be forced to pennit the sale of liquor. See id., at 4140-4151. The sketchy 
records of the state convention · reflect no consensus on the thrust of 
§ 2, although delegates at ~eveml conventions expressed their hope that 
state regulation of liquor traffic would begin immediately. E. Brown, 
Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution 104 
(1938) (Wilson, President of the Idaho Convention); id., at 191-192 
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chair-
man of Missouri CoRvention); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at 
Washington Convention calling for state action "to regulate the liquor 
traffic"). See generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment 
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage 
·.Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendnient, -7~ Ha'rv. L. Rev. 
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should 
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority. 
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amend-
ment recognized that each State holds great powers over the 
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar-
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types 
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney 
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others 
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States 
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch & 
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing 
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The 
Court upheld the chailenged state authority in each case, 
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet 
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of 
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2 
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power 
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's 
Market, supra, 229 U. S., at 64. 
Subsequent decisions ha.ve given "wide latitude" to state 
liquor regulation, Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 
42 (1966), but they also have stressed that important federal 
·nterests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the 
wenty-first Amendment. 131 *I iFtliitOJfl !lBBi9 POt aU~ 
tates tax imported liquor in violation of the Export-
mport Clause. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 
377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor can nsu ate t e 1quor 
industry from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of 
equal protection, Cra'ig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 
( 1976), and due process, Wisconsin v. C onstantineau, 400 
~· _S. 433, 436 (1970). 
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which 
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce 
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the 
79-97-0PINION 
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some 
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court 
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a 
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alco-
hol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Ziffrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the 
state program was reasonable. !d., at 139. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were 
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 
331-332 (1964). 
"To draw a conclusion ... that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Com-
merce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors 
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplifi-
cation. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
'repealed,' then Congrees would be left with no regulatory 
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and 
is demonstrably incorrect." 
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation: 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of 
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the 
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake 
in any concrete case." I d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
U. S. 190, 206 (1976).11 
11 In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court 
commented in a footnote: 
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first 
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not alto-
gether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when 
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation imposed by Con-
gress . .. . " Id., at 425, n. 15. 
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is ra matic effort to harmonize state and federal powers 
as been evident in · severai•Iiiiii=:-f1~c.is:<h'ls t...) ~e~~E 
..:..-..:...--::::~a~;ji~~~~~~;;i;;;;; liable for anticompetitive 
conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frank-
b<2 c CJ.JAW. ~ 
1/'1. Q i or-e e0 --tk(_ 
sh~ll¥¥.0M Ac.+e 
J o.rt Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a 
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to com-
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a pro-
gram similar in many respects to the California ----"iaitt;---..a..:=.::l.-....:..:_ 
issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute ~ 
W-'~mil1Ji1181111JU11:11H-..r~MI!8-rl could not be enforced against the 
Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sher-
man c challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers 
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest 
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con-
cluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic 
pressure on the f dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order 
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n]othing in the 
Twenty-first Amendment, of course, would prevent the en-
-~-~~~'-~-...lL---~fr;;.o;;rc;:,:;e:;,;m:;;,;e~n;:.:;t~o~f the Sherman Act" against an interstate con-
spiracy to fix rices. Id., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford, 389 
S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line 
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twenty-
first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control 
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how 
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States 
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tionS,ihose contra~ be subject to the federa.I com-
merce power in appropriate situations. The competing state 
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scru-
tiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idle-
wild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332. 
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B 
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor 
of competition is both familiar and substantial. 
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They 
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." 
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4, 
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through 
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress 
"exercis[ ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce 
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Clean-
ers & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see 
. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S., 
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
procompetition policy. 
The state interests protected by California's resale price 
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this 
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in 
Rice v. Alcoholic Be Control Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 
451, 579 P. 2d 
l aE.tf conclusions of those courts are on 
V£0 the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the As i(Q c.~-M.o.>o.aJ 
porr liN rf -n::r 
c~e ~-b-1 '1h-e 
S;a:.!k o-f (~""'' "­
~ s~~ l..us -it...~ 
~ eM.fb la.i'h~ 
ivl~-f i~ f5 
1.-uJ"~ ~(, 1~ 
S1-fT~ . 
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of 
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 ( 1912). Nevertheless, this Court 
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views 
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana 
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we 
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the 
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 344 U. S. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of 
the State's system of wine pricing was "eontrolled by the rea-
soning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [supra].;, 
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we 
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in 
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors. . 
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind 
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and 
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 
490.13 The court found little correlation between resale price 
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing 
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California 
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect. 
!d., at 457-458, 57Q P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of 
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's 
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 ( 1974). Such studies, the 
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the 
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote -----------
temperance." lbid. 14 il\o ~~~ S"""fe 
1s The California Court of Appeal found •• . .-lll••lllf 
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761. 
That court rejected the suggestion that the wine price program was de-
. signed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the statutes 
"do not distinguish between California wines and imported wines." Ibid. 
14 See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 39 ( 1966) (citing study 
concluding that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no 
significant effect upon the consumption of alcoholic beverages"). 
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in 
orderly market conditions as "protect [ing] small licensees 
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456, 
579 P. 2d, at 493.15 In gauging this interest, the ,lourt J' (_ 1 
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim 
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair 
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small 
retailers .... " Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional 
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted 
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that 
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of 
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth 
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade 
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment off~') 
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. ~~ ~ 
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justifica-
tion to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com-
petition among retailers." 21 Cal 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at 
{494. The Court of Appea WI respec 
~he wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983. 
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Cali-
fornia courts that the asserted state interests are less substan-
15 The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market condi-
tions might "reduce excessive competition, thereby encouraging temper-
ance." 21 Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance, 
however, was considered by the court as an independent state interest 
in resale price maintenance for liquor. 
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----------------------------------~IH Attorney Genera has demonstrated that the program inhibits 
the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not 
consider whether the legitimate state interests in temperance 
and the protection of small retailers ever could prevail against 
the undoubted federal interest in a competitive economy. 
The unsubstantiated state concerns put forward in this case 
simply are not of the same statute as the broad goals of the 
rman Act. 
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly 
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter 
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's 
wine pricing program.'6 The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is 
Affirmed. 
16 Since Midca.I requested only injunctive relief from the state court, 
there is no question before us involving liability for damages tmder 15 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge 
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting stat-
utes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is 
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act 
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 
U.S. 341 (1943), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
I 
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, ~rectifiers must 
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.1 If 
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con-
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that 
1 The statute provides: 
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and 
rectifier shall: 
"(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers 
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contmct made 
by the person who owns or controls the brand. 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade con tract and file a schedule of resale 
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or 
consumers." 
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producer's brands. Id., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine 
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price 
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair 
trade contract .... " Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 197.Q2. 
"""r---...go-r'"" dministration of the wine pricing program -the State 
~~~~~~~--~--------~--~~~~~ ~ is div1 e mto t 1ree trac mg areas sing e fair trade con-
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all whole-
sale transactions in that brand within a given trading are3t. 
Id., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similarly, the 
wine prices posted by a single distributor within a trading area 
bind all wholesalers in that area. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. 
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 
( 1979). A licensee selling below the established prices faces 
fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 24880.2 The State has no direct control 
over wine prices, and it does not review the reasonableness of 
the prices set by wine dealers. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine 
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27 
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also 
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract 
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allega-









its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midca.l then ~~" 
sought to enjoin the State's wine pricing system witfl~ -v_;~. 2 
~ of mandate from the California Court of Appeal for the Third ~ 
l -Appellate District. 1 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme ) 
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice 
2 Licensees that sell wine below the prices specified in fair trade con-
tracts or schedules also may be subject to private damage suits for unfair 
competition. !d., § 24752. 
, 
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v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 21 Cal. 3d 431, 
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court 
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors. 
Irt tha:b sa~ ~he ~tt~e ~preme ¢'ourt ~that because the 
State played only a passive part in wine pricing, there was no 
Parker v. Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state 
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The 
prices are established by the producers according to their 
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or 
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is re-
stricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers. 
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the 
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are 
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486. 
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric-
ing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors 
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that 
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over 
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion 
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establish-
ments. The court emphasized that the California program 
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but 
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the 
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed 
at identical prices.3 Referring to congressional and state 
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main-
8 The court cited record evidence that in July 1976, five leading brands 
of gin each sold in California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and that 
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth. 
Rice v. Alcoholic B everage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and 
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978). 
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or 
small retail stores. See p. -, infm. 
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the 
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984, 
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the De'Partment of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price 
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade. 
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from 
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion, an intervenor.5 The California Supreme Court declined 
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari 
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979), 
and now affirm the decision of the state court. 
II ~ 
The threshold question is whether California's ~---. _ f_o_r _ _,.~ 
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled 
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
~---:t-ra-d-;-e .- Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 
373, 407 (1911), p.ginted -eut- t at sue arrangements are 
"designed to maintain prices ... , and to prevent competition 
among those who trade in [competing goods]." See Albrecht 
v. The H er:ald Co., 390 U. S. 145 ( 1968); United States v. 
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United States v. 
Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). For many years, 
though, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the States 
to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. The 
goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect small 
4 The State also did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bel., 87 Cal. App. 3d 995, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 492 (1979), which used the a.nalysi · in Rice to invalidate California's 
resale price maintenance scheme for retail wine sales to consumers. 
5 The California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association 
of independent retail liquor dealers in California, claims over 3,000 
members. 
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retail establishments that Congress thought might otherwise 
be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters. 
But in 1975 that congressional permission was rescinded. The 
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, repealed 
the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation.6 Conse-
quently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance 
now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry or pro-
gram enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale 
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see 
Albrecht v. The Heraald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. Park & Sons Co. , supra. The wine producer holds the 
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices 
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out 
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competi-
tion among wholesalers and retailers as effectively as "if they 
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same 
J.. restrictons ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 
408.7 Moreover, there can be no claim that the California 
program is simply intrastate regulation beyond the reach of 
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 
supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
6 The congre sionul reports accompanying the Consumer Goods Pricing 
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that the repeal of fair trade authority 
would not alter whatever power the States hold under the Twenty-first 
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 
1st Scss., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341 , 94th Cong., 1st Sess ., 3, n. 2 
(1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this 
case in Part III, infra. 
7 In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale 
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. -, supra, 
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in 
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld 
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provisions were declared 
invalid in Rice." Midcal Aluminum Co. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App . 3d 979, 983, 
153 Cal. Rptr. 757,760 (1979) . 
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in 
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust 
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That 
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our 
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which, 
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as 
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, 
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its 
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 
!d., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the 
Sherman Act no purpose to nullify state powers. Because the 
Act is directed against "individual and not state action," the 
Court concluded that state regulatory programs could not 
violate it. I d., at 352. 
Under the program cha1lenged in Par'lcer, the state Agricul-
tural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organiza-
tion of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the 
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Com-
mission, which was appointed by the governor, had to approve 
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state 
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate 
program. . . . [Il t is the state, acting through the Commis-
sion, which adopts the program and enforces it .... " I d., at 
352. In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court 
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such over-
sight, the result could have been different. The Court ex-
pressly noted, "[A] state does not give immunity to those who 
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, 
or by declaring that their action is lawful .... " !d., at 351. 
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975). the Court 
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar associa-
tion were not mandated by ethical standards established by the 
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were not 
immune from antitrust attack. "It is not enough that ... 
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as sovereign." !d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor 
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) , a majority of the 
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In 
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held 
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "refl.ect[ed] 
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to pro-
fessional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examina-
tion by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in 
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U. S. 350, 362 ( 1977). 
Only last Term this Court found antitrust immunity for a 
California program requiring state approval of the location of 
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif. 
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program 
provided that if an automobile franchisee protested against a 
proposed new or relocated dealership, the State would hold a 
hearing "to determine whether there is good cause to block the 
change." I d., at 103. In view of the State's active role, the 
Court held, the program was not subject to the Sherman Act. 
The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of 
the state policy was to "displace unfettered business freedom 
in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automo-
bile dealerships." I d., at 109. 
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immu-
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint 
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively super-
vised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.) .8 The California system for wine pricing satis-
8 See No1·man's On the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 44 F. 2d 1011, 1018 
(CA3 1971); Asheville Tobacco Bd. v. FTC, 263 F. 2d 502, 509-510 (CA4 
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly 
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte~ 
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply author-
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private 
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the 
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does the govern-
ment regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State 
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed 
reexamination" of the program.0 The national policy in favor 
of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy 
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private 
price-fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does 
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action 
is lawful. ... " 317 U.S., at 351. 
III 
Petitioner contends that even if California's system of wine 
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amend-
ment bars application of the Sherman Act ·in this case. Sec-
tion 1 of that constitutional provision repealed the Eighteenth 
Amendment's prohibition on liquor. The second section re-
serves to the States certain power to regulate traffic in liquor: 
"The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, 
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein 
1959) ; Note, Parker v. B1·o1un Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After 
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 (1977). 
0 The California program contrasts with the approach of those States 
that completely control the di~tribution of liquor wit.hin their boundaries. 
E. g., Va. Coda §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Such comprehensive reg-
ulation would be lmmune from the Sherman Act under Parlcm· v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943), since the State would "disJ1l ace unfettered business 
freedom" with it own power. New Motor Vehicle Board of Calif. v. 
Onin W. Fox Co. , 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978); See State Board v. Young's 
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936) , 
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of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, IS 
hereby prohibited." The remaining question before us is 
whether § 2 permits California to countermand the congres-
sional policy-adopted under the commerce power-in favor 
of competition. 
A 
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focused on e 1e provisiOn 
rather than the history behind it. State Board v. Young's 
Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936)?0 In terms, the 
Amendment gives the States control over the "transportation 
or importation" of liquor into their territories. Of course, 
such control logically entails considerable regulatory powers 
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol. 
10 The approach is not only supported by sound canons of constitutional 
interpretation but also demonstrates a wise reluctance to try to interpret 
the complex currents beneath the congressional resolution the proposed 
the Amendment and the state conventions that ratified it:" The Senate 
sponsor of the resolution said the purpose of § 2 was "to restore to the 
States ... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting 
intoxicating liquors .... " 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen. 
Blaine). Yet he also made sttttements support.ing Midcal's claim that 
the Amendment was designed only to ensure that "dry" StaiPS could not 
be forced to permit the sale of liquor. See id., at 4140-4151. The sketchy 
records of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the thrust of 
§ 2, although delegates at several conventions expre~sed their hope that 
state regulation of liquor traffic would bPgin immediately. E. Brown, 
Ratification of the Twcnty-fir;:;t Amendment to the Constitution 104 
(1938) (Wilson, President of the Idaho Convention); id., [Lt HH-192 
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chair-
man of Missouri Convention); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at 
Washington Convention calling for state action "to regulate the liquor 
traffic"). See generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment 
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage 
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 
1145, 1147 (1959) , 
7 
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should 
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority. 
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amend-
ment recognized that each State holds great powers over the 
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar-
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types 
of liquor that could be imported from other Sta.tes, Mahoney 
v. Joseph 'Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others 
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States 
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch & 
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing 
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The 
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case, 
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet 
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of 
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2 
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power 
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's 
Market, supra, 229 U. S., at 64. 
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state 
liquor regulation , Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 
42 ( 1966), but they also have stressed that important federal 
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. That provision does not allow the 
States to tax imported liquor in violation of the Export-
Import Clause. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 
377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor can the States insulate the liquor 
industry from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of 
equal protection, Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 
(1976), and due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U. S. 433, 436 (1970). 
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which 
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce 
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the 
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some 
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
M orgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 ( 1939) (per curiam), this Court 
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a 
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alco-
hol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Ziffrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves,_, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the 
state program was reasonable. !d., at 139. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were 
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 
331-332 (1964). 
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Com-
merce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors 
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplifi-
cation. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory 
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and 
is demonstrably incorrect." 
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation: 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of 
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the 
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake 
in any concrete case." !d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 206 (1976).11 
11 In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court 
commented in a footnote: 
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first 
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not alto-
gether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when 
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation imposed by Con-
gress .... " /d., at 425, n. 15. 
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This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers 
has been evident in the Court's conclusion in several cases that 
the liquor industry may be held liable for anticompetitive 
conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frank-
fort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951), for example, a 
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to com-
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a pro- *'-
gram similar in many respects to the California sefi.em,r=at ~ [~z ·~ _ .. issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute vio-
lated the Sherman Act and could not be enforced against the 
distributor. Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sher-
man Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers 
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest 
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con-
cluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic 
pressurP on the r dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order 
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n]othing in the 
Twenty-first Amendment, of course, would prevent the en-
forcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate con-
spiracy to fix prices. !d., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford, 389 
U. S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line 
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twenty-
first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control 
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how 
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States 
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tions, those controls may also be subject to the federal com-
merce power in appropriate situations. The competing state 
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scru-
tiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idle-
wild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332. 
-
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B 
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor 
of competition is both familiar and substantial. 
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They 
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and ·our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." 
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4, 
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through 
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress 
"exercis [ ed] ail the power it possessed" under the Commerce 
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Aaantic Clean-
ers & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see 
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S., 
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
procompetition policy. 
The state interests protected · by California's resale price 
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this 
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in 
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 
431, 451, 579 P. 2d 476, 490 (1978).12 Of course, the findings 
and conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court 
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the 
· er s m 1 s wme pncmg system IS sha e 
~~.~...~ ~....!:!!£.-,!~~~,Jl.li>......._,._. ~o!.!.f_t!:!;h~is~"" we note , the state 
agency responsible for administering the program did not appeal the 
decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p. -, supra; Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 20. Instead, this action has been maintained by the California 
Liquor Dealers Association, a private intervenor . .]tnt .!)either the inter-
venor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a brieC amicus curiae in 
support of the legislative scheme, has specified any state interests pro-
tected by the resale price mn,intenance system other than those noted in 
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of 
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court 
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views 
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana 
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we 
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the 
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 344 U. S. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of 
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the rea-
soning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [supra]." 
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we 
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in 
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors. 
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind 
·liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and 
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 
490.13 The court found little correlation between resale price 
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing 
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California 
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect. 
Id., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing Ca1ifornia Dept. of 
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's 
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the 
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the 
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote 
temperance.'' Ibid. 14 
18 The California Court of Appeal found only these same interests in 
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760~761. 
That court rejected the suggestion that the wine price program was de-
signed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the statutes 
"do not distinguish between California wines and imported wines." Ibid. 
14 See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 39 (1966) (citing study 
concluding that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no 
significant effect upon the consumption of alcoholic beverages"). 
,..... 
79-97-0PINION 
CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM 15 
The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in 
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees 
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 1)56, 
579 P. 2d, at 493.15 In gauging this interest, the ,.eDurt 
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim 
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair 
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small 
retailers .... " Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional 
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted 
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that 
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of 
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth 
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade 
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair 
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. -, 
supra, the State Supreme Court found 'no persuasive justifica-
tion to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com-
petition among retailers." 21 Cal. 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at 
494. The Court of Appeal made the same finding with respect 
to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983. 
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Car 
fornia courts that the asserted state interests are less 
15 The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market condi-
tions might "reduce excessive competition, thereby encouraging temper-
ance." 21 Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance, 
however, was also considered by the court as an independent state interest 
in resale price maintenance for liquor. 
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Attorney General has demonstrated that the program inhibits 
the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not 
consider whether the legitimate state interests in temperance 
and the protection of small retailers ever could prevail against 
the undoubted federal interest in a competitive economy. 
The unsubstantiated state concerns pttt ferw:trd~ in this case 
simply are not of the same statu,fe as the ~ goals of the 
Sherman Act. ~ 
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly 
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter 
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's 
wine pricing program.10 The judgment of the California 
.Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is 
Affirmed. 
16 Since Midca.l requested only injunctive relief from the state court, 
there is no question before us involving liability for damages under 15 
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MR. Jus'riCE PowJ<~LL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal1 Aluminum, Inc.; 
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge 
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting stat-
utes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is 
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sheni1an Act 
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 
U. S. 341 (1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
I 
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers must 
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.1 If 
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con-
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that 
1 The stnt.ute provides: 
"Each wine grower, wholcsLder licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and 
rectifier shaH: 
"(a) Po~t a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailer~ or con~umers 
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made 
Ly tho person who owns or eontrob tho brand. 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of re,sale 
prices, if he own~ or controls a brand of wine resold t.o retailers or 
consumer:;." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964), 
t3 
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producer's brands. Id., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine 
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price 
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair 
trade contract .... " Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979). 
The State is divided into three trading areas for adminis-
tration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade con-
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all whole-
sale transactions in that brand within a giveu trading area. 
Id., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly, 
state regulations pr<)vide that the wine prices posted by a 
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers 
in that area. M -idcal Aluminum, lnr;. v. Rice, 90 Cal .1\pp. 
3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr, 757, 762 (1979). A licensee 
seling below the established prices fa~es fines, license suspen-
sion, or outright license revocation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
~ 24880.2 The State has no direct control over wine prices, 
and it does not review the reasonableness of the prices set by 
wine dealers .. 
Midcal Aluminum. Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine 
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27 
cases of wine for less thau the prices set by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also 
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract 
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allega-
tions were true and that the State could fine it or suspend 
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midca1 then 
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for 
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction ag~ainst 
the State's wine pricing system. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme 
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
2 Licrn,;ees that Hell wine below the prices specified in fajr tmde con-
tract,.; or schedule~ al,;o may be :;ubjcct to private damage :;uits for tmfair 
competition. I d., § 24752, 
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§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice 
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 CaL 3d 431, 
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court 
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors. 
In that case, the court held that because the State played 
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v. 
Brown immunity for the program .. 
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state 
plays no rol(' whatever in setting the retail prices. The 
prices are established by the producers according to their 
own ecouomic interests. without r('gard to any actual or 
potential an ticompetitive effect; the state's role is re-
stricted to enforci ng the prices specified by the producers. 
There is 1.10 control. or 'pointed re-examination,' by the 
state to insur(' that the policies of the Sherman Act are 
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21 
CaL 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486. 
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric-
ing policies were protected by ~ 2 of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, which insulates stat~ regulation of intoxicating liquors 
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that 
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over 
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion 
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establish-
ments. The court emphasized that the California system 
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but 
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the 
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed 
at identical prices.~ Referring to congressional and state 
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main-
8 The court cited rc<·ord evidence tlm.t in July 1976, five leading bnmds 
of gin each ;;old in California, for $4.~9 for a fifth of a gallon, and that 
five le1Lding bramb of ~cotch whiskey i:iold for either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth . 
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and 
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978). 
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or 
small retail stores.. See pp. 14-15, infra. 
In the insta11t case, the State Court of Appeal found the 
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984, 
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price 
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade. 
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from 
this Court. did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion , an iutervenor.5 The California Supreme Court declined 
to hear the case, aud the Dealers Association sought certiorari 
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979), 
and now affirm the decision of the state court. 
II 
The threshold question is whether California's plan for 
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled 
consisteutly that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 
373, 407 (1911) , the Court observed that such arrangements 
are "designed to maintain prices ... , and to prevent com-
petition among those who trade in [competing goods]." See 
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United 
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United 
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). For many 
years owever, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the 
States to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. 
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect 
1 Tho Stat<> al:;o did uot appeal the deci::;ion in Capiscean Corp. v. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 492 (1979) , which u~cd the analysi::; in Rice to invalidate Califomia's 
resale pric(' maintt•nance :scheme for retail wine ~a.le:s to cou~urner:;. 
5 The California. Hetail Liquor Dealer::; AH::5ociation, a trade associ!Ltion 
of imlrpl'nclent. retail li4uor dcalen:> in California, claim::; over 3,000. 
member;;, 
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small retail establishments that Congress thought might other-
wise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume dis-
counters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was 
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 
801, repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. 0 
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price main-
tenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry 
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale 
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schweg-
mann Bros. Y. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see 
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the 
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices 
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out 
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competi-
tion among wholesalers and retailers as effectively as "if they 
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same 
restrictions ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 
408.7 Moreover, there can be no claim that the California 
program is simply iBtrastate regulation beyond the reach of 
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 
s-upra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
u The cougre<::>ional report::; acc:ompnuying the Consumer Goods Pricing 
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that. repeal of fair trade authority 
would not alter whatever powPr the States hold under the Twenty-first 
Amendment. to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 
lst Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., ht Se~., 3, n. 2 
(1975). We com;ider the effect of the Twenty-first AmPndment on this 
ca;;e in P::trt III, ·infra. 
7 In Bice, the California Supr<'mc Court found direct evidence that resale 
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. a, supra, 
a11d 11. 3. Although the Conr1 of Appea.I marie no such specific finding in 
thi~:> case, the ('OUI't. noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld 
for tite S<Ulle reasons the rrtail price maintenance provisions were declared 
invalid in Bice." Midcal Alurn£nwn, Inc . v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979,, 
98:3, 15:3 Cal. Hptr. 757, 760 (1979). 
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'l'hus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in 
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust 
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That 
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded iu our 
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which, 
uuder the Constitution, the states are sovereign. save only as 
Congress may constitutioually subtract from their authority, 
au unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its 
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 
ld., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the 
Sherman Act HO purpose to nullify state powers. Because the 
Act is directed against "individual and not state action, " the 
Court coucluded that state regulatory programs could not 
violate it. ld. , at 352. 
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul-
tural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organiza-
tion of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the 
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Com-
mission, which was appointed by the governor. had to approve 
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state 
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate 
program. . . . [I] t is the state, acting through the Commis-
siou. which adopts the program and euforces it .... " Id., at 
352. In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court 
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such over-
sight, the result could have been different. The Court ex-
pressly noted , "a state does not give immunity to those who 
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, 
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ... " I d., at 351. 
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In 
Goldfarb v. Viry'inia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). the Court 
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar associa-
tion were not mandated by ethical standards established by the 
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules >thPrefore were uot 
immune from aHtitrust attack.. "It is not enough that .... 
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the 
State actiug as sovereign." I d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor 
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579 (1976), a majority of the 
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In 
contrast, Arizona rules agaiust lawyer advertising were held 
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reftect[ed] 
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to pro-
fessional behavior" and were "subject to poi11ted re-examina-
tion by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in 
enforcement proceedings." Bales v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U. S. 350, 362 (1D77). 
Only last Term, this Court found antitrust immuuity for a 
California program requiring state approval of the location of 
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Tfehicle Bd. of Calif. 
v. Orrin W . Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That )ro ram 
provided that the State would hold a hearing fan automobile 
franchisee protested the establishment or relocation of a com-
peting dealership. I d., at 103. In· view of the State's active 
role, the Court held, the program was not subject to the 
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered 
business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relo-
cation of automobile dealerships." I d., at 109'. 
These decisions establish two staudards for antitrust immu-
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challeuged restraint 
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy''; seco11d, the policy must be "actively super-
vised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 ( 1978) (opinion of 
BmmN AN , J.). H The Califomia system for wine pricing sa tis-
8 Sre Norman's On the Waterf,.ont, Inc . v. Wheatley, 4-l F. 2d 1011, 1018 
(CA3 1971) ; Asheville Tobacco Bd .. v. FTC, 26;3 F. 2d 502, 509-510 (CA4. 
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly 
stated and clear iu its purpose to permit resale price mainte-
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply author-
izes price-setti11g and enforces the prices established by private 
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the 
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate 
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not moni-
tor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamina-
tion" of the program.1J The national policy in favor of 
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy 
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private 
price-fixing arraugemeut. As Parker teaches. "a state does 
not give immuuity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizillg them to violate it, or by declaring that their action 
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351. 
III 
Petitioner contends that even if California's system of wine 
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amend-
ment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Sec-
tion 1 of that Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition on the manufacture, sale or transportation 
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain 
power to regulate traffic in liquor: "The transportation or 
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the 
105\-J): Note, Parker v. Bruu·n ReviHi1(•d: The State Action Doctrine After 
C:uldfarb. Cuntor, and Bates. 77 Cohun. L. Rev. 8V8, 916 (1977) . 
9 The California program ('Olltrast8 with t.he approach of those States 
that complete!)' control tlw Ji::;tributiou of liquor within the1r boundaries. 
E. Q., Va . Code§§ 4--15, 4--28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Sueh eornprehensive reg-
ulatiotl would be immune from the 81wrman Aet. under Parker v. Brown,. 
317 U. S. M1 (10·!:~), ~inre tiH' Sta.t<' would ' ·di~place unfe1tered but-~iness 
fn:Pdom" with itt-~ own power. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox 
Co., 439 U. 8. 9fi, 109 (1978); Bee State Board v. Yo·ung's Market Co .). 
'299 u. s. 5\J , 63 (l\-J3ti) . 
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 
The remaining question before us is whether § 2 permits 
California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted 
under the commerce power-m favor of competition. 
A 
Iu determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the 
provision rather than the history behind it. State Board v. 
Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936).' 0 In terms, 
the Amendment gives the States control over the "transporta-
tion or importaqon' ' of liquor into their territories. Of course, 
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power 
not strictly limited to importipg and transporting alcohol. 
10 The approach j>; ~upportrd b~, ~onnd ranons of com>titutional inter-
pretation and drmollstrntr~ a wist~ reluctance to wade into the complex 
currents beneath thp c·oHgr!'~:<ional l'f'i'iolntion that propo~ed tht> Amend-
llH'nt. and the ,;tate rollvl'ntions that ra.tifiPd it. Tht> Senate sponsor 
of the resolution ><a.id tlw pmpo,.;e of §:! wac; "to rt>,.,tore to thf' Statt•s .. . 
ab,.;ulutc' elllltrol in rlfr<'t uvC'r iptt>r;;t:1.tl' commrreP affeeting intoxi-
t·nting liquor~ , ... " 76 Coug. Hec . 414:3 (HJ:l:l) (remarks of Sen. 
Bhtine). Yet, be al,;o made ;;ta.temrnt,; ,;upporting ::\I ideal ':; claim that 
the Amendrrwnt wa~ cl<•,;igned only to l'llHilrr t.hat "dr~·" State:; could not 
be forced to pl'rmit tlw tialr of liqu~Jj' . SPe id., at. 4140-4151. Tlw sketchy 
reeord;:; of the ::;tate convention::: rctl<'et no ron:;Pil<'ll<' on the thrust of 
§ 2, although delegatrs Ht ,;cwral ronn·nt.im1,- expre~sed their hope that 
state reguhtion of liquor t mliit• woukl bPgin immediately . E. Brown, 
Hatification of the TwPJtty-Jirt>l Amemlment to the Constitution 104 
(1938) (Wilson, l're~icleut of tlw Idaho Convention); id., a.t 191-192 
(Darnall , Preside11L of Maryland ('{)nvrntion) ; id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chair-
man of Mi:;~ouri C011 \TnLion); id.. fLt; ..J.p9-..J.73 ( re,;olution au opted u,t 
Wa:;hington Convention eallin~ for state a.rtion "to J'egulatc the liquor 
traffic"). See generally X ott', The Effcet. of the Twenty-firti1· Amendment 
on State Authority lo Co.utrol lntoxi<·ating Liquor,, 75 Cultnn. L. Rev. 
1578, 1580 (1975) ; ~ote, E<"onomic; Locali::;m in State Aleoholie Beverage 
Laws-Expl'ri<•nco Under the TweHty-firsL Amendment, 7'2 Harv. L . Rev. 
1145, 1147 (1959) . 
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should 
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority. 
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amend-
ment recognized that each State holds great powers over the 
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar-
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types 
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney 
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others 
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States 
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch & 
Co. v. NlcKittrick, 305 G. S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing 
Co. v. Liquo1· Control Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). · The 
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case, 
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importatiou and transportatiou" of intoxicating liquors. Yet 
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of 
the Amendment, the Court :resisted the contention that § 2 
''freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power 
to be found ill other provisions of the Constitution." Young's 
Market, supra, 229 U. S., at 64. 
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude'' to state 
liquor regulation, Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 
42 (1966), but they also have stressed that important federal 
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported 
liquor in violation of the Export-Import Clause. Department 
of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor 
can they insulate the liquor industry from the Fourteenth 
Amendment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976), and due process, Wis-
. consin v. Constant'ineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970). 
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which 
Congress eau regulate liquor under its interstate commerce 
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the 
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some 
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court 
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a 
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alco-
hol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Ziffrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
systNn of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the 
staiR program was reasonable. ld., at 139. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were 
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 
331-332 (1964). 
"To draw a conclusio11 . . . that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Com-
mercE:' Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors 
is concc'nwd would, however, be an absurd oversimplifi-
cation. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
'repealed.' then Congress would be left with no regulatory 
power over i11terstate or foreigu commerce in iutoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be pateutly bizarre and 
is demonstrably incorrect." 
The Court added a significant, it' eleme11tary, observation: 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment am! the Commerce Clause 
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of 
the Coustitution, each must be considered in the light of the 
other. and iu the context of the issues and interests at stake 
in ally concrete case." !d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
U. S. 190, 206 (1976).n 
u b1 Nippert 1 . C'ity of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court 
comnwntE·tl in a foot uute: 
" I l•:jwn lhr eomtn(•rce in intoxieatiug liqnors, over which the Twenty-fir:st 
AuH'n<hnmt gives the 8tatr~ till• highrst dPgrre of control, is not alto-
grt.h<'r f>pyond the reach of thr federal commerce power, at any rate when 
the State'" regulation ~qunrdy <'onftict<> with regulntion imposrd b:r Con-
gr<•::.:< •••• " I d. , at. 425, n. 1!). 
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'l'his pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers 
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held 
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not man-
dated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & 
Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort 
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a 
liquor mauufacturer attempted to force a distributor to com.-
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a pro-
gram similar in many respects to the Califomia s st 
issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute could 
not be enforced ag·ainst the distributo(#e ., d8l 1 J:he J.---:--:----=----
~hq ' j Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sher- vio (().+~ -fLt 
man Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers S ~ Ac:.tJ ;T 
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest 
price'' charged anywhere iu the United States. Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con-
cluded that the statute exerted ''no irresistible economic 
pressure on the [dealers] to violate the Sherman Act iu order 
to comply,' ' but it also cautioned that " [ n] othing in the 
Tweuty-first Amendment, of course, would prevent the en-
forcement of the Sherman Act" agaiust an interstate con-
spiracy to fix liquor prices. !d., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford, 
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
These decisions demonstrate that there is 110 bright line 
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twenty-
first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control 
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor a11d how 
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States 
retai11 substantial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tions, those controls may be subject to the federal com-
mercr power in appropriate situations. The competing state 
and federal iuterests can be reconciled only after careful scru-
tiny of those coucNns in a "concrete case.'' Hostetter v. Idle~ 
wild Liq'uor Corp ., 377 U, S., at 332, 
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B 
rrhe federal interest in enforcing the national policy iu favor 
of competition is both familiar and substantial. 
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They 
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." 
United States v. 'Popco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
See Northern Pacific Ry. \. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4, 
( 1 958). Although this federal interest is expressed through 
a statute rather than a constitutional provisiou, Congress 
"exercis[edJ all the power it possessed" under the Commerce 
Clause when it approved the Shermall Act. Atlantic Clean-
ers & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see 
City vf Lafayette v. Lo·uisia·na Power & Light Co., 435 U. S., 
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
]Jrocompetition policy. 
The state interests protected by California's resale price 
maintenauce system were identified by the state courts in this 
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in 
Hice v. Alcoholic B13verage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d, 
at 451, 579 P. 2d. at 490. 12 Of course, the findings and 
couclusions of those courts arf' uot binding on this Court 
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the 
12 As the unusual po::;ture of thi~ rase reflects, the Sta.te of California 
has shown less than an enthusiastic interest in its wine pricing system. 
A~ we noted, the ,;tate agency re;;ponsible for administering the program 
did not, appeal thP deri~ion of the California. Court of Appeal. See p . 4, 
li~tpr-a ; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. lnstrad, thi~ action has l>t>en maintained by 
lhe Culifornia Liquor DPaler;, A,;:;ociation, a prviate intervenor. But 
1wither the intervruor nor rhr Sta.tr Attornry General, who filed a brief 
amicus curiae in support of the legil:\lative srhl•mr, has speCified any state 
iutercst:s protl:'rted by the re;;a]e price maintenance Hystrm other than 
those noted in th<' :,;(atr court opinio rlt~->d .in text, 
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of 
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court 
accords rcrespectful consideration and great weight to the views 
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana 
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we 
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the 
absence of ((exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 344 U. S. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of 
the State's system of wine pricing was "·controlled by the rea-
soning of the [California.] Supreme Court in Rice [supm] ." 
90 Cal. App. 3c.l, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr. , at 761. Therefore, we 
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in 
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors. 
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind 
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and 
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 
490.13 The court found little correlation between resale price 
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing 
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California 
from 1950 to 1972. while resale price maintenance was in effect. 
!d., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of 
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's 
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the 
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the 
justification for such laws ou the ground that they promote 
temperance." Ibid.u 
13 The California Court, of Appeal found no additional state intere&1s in 
the int;tant ea::>e. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761. 
That court rejceterl the sugge&iion that. the wine price program was de-
signed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the &iatutes 
"do not distinguish between California. wines and imported wines." Ibid. 
11 See Seagram<~· Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. a5, 39 (1966) (citing ::>i.udy 
coneludiug that n'salc price mniutrnance in New York State had "nq 
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in 
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees 
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456, 
579 P. 2d, at 493.' 5 In gauging this interest, the court 
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim 
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair 
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small 
retailers .... " Ibid. The agency relled on a congressional 
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted 
under the Miller-Tydiugs Act. The study revealed that 
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of 
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth 
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade 
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Coug., 1st Sess., 
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair 
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goocls Pricing Act, see p. 5, 
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justifica-
tion to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com-
petition among retailers." 21 Cal 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at 
494. The Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with 
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983. 
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Cali-
for·Hia courts that the asserted state interests are less substan-
tial than the national policy in favor of competition. That 
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is 
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State 
Supreme Court iu Rice. Nothing in the record in this case 
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small 
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State 
15 The California Supreme Court nl~o stated that orderly market condi-
1 ion~ might. ''redncp PX<'<'..;~iw competition, tlwrpby eueouraging temper-
nurP." 21 Cal. :3d, at. 45(), 579 P. 2d. at 493. The concern for t.empcraucc, 
how<'vcr, wa,.; con:;idl'red by the comt as an independent :>tate interes1, 
it1 resalr priee maintenance for littuor. 
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Attorney General in his amicus brief has demonstrated that 
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Cali-
fornians. We need not consider whether the legitimate state 
interests in temperance and the protection of small retailers 
ever could prevail against the undoubted federal interest in a 
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concerns 
put forward in this case simply are not of the same statute as 
the broad goals of the Sherman Act. 
Vir e conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly 
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter 
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's 
wine pricing program.10 The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is 
Affirmed, 
16 Since Midca.l requested only injunctive rPlief from Lhe state court, 
~here is no que;;tion before us involving liability for damages under 19 
u, s. c. § 15. 
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.{California's resale price maintenance and price 
posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade. The 
issue in this case is whether those state laws are 
shielded from the Sherman Act by either the "state 
action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 
(1942), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
I 
Under § 24866(b) of the California 
Business and Professions Code, all wine producers, 
2. 
schedule for that producer's brands. Id. , § 
24866(a). No state-licensed wine merchant may sell 
wine to a retailer at other than the price set 
"either in an effective price schedule or in an 
effective fair trade contract. II Id. , § 
24866(a). 
For administration of the wine price 
program, the State is divided into three trading 
areas. A single fair trade contract or schedule 
filed within a trading area sets the terms for all 
wholesale transactions in that trading area 
involving that brand of wine. Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code Ann. §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). 
All wholesalers within a trading area are bound by 
~·1 ~ ~~ r~ "J".e'-t .fi.~"tJtA,o 
theAprices posted , by [ a singl~ distributor. Midcal 
® jl'\ tlo.. W'f. I< ~I 
Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-
984 (1979). A licensee not meeting these 
requirements may face fines, license suspension, or 




! was charged by the Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control with selling 27 cases of wine at 
less than the prices set by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. A second count 
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair 
trade contract or schedule had been filed with the 
State. Respondent stipulated that the allegations 
were true and that the State could fine it or 
suspend its license for those transgressions. Jt. 
App • , at 1 9-2 0 • Midcal then sought to enjoin the 
~ 
State's wine pricing system with a writ of mandate 
from the California Court of Appeal for the Third 
Appellate District. 
The state court ruled that the wine 
pricing scheme restrains trade in violation of the 
Sherman Act. 1 5 U.S. C. § § 1 , et seq. The court 
relied entirely on the reasoning of the California 
Supreme Court in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control 







Parker v. Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the price maintenance program 
before us, the state plays no role 
whatever in setting the retail prices. 
The prices are established by the 
producers according to their own economic 
interests, without regard to any actual or 
potential anticompetitive effect; the 
state's role is restricted to enforcing 
the prices specified by the producers. 
There is no control, or 'pointed re-
examination,' by the state to insure that 
the policies of the Sherman Act are not 
'unnecessarily subordinated' to state 
T?Olicy." 21 Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P.2d, at 
486. 
Rice also rejected the claim that 
California's liquor price policies were protected 
by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which 
5. 
in 1 iquor price maintenance the promotion of 
temperance and the preservation of small retail 
establishments. The state supreme court emphasized 
that the California program not only permitted 
vertical control of prices by producers, but also 
frequently resulted in horizontal price-fixing. 
Under the program, many comparable brands of liquor 
were marketed at identical prices. }/ Referring 
to congressional and state legislative studies, the 
court observed that resale price maintenance has 
little positive impact on either temperance or 
small retail stores. See p. , infra. 
In the instant case, the state Court of 
Appeal found the analysis in Rice squarely 
controlling and ruled that the system of wine 
pricing unlawfully restrains trade. 90 Cal. App., 
at 984. The court ordered the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the 
resale price maintenance and price posting 
6. 
Association ( CRLDA), an intervenor. The 
California Supreme Court declined to hear the case, 
and the CRLDA sought certiorari from this Court. 
We granted the writ, u.s. ( 1979) , and 
now affirm the decision of the state court. 
II 
The threshold question is whether 
California's policy for wine pricing violates the 
Sherman Act. This Court has ruled consistently 
that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
trade. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 
2 2 0 U • S • 3 7 3 , 4 0 7 ( 1 9 1 1 ) , pointed out that such 
arrangements are "designed to maintain prices • 
. , and to prevent competition among those who trade 
in them." See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 
13 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 
u.s. 29 (1960); United States v. Schrader's Son, 
Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). For many years, though, 
7. 
~A;/ 
Congress ~t might otherwise be driven from the 
marketplace by large-volume discounters. But in 
1975 that congressional permission was rescinded. 
The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 
801 , repealed Miller-Tydings and related 
legislation. __§) Consequently, the Sherman Act's 
ban on resale price maintenance now applies to fair 
trade contracts unless an industry or program 
enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing 
plainly constitutes resale price maintenance in 
violation of the Sherman Act. Schwegmann Bros. v. 
Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The wine 
producer holds the power to dictate prices charged 
by wholesalers and thereby to prevent price 
competition. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out in 
Dr. Miles ~;>.11_,· such vertical control 
destroys horizontal competition among wholesalers 
and retailers as effectively as "if they formed a 
<::. 
nu_ ~ c.. ,?~ o v./. 
1'1\(t<t,•)~ 
~v. S~) 
5 vo w;, -z..tt ( t1sJ. 
' e.s ~ G,J o/, 
8. 
the Sherman Act as regulation with no interstate 
impact. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Cal vert Corp., 
supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per 
curiam). 
Thus, we must consider whether the State's 
involvement in the price-setting program is 
sufficient under Parker v. Brown to establish 
antitrust immunity. That immunity for state 
regulatory programs is grounded in our federal 
structure. 11 In a dual system of government in 
which, under the Constitution, the states are 
sovereign, save only as Congress may 
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an 
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be 
attributed to Congress. 11 Parker v. Brown, supra, 
317 u.s., at 350-351. In Parker, this Court found 
in the Sherman Act no purpose to nullify state 
powers. Because the Act is directed against 
9. 
state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission 
authorized the organization of local cooperatives 
to develop marketing 
raisin crop. The Court the 
Advisory Commission, which was appointed by the 
governor, had to approve cooperative policies 
following public hearings: "It is the state which 
has created the machinery for establishing the 
prorate program • [I]t is the state, acting 
through the Commission, which adopts the program 
and enforces it. II Id., at 352. In view of 
this extensive official oversight, the Court wrote, 
the antitrust laws did not apply. Without such 
oversight, the result could have been different. 
The Court expressly noted, "[A] state does not give 
immunity to those who viol ate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring 
that their action is lawful." Id., at 351. 
Several recent decisions have applied 
established by 
s~~ 
the ' s tate C~l?-b-5. 11 It is 
'\ 
1 0 0 
not enough 
that ••• anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by 
state action; rather, anticompetitive conduct must 
be compelled by direction of the State acting as 
sovereign... Id., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor v. 
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a majority 
of the Court found that no antitrust immunity was 
conferred by a state agency's passive acceptance of 
a public utility's tariff. In contrast, the 
Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held 
to be immune from Sherman Act challenge because 
they 11 reflect[ed] a clear articulation of the 
State's policy with regard to professional 
behavior .. and were 11 Subject to pointed re-
examination by the policymaker the Arizona 
Supreme Court in enforcement proceedings ... 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
Only last Term this Court found antitrust immunity 
for a California program requiring state approval 
11. 
and affirmatively expressed" goal was to "displace 
unfettered business freedom in the matter of the 
establishment and relocation of automobile 
dealerships." Id., at 109. 
These decisions establish two standards 
for •antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. 
First, the challenged restraint must be "one 
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as 
state policy": second, the policy must be "actively 
supervised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette 
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 
(1978). ~/ The California system for wine pricing 
satisfies the first standard. The legislative 
policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its 
purpose to permit resale price maintenance. The 
program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply 
authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices 
established by private parties. The governmental 
1 3. 
is hereby prohibited." u.s. Const. , 
Amend. XXI. 
The remaining question before us is whether § 2 
permits California to countermand the congressional 
pol icy -- adopted under the commerce power -- in 
favor of competition. 
A. 
In determining State powers under the 
Twenty-first Amendment, this Court has focused on 
the language of the provision rather than the 
history behind it. State Board v. Young's 
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1936). ~ --KL In 
terms, the amendment gives the States control over 
the "transportation or importation" of liquor into 
the States. Of course, such control logically 
entails considerable regulatory powers not strictly 
limited to importing and transporting alcohol. 
Z if r in v . Reeves , 3 0 8 U . S . 1 3 2 , 1 3 8 ( 1 9 3 9 ) • We ---
should not, however, lose sight of the explicit 
1 4. 
a State from other jurisdictions. Young's Market, 
supra, concerned a license fee for interstate 
imports of alcohol; another case focused on a law 
restricting the types of liquor that could be 
imported from other States, Mahoney v. Joseph 
Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 ( 1938); two others 
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports 
from States that proscribed shipments of liquor 
from other States, Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. 
Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939); Joseph 
F. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939). 
The Court upheld the challenged state authority in 
all four cases, largely on the basis of the 
amendment's grant of state power over the 
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating 
liquors. Yet even in those special circumstances, 
the Court resisted the contention that § 2 "freed 
the States from all restrictions upon the pol ice 
power to be found in other provisions of the 
1 5. 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45 (1966), but also 
have stressed that important federal interests in 
liquor matters survived the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. That provision does not 
prevent federal action with respect to liquor under 
the Export-Import Clause. Department of Revenue v. 
James Beam Co., 377 u.s. 341 (1964). Nor can the 
state insulate the liquor industry from the 
Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of equal 
protection, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), or 
due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 
433 (1970). 
More difficult to define, however, is 
congressional control over liquor under its 
interstate commerce power. Although that power is 
directly qualified by § 2, the Court has held that 
the federal government retains some Commerce Clause 
authority over liquor. In William Jameson & Co. 
v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (E_er curiam), 
1 6. 
Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was 
satisfied that the State program was reasonable. 
Id. , at 1 39. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power 
over liquor were sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild 
Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-332 
(1964). 
"To draw a conclusion • • that 
the Twenty-first Amendment somehow 
operated to 'repeal' the commerce clause 
wherever regulation of intoxicating 
liquors is concerned would, however, be an 
absurd oversimplification. If the 
commerce clause had been pro tanto 
'repealed,' then Congress would be left 
with no regulatory power over interstate 
or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be 
1 7. 
the commerce clause are parts of the 
Constitution. Like other provisions of 
Constitution, each must be considered in the 
of the other, and in the context of the issues and 
interests at stake in any concrete case." Id. , at 
332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 u.s. 190 (1976). ~ 
vz.D..tr ~ tk ~ ~ 
This pragmatic effGr~ to harmonize state 
. 1'\ 
and federal powers has been evident in the Court's 
treatment of Sherman Act suits implicating 
regulation of intoxicating 
States v. 




s _llte law, 




comply with Louisiana's resal e---- price main enance 
) 
1 8. 
violated the Sherman Act and could not be enforced 
against the distributor. Fifteen years later, the 
'2: 1f/ 
Court rejected a Sherman Act challenge/'\a New York 
State requirement that 1 iquor dealers attest that 
their prices were "no higher than the lowest price" 
charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (1966). Although 
the Court concluded that the statute exerted "no 
irresistable economic pressure on the appellants to 
violate the Sherman Act in order to comply," it 
also pointed out that "[n]othing in the Twenty-
first Amendment, of course, would prevent the 
enforcement of the Sherman Act" against an 
interstate conspiracy to fix prices. Id., at 45. 
See Burke v. Ford, 389 u.s. 320 (1967) (per 
curiam). 
These decisions demonstrate that there is 
no bright 1 ine between federal and state powers 
over liquor. The Twenty-first Amendment grants the 
1 9. 
liquor regulations, but those controls may also be 
subject to federal commerce power regulation in 
appropriate situations. In these other areas, the 
state and federal interests can be reconciled only 
after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a 
"concrete case." Idlewild, supra, at 332. 
B 
The federal interest in enforcing the 
national policy in favor of competition is both 
familiar and substantial. 
"Anti trust laws in general, and 
the Sherman Act in particular, are the 
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are 
as important to the preservation of 
economic freedom and our free-enterprise 
system as the Bill of Rights is to the 
protection of our fundamental personal 
freedoms." 
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 
20. 
"exercis[ed] all the power it possessed" under the 
commerce clause when it approved the Sherman Act. 
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 
U.S. 425, 435 ( 1932): see City of Lafayette v. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co., supra, 495 U.S., at 
39 8. We must acknowledge the importance of the 
Act's procompetition policy. 
Our view of California's interests in its 
wine pricing system is shaped in part by the 
unusual posture of this case. As we noted, the 
state agency that administers the program did not 
appeal the decision of the California Court of 
Appeal. See p. supra: Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. 
Instead, this action has been maintained by the 
CRLDA, a private intervenor. 
t X. 
(._~ ~~..:f 
State Attorney General, who filed a .....,b_r_l_e~-
V\ot k&.."' ">f ,. (~tV I..J.<). l.u' ..._-'- ~'7 v .. :.J-/,pA.. C g L I> A ~ 
amicus curicl~;:• ±H?Pert ef f19s , eg i slath e ssh11 
---
::lUiS: . 2 ; ?7 d t he' 
1 
particular state interests 
\ O,.lfc-'tw~--
protected by ~sale price maintenance syst~ 
21. 
Court to the extent they undercut state rights 
guaranteed by the Twenty-first Amendment. See 
Hooven & All~ Co. v. Evatt, 3 24 u.s. 652, 659 
(1945); Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 
246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court accords 
"respectful consideration and great weight to the 
views of the state's highest court" on matters of 
state law, Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 
U.S. 95, 99 (1938), and we customarily accept the 
factual findings of state courts in the absence of 
"exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood , 3 4 4 U . S . 1 57 , 1 6 1 ( 1 9 52 ) • 
The California Court of Appeal stated that 
its review of the state's system of wine pricing 
was "controlled by the reasoning of the 
[California] Supreme Court in Rice [v. Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Board, 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d, 
476 (1978)]." 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983. Therefore, 
we turn to that opinion's treatment of the state 
22. 
promote temperance and orderly market conditions." 
Id., at 451: 579 P.2d, at 493. ~ The court found 
little correlation between resale price maintenance 
and temperance. It cited a state study showing a 
42 % increase in per capita liquor consumption in 
California from 1950 to 1972, while resale price 
maintenance was in effect. Id. at 457-458, 579 
P.2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of Finance, 
Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of 
California's Alcohol Control Program xi, 15 (1974). 
Such studies, the court wrote, "at the very least 
raise a doubt regarding the justification for such 
laws on the ground that they promote temperance." 
Ibid. 
The Rice opinion identified the state 
interest in orderly market conditions as 
"protect[ing] small licensees from predatory 
pricing policies of large retailers" and, again, 
temperance. Id. at 456, 579 P.2d, at 493. The 
23. 
argument that fair trade laws were necessary to the 
economic survival of small retailers." Ibid. The 
Appeals Board had relied on a congressional study 
of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws 
enacted under the Miller-Tydings Act. That report 
found that "states with fair trade laws had a 55 
per cent higher rate of firm failures than free 
trade states, and the rate of growth of small 
retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
197 2 was 3 2 per cent higher than in states with 
fair trade laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-
466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975). Pointing to 
the congressional abandonment of fair trade in the 
1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, the state Supreme 
Court found no persuasive justification to continue 
"fair trade laws which eliminate price competition 
among retailers." Id., at 457, 579 P.2d, at 494. 
That conclusion was adopted by the Court of Appeal 
for the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d., at 
24. 
in favor of competition. That evaluation of the 
State's stake in resale price maintenance for wine 
, ~bo..r~~ ~ it... ....... t~ ~ ~ ~ $t~ )~ 
is rea son abl'jl' ~ tl=!: i ers ~.eB11:7W.~...,..!!"'~~~-.!iM!l-.:~d!::bee-A--
~f ~ ~~) 
'JC'.eiu.telil :a.~~::-t:h'1T -cou-rt. We conclude that the 
California Court of Appeal decided that 
the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter for 
the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the 
State's wine pricing program. ~ 
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lL The statute provides: 
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to 
sell wine, wine rectifier and rectifier 
shall: 
" (a) Post a schedule of selling 
prices of wine to retailers or consumers 
for which his resale price is not governed 
by a fair trade contract made by the 
person who owns or controls the brand. 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade 
contract and file a schedule of resale 
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of 
wine resold to retailers or consumers." 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. § 24 86 6 (West Supp. 
1979). 
I FN2. 
3/ The court cited record evidence that in July 
1976 five leading brands of gin all sold in 
California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and 
that five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for 
either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth. Rice v. Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Appeals Board, 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454 
& nn. 14, 15, 579 P.2d 476, 492 & nn. 14, 15 
(1978). 
4/ The State also did not appeal the decision in 
Capiscean Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Bd., 
87 Cal. App. 3d 996 (1979), which used the analysis 
in Rice to invalidate California's resale price 
maintenance scheme for retail wine sales to 
consumers. 
The California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Association (CRLDA), a trade association of 
independent retail liquor dealers in California, 
FN3. 
repeal of general fair trade authority would not 
alter whatever power the States hold under the 
Twenty-first Amendment to control liquor prices. 
S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975)~ 
H. Rep. No. 94-431, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, n.2 
(1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first 
Amendment on this case in Part III, infra. 
7 I In Rice, the California Supreme Court found 
direct evidence that resale price maintenance 
resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. 
supra, & n.3. Although the Court of Appeal made no 
such specific finding in this case, the court noted 
that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld for 
the same reasons the retail price maintenance 
provisions were declared invalid in Rice." Midcal 
Aluminum Co. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983 
(1979). 
1 2. 
program. The national policy in favor of 
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a 
gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is 
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement. As 
Parker teaches, "a state does not give immunity to 
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing 
them to violate it, or by declaring that their 
action is lawful." 317 U.S., at 351. 
III 
Petitioner contends that even if 
California's system of wine pricing is not 
protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment 
bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. 
Section 1 of that constitutional provision repealed 
the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition on liquor. 
The second section reserves to the States certain 
power to regulate traffic in liquor. 
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DOS, 2/12/80 
No. 79-97, California Retail Liquor 
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion 
of the Court(;) 
In a state court action, respondent Midcal 
Aluminum, Inc., a wine distributor, presented a 
successful antitrust challenge to California's 
resale price maintenance and price posting statutes 
for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this 
case is whether those state laws are shielded from 
the Sherman Act by either the "state action" 
doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), 
or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
I 
Under § 24866(b) of the California 
2. 
trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale 
price schedule for that p roducer's brands. Id., § 
24866(a). No state-licensed wine merchant may sell 
wine to a retailer at other than the price set 
11 either in an effective price schedule or in an 
effective fair trade contract .•. II Id., § 24862 
(West Supp. 1979). 
For administration of the wine pricing 
program, the State is divided into three trading 
areas. A single fair trade contract or schedule 
for each brand sets the terms for all wholesale 
transactions in that brand within a given trading 
area. Id., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). 
Similarly, the wine prices posted by a single 
distributor within a trading area bind all 
wholesalers in that area. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. 
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 
757, 762 (1979). A licensee selling below the 
established prices faces fines, license suspension, 
3. 
dealers. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale 
distributor of wine in Southern California. In 
July 1978, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control charged Mid cal with selling 27 cases of 
wine for less than the prices set by the effective 
price schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The 
Department also alleged that Midcal sold wines for 
which no fair trade contract or schedule had been 
filed. Midcal stipulated that the allegations were 
true and that the State could fine it or suspend 
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. 
Midcal then sought to enjoin the State's wine 
pricing system with a writ of mandate from the 
California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate 
District. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine 
pricing scheme restrains trade in violation of the 
Sherman Act, 15 u.s.c. § 1 et seq. The court 
4. 
the sale of distilled liquors. In that case, the 
state Supreme Court found that because the State 
~ 
played only a passive part in wine pricing, there 
was no Parker v. Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the price maintenance program 
before us, the state plays no role 
whatever in setting the retail prices. 
The prices are established by the 
producers according to their own economic 
interests, without regard to any actual or 
cJ71::tential anticompetitive effect: the 
state's role is restricted to enforcing 
the prices specified by the producers. 
There is no control, or 'pointed re-
examination,' by the state to insure that 
the policies of the Sherman Act are not 
'unnecessarily subordinated' to state 
policy." 21 Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P.2d, at 
486. 
5. 
from many federal restrictions. The court 
determined that the national policy in favor of 
competition should prevail over the state interests 
in 1 iquor price maintenance the promotion of 
temperance and the preservation of small retail 
establishments. The court emphasized that the 
California program not only permitted vertical 
control of prices by producers, but also frequently 
!"' 
resulted in horizontal pricefJixing. Under the 
program, many comparable brands of liquor were 
marketed at identical prices. 2/ Referring to 
congressional and state legislative studies, the 
court observed that resale price maintenance has 
little positive impact on either temperance or 
small retail stores. See p. , infra. 
In the instant case, the state Court of 
Appeal found the analysis in Rice squarely 
controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr, 
at 760. The court ordered the Department of 
6. 
appeal the ruling in this case. _!L. An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Association, an intervenor. _2/ The California 
Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and the 
Dealers Association sought certiorari from this 
Court. We granted the writ, u.s. 
( 1979), and now affirm the decision of the state 
court. 
II 
The threshold question is whether 
California's policy for wine pricing violates the 
Sherman Act. This Court has ruled consistently 
that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
trade. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 
2 2 0 U • S • 3 7 3 , 4 0 7 ( 1 9 1 1 ) , pointed out that such 
arrangements are "designed to maintain prices . 
• , and to prevent competition among those who trade 
in [competing goods]." See Albrecht v. The Herald 
7. 
permitted the States to authorize resale price 
maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. The goal of that 
statute was to allow the States to protect small 
r etail establishments that Congress thought might 
otherwise be driven from the marketplace by large-
volume discounters. But in 1975 that congressional 
permission was rescinded. The Consumer Goods 
Pricing Act of 197 5, 89 Stat. 801, repealed the 
Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. ~/ 
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price 
maintenance now applies to fair trade contracts 
unless an industry or program enjoys a special 
antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing 
plainly constitutes resale price maintenance in 
violation of the Sherman Act. Schwegmann Bros. v. 
Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); see Albrecht v. 
The Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons , 3 4 0 U • S • 2 1 1 ( 1 9 5 1 ) ; Dr • M i 1 e s 
8. 
Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys 
horizontal competition among wholesalers and 
retailers as effectively as "if they formed a 
combination and endeavored to establish the same 
restrictions . by agreement with each other." 
220 U.S., a~08. ___ 7/ Moreover, there can be no 
claim that the California program is simply 
intrastate regulation beyond th reach of the 
Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert 
Co~, supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 u-.s. 320 (1967) 
(per curiam). 
Thus, we must consider whether the State's 
involvement in the price-setting program is 
sufficient to establish anti trust immunity under 
Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 3 41 (1943). That 
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded 
in our federal structure. "In a dual system of 
government in which, under the Constitution, the 
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may 
9. 
v. Brown, this Court found in the Sherman Act no 
purpose to nullify state powers. Because the Act 
is directed against "individual and not state 
action," the Court concluded that state regulatory 
programs could not violate it. Id., at 352. 
Under the program challenged in Parker, 
the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission 
authorized the organization of local cooperatives 
to develop marketing policies for the raisin crop. 
The Court emphasized that the Advisory Commission, 
which was appointed by the governor, had to approve 
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It 
is the state which has created the machinery for 
.........._ 
establishing the prorate program • 
"--
[I]t is 
the state, acting through the Commission, which 
adopts the program and enforces it ••• II Id. , at 
352. In view of this extensive official oversight, 
the Court wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. 
Without such oversight, the result could have been 
1 0. 
Id., at 351. 
Several recent decisions have applied 
Parker's analysis. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State 
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court concluded that 
fee schedules enforced by a state bar association 
were not mandated by ethical standards established 
by the state Supreme Court. The fee schedules 
therefore were not immune from anti trust attack. 
"It is not enough that anticompetitive 
~onduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by 
direction of the State acting as sovereign." Id., 
at 791. Similarly, in Cantor v. Detroit Edison 
Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a majority of the Court 
found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public 
utility's tariff. In contrast, Arizona rules 
against lawyer advertising were held immune from 
Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect [ed] a 
11. 
proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 4 33 
u.s. 350, 362 (1977). 
Only last Term this Court found antitrust 
immunity for a California program requiring state 
approval of the location of new automobile 
dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif. v. 
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978). That program 
provided that if an automobile franchisee protested 
against a proposed new or relocated dealership, the 
State would hold a hearing "to determine whether 
there is good cause to block the change." Id. , at 
103. In view of the State's active role, the Court 
held, the program was not subject to the Sherman 
Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" goal of the state policy was to 
"displace unfettered business freedom in the matter 
of the establishment and relocation of automobile 
dealerships." Id., at 109. 
These decisions establish two standards 
1 2. 
supervised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette 
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 u.s. 389, 410 
(1978) (opinion of BRENNAN, J. ) . ~I The 
California system for wine pricing satis f ies the 
first standard. The legislative policy is 
forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to 
permit resale price maintenance. The program, 
however, does not meet the second requirement for 
Parker immunity. The State simply authorizes 
price-setting and enforces the prices established 
by private parties. The State neither establishes 
prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price 
schedules: nor does the government regulate the 
terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not 
monitor market conditions or engag~ in any "pointed 
reexamination" of the program. ~ The national 
policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted 
by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement 




Petitioner contends that even if 
California's system of wine pricing is not 
protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment 
bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. 
Section 1 of that constitutional provision repealed 
the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition on liquor. 
The second section reserves to the States certain 
power to regulate traffic in liquor: "The 
transportation or importation into any State, 
Terri tory, or possession of the United States for 
del ievery or use there in of intoxicating 1 iquors, 
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited." The remaining question before us is 
whether § 2 permits California to countermand the 
congressional policy -- adopted under the commerce 
power -- in favor of competition. 
1 4. 
history behind it. State Board v. Young's Market 
Co., 299 u.s. 59, 63-64 (1936). _l2L In terms, 
the Amendment gives the States control over the 
"transportation or importation" of liquor into 
their territories. Of course, such control 
logically entails considerable regulatory powers 
not strictly limited to importing and transporting 
alcohol. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 u.s. 132, 
138 (1939). We should not, however, lose sight of 
the explicit grant of authority. 
This Court's early decisions on the 
Twenty-first Amendment recognized that each State 
holds great powers over the importation of liquor 
from other jurisdictions. Young's Market, supra, 
concerned a license fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting 
the types of 1 iquor that could be imported from 
other States, Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 
U.S. 401 (1938); two others involved "retaliation" 
1 5. 
305 u.s. 391 {1939). The Court upheld the 
challenged state authority in each case, largely on 
the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating 
liquors. Yet even when the States had acted under 
the explicit terms of the Amendment, the Court 
resisted the contention that § 2 "freed the States 
from all restrictions upon the police power to be 
found in other provisions of the Constitution." 
Young's Market, supra, 229 U.S., at 64. 
Subsequent decisions have given "wide 
latitude" to state liquor regulation, Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 42 {1966), but they 
also have stressed that important federal interests 
in liquor matters survived the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. That provision does not 
allow the States to tax imported liquor in 
violation of the Export-Import Clause. Department 
of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U.S. 341 {1964). 
1 6. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970). 
More difficult to define, however, is the 
extent to which Congress can regulate liquor under 
its interstate commerce power. Although that power 
is directly qualified by § 2, the Court has held 
that the Federal Government retains some Commerce 
Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam) ,this -
Court found no violation of the Twenty-First 
Amendment in a whiskey labeling requirement 
prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration 
Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Ziffrin, Inc. v. 
Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of 1 icens ing 1 iquor haulers unti 1 it was 
satisfied that the State program was reasonable. 
Id. , at 1 39. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power 
over liquor were sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild 
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-332 (1964). 
1 7. 
liquors is concerned would, however, be an 
absurd oversimplification. If the 
Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
1 repealed, 1 then Congress would be left 
with no regulatory power over interstate 
or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be 
patently bizarre and is demonstrably 
incorrect." 
~The Court added a significant, if elementary, 
observation: "Both the Twenty-first Amendment and 
the Commerce Clause are parts of the same 
Constitution. Like other provisions of the 
Constitution, each must be considered in the light 
of the other, and in the context of the issues and 
interests at stake in any concrete case." Id. , at 
332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) . 
..!ll 
This pragmatic effort to harmonize state 
1 8. 
Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 u.s. 211 (1951); 
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 
u.s. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann Bros. v. Cal vert 
Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), for example, a · liquor 
manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to 
comply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance 
program, a program similar in many respects to the 
California scheme at issue here. The Court held 
that the Louisiana statute violated the Sherman Act 
and could not be enforced against the distributor. 
Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sherman 
Act challenge to a New York 1 aw requiring 1 iquor 
dealers to attest that their prices were "no higher 
than the lowest price" charged anywhere in the 
United States. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 3 84 
u.s. 35 (1966). The Court concluded that the 
statute exerted "no irresistible economic pressure 
on the [dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in 
order to comply," but it also cautioned that 
1 9. 
u.s. 320 (1967) (per curiam). -
These decisions demonstrate that there is 
no bright line between federal and state powers 
over liquor. The Twenty-first Amendment grants the 
States virtually complete control over whether to 
permit importation or sale of liquor and how to 
structure the liquor distribution system. Although 
States retain substantial discretion to establish 
other 1 iquor regulations, those controls may also 
be subject to the federal commerce power in 
appropriate situations. The competing state and 
federal interests can be reconciled only after 
careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "concrete 
case." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 3 77 
u.s., at 332. 
B 
The federal interest in enforcing the 
national policy in favor of competition is both 
familiar and substantial. 
20. 
economic freedom and our free-enterprise 
system as the Bill of Rights is to the 
protection of our fundamental personal 
freedoms." United States v. Topco Assoc., 
405 u.s. 596, 610 (1972) 
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 
1, 4, (1958). Although this federal interest is 
expressed through a statute rather than a 
constitutional provision, Congress "exercis[ed] all 
L the power it possessed" under the Commerce Clause 
when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic 
Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 
435 (1932); see City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S., at 398. We must 
acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
procompetition policy. 
The state interests protected by 
California's resale price maintenance system were 
identified by the state courts in this case, 90 
21 . 
those courts are not binding on this Court to the 
extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed 
by the Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & 
Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 659 (1945): 
Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 u.s. 246, 261 
(1912). Nevertheless, this Court accords 
"respectful consideration and great weight to the 
views of the state's highest court" on matters of 
state law, Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 
u.s. 95, 100(1938), and we customarily accept the 
factual findings of state courts in the absence of 
"exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 344 u.s. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that 
its review of the state's system of wine pricing 
was "controlled by the reasoning of the 
[California] Supreme Court in Rice [supra]." 90 
Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. 
Therefore, we turn to that opinion's treatment of 
22. 
"to promote temperance and orderly market 
conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P.2d, at 490. 
lll The court found little correlation between 
resale price maintenance and temperance. It cited 
a state study showing a 42 % increase in per capita 
liquor consumption in California from 1950 to 1972, 
while resale price maintenance was in effect. Id., 
at 457-458, 579 P.2d, at 494, citing California 
Dept. of Finance, Alcohol and the State: A 
Reappraisal of California's Alcohol Control 
Program, xi , 1 5 ( 1 9 7 4 ) • Such studies, the court 
wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding 
the justification for such laws on the ground that 
they promote temperance." Ibid. 14/ 
The Rice opinion identified the primary 
state interest in orderly market conditions as 
"protect[ing] small licensees from predatory 
pricing policies of large retailers." Id. at 456, 
579 P.2d, at 493. 15/ In gauging this interest, 
I ,. 
23. 
necessary to the economic survival of small 
retailers. II Ibid. The agency relied on a 
congressional study of the impact on small 
retailers of fair trade laws enacted under the 
Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that 
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent 
I 
higher rate of firm failures than free trade 
states, and the rate of growth of small retail 
stores in free trade states between 1956 and 1972 
was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair 
trade laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess.1 3 (1975). 
Pointing to the 
congressional abandonment of fair trade in the 1975 




Supreme Court found 
, supra, the 
no persuasive 
justification to continue "fair trade laws which 
eliminate price competition among retailers." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 457, 579 P.2d, at 494. The Court of 
Appeal made the same finding with respect to the 
24. 
national policy in favor of competition. That 
evaluation of the State's stake in resale price 
maintenance for wine is reasonable based on the 
material cited by the state Supreme Court in Rice. -~ 
Nothing in the record in this case suggests that 
the wine pricing system helps sustain small retail 
establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the 
State Attorney General has demonstrated that the 
program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by 
Californians~ We need not consider whether the 
legitimate state interests in temperance and the 
protection of small retailers ever could prevail 
against the undoubted federal interest in a 
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state 
concerns put forward in this case simply are not of 
the same statutre as the broad goals of the Sherman 
Act. 
We conclude that the California Court of 




No. 79-97, Midcal, Footnotes 
lL The statute provides: 
a "Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to 
sell wine, wine rectif'ier, and rectifier 
shall: 
" (a) Post a schedule of selling 
prices of wine to retailers or consumers 
for which his resale price is not governed 
by a fair trade contract made by the 
person who owns or controls the brand. 
-· 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade 
contract and file a schedule of resale 
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of 
wine resold to retailers or consumers." 
j / cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964). 
2/ Licensees that sell wine below the prices 
FN2. 
3/ The court cited record evidence that in July 
1976, five leading brands of gin each sold in 
California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and 
that five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for 
either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth. Rice v. Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Appeals Bd. , 21 Cal. 3d 4 31 , 4 54 J 
and nn. 14, 16, 579 P.2d 476, 491-492
1
and nn. 14, 
16 ( 1978). 
4/ The State also did not appeal the decision in 
Capiscean Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control 
Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal. Rptr. 
492 ( 1979), which used the analysis in Rice to 
invalidate California's resale price maintenance 
scheme for retail wine sales to consumers. 
The California Retail Liquor Dealers 
Association, a trade association of independent 
retail liquor dealers in California, claims over 
FN3. 
noted that the repeal of fair trade authority would 
not alter whatever power the States hold under the 
Twenty-first Amendment to control liquor prices. 




H. Rep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 3, n.2 
" (1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first 
Amendment on this case in Part III, infra. 
7 I In Rice, the California Supreme Court found 
direct evidence that resale price maintenance 
resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. -1 
supra, and n.3. Although the Court of Appeal made 
no such specific finding in this case, the court 
noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be 
upheld for the same reasons the retail price 
maintenance provisions were declared invalid in 
Rice." Midcal Aluminum Co. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 
979, 983, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760 (1979). 
FN4. 
State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor, and 
Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 (1977). 
9/ The California program contrasts with the 
approach of those States that completely control 
the distribution of liquor within their boundaries. 
~' Va. Code §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Repl. Vol. 1979). 
Such comprehensive regulation would be immune from 
the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 
(1943), since the State would "displace unfettered 
business freedom" with its own power. New Motor 
Vehicle Board of Cal if. v. Orr in W. Fox Co. , 4 39 
U.S. 96, 109 (1978)~ See State Board v. Young's 
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936). 
lQI This approach is not only supported by sound 
canons of constitutional interpretation but also 
demonstrates a wise reluctance to try to interpret 
the complex currents beneath the congressional 
FN5. 
control in effect over interstate commerce 
affecting intoxicating 1 iquors. II 7 6 Cong. 
Rec. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Blaine). Yet he 
also made statements supporting Midcal's claim that 
the Amendment was designed only to ensure that 
"dry" States could not be forced to permit the sale 
of 1 iquor. See id., at 4140-4141. The sketchy 
records of the state conventions reflect no 
consensus on the thrust of § 2, although delegates 
at several conventions expressed their hope that 
l state regulation of liquor traffic would begin 
immediately. E. Brown, Ratification of the Twenty-
first Amendment to the Constitution 104 (1938) 
(Wilson, President of the Idaho Convention); id., 
at 191-192 (Darnall, President of Maryland 
Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chairman of 
Missouri Convention); id., at 469-473 (resolution 
adopted at Washington Convention calling for state 
action "to regulate the liquor traffic"). See 
FN6. 
Beverage Laws -- Experience Under the Twenty-first Jl--
Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1147 (1959). 
)_ 
ll/ In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 u.s. 416 
(1946), the Court commented in a footnote: 
/) n [E)ven the commerce in intoxicating 
1 iquors, over which the Twenty-first 
Amendment gives the States the highest 
degree of control, is not altogether 
beyond the reach of the federal commerce 
power, at any rate when the State's 
regulation squarely conflicts 
("'"'--
regulation imposed by Congres t,..· 




12/ Our view of California's interests in its wine 
pricing system is shaped in part by the unusual 
posture of this case. As we noted, the state 
agency responsible for administering the program 
did not appeal the decision of the California Court 
FN7. 
the State Attorney General, who filed a brief 
amicus curiae in support of the legislative scheme, 
has specified any state interests protected by the 
resale price maintenance system other than those 
noted in the state court opinions cited in text. 
_!l! The California Court of Appeal found only 
these same interests in the instant case. 90 Cal. 
App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761. That 
court rejected the suggestion that the wine price 
program was designed to protect the State's wine 
industry, pointing out that the statutes "do not 
distinguish between California wines and imported 
wines." Ibid. 
l!/ See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 
39 (1966) (citing study concluding that resale 
price maintenance in New York State had "no 
significant effect upon the consumption of 
FN8. 
competition, thereby encouraging temperance." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P.2d, at 493. The concern for 
temperance, however, was also considered by the 
court as an independent state interest in resale 
price maintenance for liquor. 
16/ Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief 
from the state court, there is no question before 
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ers Assomatwn, Pet1t10ner, Court of Appeal of Cahfor-
v. nia for the Third Appellate 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al. District. 
[February -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge 
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting stat-
utes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is 
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act 
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 
U.S. 341 (1943), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
I 
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, or rectifiers must 
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.]. If 
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con-
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that 
1 The sta.tute provides: 
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and 
rectifier shall: 
"(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers 
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made 
by the person who owns or controls the brand. 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale 
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or 
consumers." 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964). 
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producer's brands. !d., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine 
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price 
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair 
trade contract .... " !d., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979). 
For administration of the wine pricing program, the State 
is divided into three trading a.reas. A single fair trade con- 1 
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all whole-
sale transactions in that brand within a given trading area;. 
!d.,§§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similarly, the 
wine prices posted by a single distributor within a trading area 
bind all wholesalers in that area. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. 
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 
( 1979). A licensee selling below the established prices faces 
fines, license suspension, or outright' license revocation. Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 24880.2 The State has no direct control 
over wine prices, and it does not review the reasonableness of 
the prices set by wine dealers. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wi1ie 
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27 
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also 
.. alleged that Midcal so1d wines for which no fair trade contract 
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allega-
tions were true and that the State could fine it or suspend· 
'its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. M!dcal then 
sought to enjoin the State's wine pricing system with a writ 
of mandate from the California Court of Appeal for the Third 
Appellate District. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme 
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice 
2 Licensees that sell wine · below the prices specified in fair trade con-
tracts or schedules also may be subject to private damage suits for unfair 
competition. !d., § 24752. 
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v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 21 Cal. 3d 431, 
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court 
·struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors. 
In that case, the State Supreme Court found that because the 
State played only a passive part in wine pricing, there was no 
Parker v. Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state 
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The 
prices are established by the producers according to their 
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or 
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is re· 
stricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers. 
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the 
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are 
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486. 
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric-
ing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors 
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that 
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over 
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion 
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establish-
ments. The court emphasized that the California program 
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but 
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the 
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed 
at identical prices.3 Referring to congressional and state 
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main-
3 The court cited record evidence that in July 1976, five leading brands 
of gin each ~old in California for 4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and that 
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either S .39 or $8.40 a fifth. 
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and 
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476,491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978). 
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or 
small retail stores. Seep.-, infra, 
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the 
analysis in Rice squarely controlling, 90 Cal. App., at 984, 
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price 
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade. 
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from 
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion, an intervenor.5 The California Supreme Court declined 
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari 
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979), 
and now affirm the decision of the state court. 
II 
The threshold question is whether California's policy for 
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled 
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
' trade. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 
373, 407 (1911), pointed out that such arrangements are 
"designed to maintain p'tices ... , and to prevent competition 
among those who trade in [competing goods]." See Albrecht 
v. The Herald Co,, 39"0 U, S. 145 (1968); United States v . 
., Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 ( 1960); United States v. 
\ ' Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). For many years, 
~Jt hougb, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the States 
~ to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. The 
goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect small 
4 The State also did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 492 (1979), which used the analysis in Rice to invalidate California's 
res::lle price maintenance scheme for retail wine sales to consumers. 
5 The California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association 
of independent retail liquor dealers in California, claims over 3,000 
' members. 
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retail establishments that Congress thoughS migh otherw~ 
be driven from the marketplace by large-vo~une discounters. 
But in 1975 ~congressional permission was rescinded. The 
Consumer Goocfs Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, repealed 
the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation.6 Conse-
quently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance 
now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry or pro-
gram enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale 
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schweg~ 
mann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see 
Albrecht v. The Heraald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the 
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices 
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out 
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competi-
tion among wholesalers and retailers as efi'ectively as "if they 
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same 
restrictons ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 
408.7 Moreover, there can be no claim that the California 
program is simply intrastate regulation beyond the reach of 
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 
supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
6 The congressional reports accompanying the Consumer Goods Pr' ·~ ~ 
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that the repeal of fair trade ority w1: . ., 
would not alter whatever power the States hold under the wenty-first · ~
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 9 , 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341 , 94th Con ., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2 
(1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this 
case in Part III, infra. 
7 In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale 
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. -, supra, 
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in 
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld 
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provisions were declared 
invalid in Rice." Midcal Aluminum Co. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983, 
153 Cal. Rptr. 757,760 (1979). 
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in 
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust 
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That 
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our 
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which, 
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as 
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, 
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its 
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 
!d., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the 
Sherman Act no purpose to nullify state powers. Because the 
Act is directed against "individual and not state action," the 
Court concluded that state regulatory programs could not 
violate it. I d., at 352. 
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul-
tural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organiza-
tion of local cooperatives to develop ma.rketing policies for the 
·raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Com-
mission, which was appointed by the governor, had to approve 
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state 
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate 
program. . . . [I] t is the sta.te, acting through the Commis-
sion, which adopts the program and enforces it .... " !d., at 
352. In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court 
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such over-
sight, the result could have been different. The Court ex-
pressly noted, "[A] state does not give immunity to those who 
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, 
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ... " I d., at 351. 
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court 
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state ba.r associa-
tion were not mandated by ethical standards established by the 
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules ·therefore were not 
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as sovereign." I d., at 791. Sim:!i~la!:!.r.!.ll ~i~n-:t=~o~oU..-----:--"' 
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) a majority of he 
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In 
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held 
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "refl.ect[ed] 
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to pro-
fessional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examina-
tion by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in 
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U. S. 350, 362 (1~77). 
Only last Term )this Court found antitrust immunity for a 
California program requiring state approval of the location of 
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif. 
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program 
provided that if an automobile franchisee protested against a 
proposed new or relocated dealership, the State would hold a 
hearing "to determine whether there is good cause to block the 
change." I d., at 103. In view of the State's active role, the 
Court held, the program was not subject to the Sherman Act. 
The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of 
the state policy was to "displace unfettered business freedom 
in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automo-
bile dealerships." I d., at 109. 
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immu-
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint 
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively super-
vised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.).8 The California system for wine pricing satis-
8 See Norman's On the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 44 F. 2d 1011, 1018 
(CA3 1971); Asheville Tobacco Bd. v. FTC, 263 F. 2d 502, 509-510 (CA4 
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly 
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte~ 
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply author~ 
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private 
parties. The ~tate neither establishes prices nor reviews the .
1
+ 
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does the...govet-n 
rneftt regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State 
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointe~d 
reexamination" of the program.0 ;lhe national policy in favor T~ 
t
of competition p:-.umat he thwartid gy Gt;~iltiliil~ i!Yy~gauzy 
Cloak or state involvement over what--is essentially ~private 
"~ price-.fixii:g arra:1gemenf.7 As Par~er ~eaches, "a st'ate does l a.hrh-1 ...L..\ I(..Q _ 
c..l1.t oJ-'r not give immumty to those who violate the Sherman Act by \]""''.: 'w 
JIA.vl authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action ~~'{;,P. dYV1tt-" 
is lawful. .. ," 317 U.S., at 351. GV' r b 7 
III 
Petitioner contends that even if California's system of wine 
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amend~ 
ment bar~lication of the Sherman Act in this case. Sec-
tion 1 of that):onit.itu+ional p1=ov~io .repealed the Eighteenth SrcbCN- 2 
Amendment's prohibition on liquofl. The seeend ~ectior ~e~ 
serves to the States certain power Co regulate traffic in liquor: 
"The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, 
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein 
Hl59) ; Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After 
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 ( 1977). 
9 The California program contrasts with the approach of those States 
that completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries. 
E. g ., Va. Code §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Sueh comprehensive reg-
ulation would be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown, 
317 U.S. 341 (1943), since t11e State would "displace unfettered business 
freedom" with its own power. New Motor Vehicle Board of Calif. v. 
Onin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978); Sec State Board v. Young's 
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59,63 (1936). 
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of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is 
hereby prohibited." The remaining question before us is 
~hether §. 2 permits California to counte~ th~ 
swna.l pohcy~d under the commerce power m favor 
of competition. 
A 
In determining state powers under the T'wenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focused on the language of the provision 
rather than the history behind it. State Board v. Young's 
Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936).10 In terms, the 
Amendment gives the States control over the "transportation 
or importation" of liquor into their territories. ~ 
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power-rr 
. ~ot strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol. 
"\ 10 The oach is ~te~t onl~supported by sound canons of constitutional 
~ - - Interpretation d~monstrates a wise reluctm1cC'to try to 111 -;r tr 
the complex 1 rrents beneath the congressional resolution th proposed 
the Amendment and the state conventions that ratified it. he Senate 
sponsor of the resolution said the purpose of § 2 was "to restore to the 
State.<;; ... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting 
intoxicating liquors .... " 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen. 
Blaine). Y·et he also made statements supporting Midcal's claim that 
the Amendment was designed only to ensure that "'dry" States could not 
· be forced to permit the sale of liquor. See id., at 4140--4151. The sketchy 
records of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the thrust of 
§ 2, although delegates at several conventions expressed their hope that 
state regulation of liquor traffic would begin immediately. E. Brown, 
Ratification of tho Twenty-first Amendment to tho Constitution 104 
(1938) (Wilson, President of the Idaho Convention); id., at 191-192 
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chair-
man of Mi;;souri Convention); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at 
Washington Convention calling for state action "to regulate the liquor 
traffic"). See generally Nate, The Effect of the Twenty-fir~t Amendment 
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Locali m in State Alcoholic Beverage 
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 
1145, 1147 (1959) . 
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Zifjrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132, 138 ( 1939). We should 
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority. 
This Court's early decisions on the. T-weJ:l.t.x-first Amend-
ment recognized that each State hhl.durcat power over the 
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar-
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types 
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney 
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others 
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States 
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch & 
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing 
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, '305 U. S. 391 (1939). The 
Court upheld the challenged state ·authority in each case, 
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet 
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of 
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2 
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power 
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's 
Market, supra, 229 U. S., at 64. . 
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state 
liquor regulation, Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 
42 ( 1966), but they also have stressed that important federal 
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of _91e 
Twenty-first Amendment. 'I'fta-t-provlsion Q'Omj-not1rllo~1he 
-----st~te.J, tax imported liquor in violation of the Export-
Import Clause. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 
377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor can th~~te§)insulate the liquor 
industry from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of 
equal protection, Cmig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 
( 1976), and due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U. S. 433, 436 (1970). 
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which 
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce 
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the 
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some 
Commerce Cla.use authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court 
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a 
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alco-
hol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Zifjrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the 
state program was reasonable. !d., at 139. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were 
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 
331-332 (1964). 
"To draw a conclusion ... that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Com-
merce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors 
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplifi-
cation. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory 
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and 
is demonstrably incorrect." 
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation: 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of 
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the 
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake 
in any concrete case." !d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 206 (1976).11 
11 In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court 
commented in a footnote: 
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicnting liquors, ov·er which the Twenty-first 
Amendment gives the Stales thP highest degree of control, is not alto-
gether beyond the reach of thl? federal commerce power, at any rate when 
the State's regulation squnrely conflicts with regulation impo~ed by Con-
gress . .. . " !d., at 425, n. 15. 
I 
79-97-0PINION 
12 CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM 
This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers 
has been evident in the Court's conclusion in several cases that 
the liquor industry may be held liable for anticompetitive 
conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frank-
fort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945). IIi Schwegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951), for example, a 
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to com-
ply with Louisiana's resa.le price maintenance program, a pro-
gram similar in many respects to the California scheme at 
issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute vio-
lated the Sherman Act and could not be enforced against the 
distributor. Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sher-
man Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers 
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest 
price'' charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con-
cluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic 
pressure on the [dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order 
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n] othing in the 
Twenty~first Amendment, of course, would prevent the en'" 
forcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate con-
spiracy to fix prices. Id., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford, 389 
U. S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
These decisions demonstra.te that there is no bright line 
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twenty-
.first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control 
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how 
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States 
retain substantial discm;_t~~o establish other liquor regula-
tions, those controls~;-ay~ be subject to the federal com-
merce power in appfcmriate situations. The competing state 
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scru-
tiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idle-
wild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332. 
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B 
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor 
'Of competition is both familiar and substantial. 
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They 
are as important to the p-reservation of economic freedom 
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." 
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 ( 1972). 
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4, 
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through 
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress 
"exercis [ ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce 
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Clean-
ers & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see 
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S., 
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
procompetition policy. 
The state interests protected by California's resale price 
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this 
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in 
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 
431, 451, 579 P. 2d 476, 490 (1978).u Of course, the findings 
and conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court 
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the 
12 Our view of Californiajs intJcrests in its wine pricing systom is shaped 
in part by the unusual posture of this case. As we noted, the state 
agency responsible for administering the program did not appeal the 
decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p. -, supra; Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 20. Instead, this action bas been maintained by the Ca1ifornia 
Liquor Dealers Association, a private intervenor. But neither the inter-
venor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a brief amicus curiae in 
support of the legisla,tive scheme, has specified any state interests pro-
tected by the resa1e price maintenance system other than those noted in 
the state court opinions cited in text. 
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of 
Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court 
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views 
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana 
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we 
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the 
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of 
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the rea-
soning of the [California.] Supreme Court in Rice [supra]." 
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we 
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in 
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors. 
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind 
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and 
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 
490.13 The court found little correlation between resale price 
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing 
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California 
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect. 
!d., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of 
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's 
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the 
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the . 
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote 
temperance." Ibid.14 
t-.:> 0. \ 
13 The California Court of Appeal foun~l'l€f!e sar97 interests in 
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761. 
That. court rejected the suggestion that the wine price program was de-· 
signed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the statutes 
"do not distingui.~h bl'twern California wines and imported wines." Ibid. 
14 See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 39 (1966) (citing study 
concluding that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no 
significant effect upon the consumption of alcoholic beverages"). 
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in 
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees 
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456, 
579 P. 2d, at 493.'5 In gauging this interest, the Court 
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim 
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair 
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small 
retailers .... " Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional 
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted 
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that 
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of 
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth 
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade 
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair 
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. -, 
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justifica-
tion to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com-
petition among retailers." 21 Cal. 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at 
494. The Court of Appeal made the same finding with respect 
to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983-:-
We have n~basis f9r disf!greeing: with the view of the Cali-
fornia courts that the asserted state interests are less substan-
tial than the national policy in favor of competition. Tha~ 
e~alu~tion of the State's stake in resale pric~ maintenance for 
WI'ne IS reasonable based on the matenal cited by the State 
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the record in this case 
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small 
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State 
15 The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market condi-
tions might "reduce excessive competition, thereby encouraging temper-
ance." 21 Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance, 
however, was ~considered by the court as an independent state interest 
in resale price maintenance for liquor. 
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Attorney General has demonstrated that the program inhibits 
the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not 
consider whether the legitimate state interests in temperance 
and the protection of small retailers ever could prevail against 
the undoubted federal interest in a competitive economy. 
The unsubstantiated state concerns put forward in this case t 
simply are not of the same statu as the -broad goals of the 
Sherman Act. 
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly 
decided that the Twenty-first Amondment,providos no shelter 
for the violation of the Sherman Act ~u~ cy tho State's 
wine pricing program.10 The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is 
Affirmed, 
10 Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief from the state court, 
there is no question before us involving liabilit,y for damages under 15 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge 
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting stat-
utes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is 
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act 
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 
U.S. 341 (1943), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
I 
Under § 24866 (b) 
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, rec 1 ers mus 
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.1 If 
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con-
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that 
1 The statute provides: 
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and 
rectifier shall: 
"(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers 
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made 
by the person who owns or controls the brand. 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale 
prices, if ht owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or 
consumers." 1 _ 
(. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 24866 (We~ 
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producer's brands. ld. , § 24866 (a). No sta.te-licensed wine 
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price 
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair 
trade contract .... " ld., § 24862 (West Supp. 197,;;.9-:-):.... --:--~-~ 
or a ministration of the wine pncmg_ J2!0~ the tate 
is divide m o ree trading area A single fair trade con-
tractM s• J. blQ for each brand s s the terms for all whole-
sale transactions in that brand within a given trading are 
ld., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979) . .SiL-·l=ar:..::.ll...)Jit::.t=he~~-­
wine prices posted by a single~ a trading area 
bind all wholesalers in that area. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. 
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 
( 1979). A licensee selling below the established prices faces 
fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal. 
Bus. & Prof. Code § 24880.2 The State has no direct control 
over wine prices, and it does not review the reasonableness of 
the prices set by wine dealers. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine 
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27 
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also 
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract 
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allega-
tions were true and that the State could fine it or suspend 
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midcal then 
· · the St e-pr~~~~~~-~ 
v ~f:;a;&*iililillle~ he Califorma ourt of Appeal for the Third --~ 
L Appellate Distnc . 
d,._,_ i~ ~ The Court o Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme 
· i1' -tke restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
~ ~-<- ~ § 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice 
~-t~~ 
~:..c-4 S''i Je<M. 2 Licensees that sell wine below the prices specified in fair trade con-
tracts or schedules also may be subject to private damage suits for unfair 
competition. !d., § 24752. 
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v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals ~al~431, 
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court 
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors. 
In that case, ~'rnb S!!i:JFe~e }tourt that because the 
State played only a passive part in pricmg, t 1ere was no 
Parker v. Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state 
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The 
prices are established by the producers according to their 
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or 
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is re-
stricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers. 
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the 
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are 
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486. 
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric-
'ing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors 
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that 
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over 
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion 
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establish- G'i~_ 
ments. The court emphasized that the California ~]!11Jio~g!!iitil!ll&lflliitf~..l--=--r:.._, _ 
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but 
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the 
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed 
at identical prices.3 Referring to congressional and state 
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main-
s Tho court cited record evidence that in July 1976, fivo leading brands 
of gin each sold in California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and that 
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either S8.39 or S8.40 a fifth. 
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and 
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978). 
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tenance has little positive im act on either temperance or 
small retail stores. See , infra. 
In the instant case, the tate Court of Appeal found the 
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984, 
153 Cal. Rptr. , at 760. The court ordered the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price 
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade. 
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from 
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion, an intervenor.5 The California Supreme Court declined 
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari 
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979), 
and now affirm the decision of the state court. 
II pi~ 
The threshold question is whether California's for 
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled 
consistently that resaie price maintenance illegally restrains 
\---...;t~ra-d;:.e..:..  ..:. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. ~ 
·+~Gd obs:~J --- 373, 40 (1911), 1 · · Jt t that such arrangements are ~ 
"designed to maintain prices ... , and to prevent competition -------
among those who trade in [competing goods]." See Albrecht 
v. The H emld Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United States v. 
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 ( 1960); United States v. 
Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 ( 1920). For many years, 
though, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the States 
to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. The 
goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect small 
1 Tho State also did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 492 (1979), which used the analysis in Rice to invalidate California's 
resale price maintenance schC'mc for retail wine sales to consumers. 
5 The Californi'a Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association 
of independent retail liquor dealers in California, claims over 3,000 
members. 
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retail establishments that Congress thought might otherwise 
be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters. 
But in 1975 that congressional permission was rescinded. The 
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, repealed 
the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. 6 Conse-
quently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance 
now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry or pro-
gram enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale 
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see 
Albrec t v. The Hr~._ri,a]..d Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340LJ. S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the 
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices 
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out 
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competi-
tion among wholesalers and retailers as effectively as "if they 
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same 
restnc ns ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 
Moreover, there can be no claim that the California 
program is simply intrastate regulation beyond the reach of 
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 
supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
o The congresRional reports accompanying the Consum r Goods Pricina 
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that repeal of fair trade au onty 
would not alter whatever power the States hold under the Twenty-first 
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2 
(1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this 
case in Part III, infra. 
7 In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale 
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. , supra, 
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in 
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld 
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provisions were cleclar 
invalid in Rice." Midcal Aluminum v. Rice, a . pp. 979, 983, 
153 Cal. Rptr. 757,760 (1979). 
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in 
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust 
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That 
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our 
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which, 
under the Constitution, the states arc sovereign. save only as 
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, 
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its 
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 
Id., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the 
Sherman Act no purpose to nullify state powers. Because the 
Act is directed against "individual and not state action," the 
Court concluded that state regulatory programs could not 
violate it. Id., at 352. 
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul-
tural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organiza-
tion of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the 
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Com-
mission, which was appointed by the governor. had to approve 
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state 
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate 
program. . . . [I]t is the state, acting through the Commis-
sion, which adopts the program and enforces it .... " ld., at 
352. · In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court 
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such over-
sight, the result could have bee · 
pressly noted, " s ate oes not give immunity to those who 
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, 
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ... " Id., a.t 351. 
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court 
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar associa-
tion were not mandated by ethical standards established by the 
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were not 
immune from antitrust attack. "It is not enough that ... 
79-97-0PINION 
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as sovereign." I d. , at 791. Similarly, in Cantor 
v. Detroit Edison Co. , 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a majority of the 
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In 
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held 
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect[ed] 
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to pro. 
fessional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examina-
tion by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court--in 
enforcement procredings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizora.t, 433 
U. S. 350, 362 (1977). 
Only last Term this Court found antitrust immunit for a 
California program requiring state approval t e location of t;l,sJCX~ 
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. [i({ 
v. Orrin W. F_ · Co., 439 1!· S. 96 \1978). @graffi&i)T ~ ..it 
"13~~:ed=thii7":r:iJan automobile franchisee iill:.,Qiiuted~ sr-a~ f~t ' ll\.ll 
proposed new or relocated dealership, the ~tatQ smotld I olil a,. )t~ 
bearing "to detel'ffiitre whether thete i~ geed etnlse to block the j ~ 1"ftlJ 
clumW:.:Z¥ , lb 108. In view of the State's active role, the 4t. 
Court held; the program was not subject to the Sherman Act. 
The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of _ ;~J_ ~~ 
the state policy was to "displace unfettered business freedom  
in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automo- {~ 
bile dealerships." I d., at 109. fk 
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immu- F..Je&ef 
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint 1 es~~ 
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed I ~ ~a..'l~~"~ ~ 
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively super- t:fr .._ t. .---r f 
I' 
vised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana ...p_ .. -n:&"S:~~ 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of ~< k...-f> _ 
BRENNAN, J.).8 The California system for wine pricing satis- ~ 
8 See Norman's On the Wat erfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 44 F. 2d 1011, 1018 
(CA3 1971); Asheville Tobacco Bd. v. FTC, 263 F. 2d 502, 509~510 (CA4 
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly 
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte-
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply author-
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private 
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the 
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does the govern-
ment regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State 
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed 
reexamination" of the program.9 The national policy in favor 
of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy 
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private 
price-fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does 
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action 
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351. 
III 
Petitioner contends that even if California~s system of wine 
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amend-
ment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Sec-
tion 1 of that constitutional provision repealed the Eighteenth 
V Amendment's prohibition on liquor. The second section re-
~ to the States certain power to regulate traffic in liquor: 
"'!Jhe transportation or importation into any State, Territory, 
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein 
1959) ; Note, Pad.:er v. Brotun Revisited : The State Action Doctrine After 
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 (1977). 
9 The California program contrasts with the approach of those States 
that completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries. 
E. g., Va. Code§§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. VoL 1979). Such comrwchcn ive reg-
ulation would be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown, {S&, 
317 U.S. 341 (1943), since the State would "di ~:Jplace unfettered busin;;:;es:.:::.·s __ __,_ _ _ _ 
freedom" with its own power. New Motor Vehicle . v. 
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978); iec State Board v. Young's J 
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of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, IS 
hereby prohibited." The remaining question before us is 
whether § 2 permits California to countermand the congres-
sional policy-adopted under the commerce power-in favor 
of competition. 
A 
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focused on the anguage of the provision 
rather than the history be 1 1d it. State Board v. Young's 
Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936).10 In terms, the 
Amendment gives the States control over the "transportation 
or importation" of liquor into their territories. Of course, 
such control logically entails considerable regulatory powers 
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol. 
10 Tho approach is not only supported by sound canons of constitutional 
interpretation but also demonstrates a wise reluctkmce to h:!J~~!!!!J!~) 
the complex currents beneath the congreRsional resolution 
the Amendment and the state conventions that ratified it. he Senate 
sponsor of the resolution said the purpose of § 2 was "to restore to the 
States ... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting 
intoxicating liquors .... " 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen. 
Blaine). Yet he also made statements supporting Midcal's claim that 
the Amendment was designed only to ensure that "dry" States could not 
be forced to permit the sale of liquor. Sec id., at 4140-4151. The ketchy 
records of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the thrust of 
§ 2, although delegates at several conventions expressed their hope that 
state regulation of liquor traffic would begin immediately. E. Brown, 
Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Con::;titution 104 
(1938) (Wilson, President of the Idaho Convention); id., at HH-192 
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chair-
man of Missouri Convention); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at 
Washington Convention calling for state action "to regulate tl1e liquor 
tra.ffic"). See generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment 
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage 
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 
1145, 1147 (1959). 
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should 
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority. 
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amend-
ment recognized that each State holds great powers over the 
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar-
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types 
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney 
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others 
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States 
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch & 
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing 
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The 
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case, 
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet 
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of 
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2 
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power 
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's 
Market , supra, 229 U. S. , at 64. 
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state 
liquor regulation , Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 
42 (1966), but they also have stressed that important federal 
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. That provision does not allow the 
States to tax imported liquor in violation of the Export-
Import Clause. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 
377 U. S 341 (1964). Nor can the States insulate the liquor 
industry from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of 
equal protection, Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 
( 1976) , and due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 
U. S. 433, 436 (1970). 
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which 
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce 
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the 
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some 
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court 
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a 
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alco-
hol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 ( 1935). And in Ziffrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the 
state program was reasonable. I d., at 139. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were 
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 
331-332 (1964). 
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Com-
merce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors 
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplifi-
cation. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory 
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and 
is demonstrably incorrect." 
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation: 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of 
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the 
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake 
in any concrete case." Id., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
U. S. 190, 206 (1976).11 
11 In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court 
commented in a footnote: 
"[E] ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first 
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not alto-
gether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when 
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation imposed by Con-
gress .... " /d., at 425, n. 15. 
\ 
79-97-0PINION 
12 CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM 
J_ This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal )Owers 
hltSoeen evidentln · · several @AI!•• ... 
~-·-ttrn-tiqtlor industry'i!IU§ * I . m liable for anticompetitive 
conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frank-
~~rt' 
v-t6{(1... & -#q 
s~Act 
fort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951), for example, a 
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to com-
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a pro-
gram similar in many respects to the California . .it:l 1tf 
issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute ~ 
\Mi.t.i~ii!I*J•illliilliliiilllllii;iiiiiil} could not be enforced against the 
distributo . Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sher-
-------'- ...... ...:-a'!::"n-:rc::;t~challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers 
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest 
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con-
cluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic 
pressure on the [dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order 
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n] othing in the 
Twenty-first A~endment, of course, would prevent the en-
forcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate con-
spiracy o x )rices. Id., at 45-46. See Burlce v. Ford, 389 
U. S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line 
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twenty-
first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control 
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how 
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States 
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tions, those controls may be subject to the federal com-
merce power in appropriate situations. The competing state 
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scru-
tiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idle-
wild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332. 
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B 
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy ih favor 
of competition is both familiar and substantial. 
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They 
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.'' 
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972). 
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4, 
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through 
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress 
"exercis[ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce 
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Clean-
ers & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see 
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S., 
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
procompetition policy. 
The state interests protected by California's resale price 
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this 
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in 
Rice v. Alcoholic Bevem e Control AP' eal , 
I 5 451, 579 P. 2d 490 ~.
12 Of course, the findings 
and conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Courr:r:---Ar" 
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the 
As 
agency responsible for administering the 
decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p. , supra; Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 20. Instead, this action has been maintaine by the California 
Liquor Dealers Association, a private intervenor. But neither the inter-
venor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a brief amicus curiae in 
support of the legislative scheme, has specified any state interests pro-
tected by the resale price maintenance system other than those noted in 
the state court opinions cited in text. 
,4- f lt lMM.{SuaP ~-t-WI.t- J ftw ~~ 
~~~ ~ S+~ <!"~  
s~ ~s-s- +t..~ ~ ~-+~:ttfh~ 
I~ 't ~ f~ ~l~ ' 
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of 
Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court 
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views 
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana 
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938) , and we 
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the 
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of 
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the rea-
soning of the [California.] Supreme Court in Rice [supra]." 
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we 
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in 
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors. 
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind 
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and 
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 
490.13 The court found little correlation between resale price 
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing 
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California 
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect. 
!d., at 457-458, 579 P. 2cl, at 494, citing California Dept. of 
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's 
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the 
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the 
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote 
temperance." Ibid.14 
18 The California Court of Appeal found only these l"ame interests in 
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761. 
That court rejected the suggestion that the wine price program was de-
signed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the statutes 
"do not distingu1«h between California wines and imported winPs." Ibid. 
14 See Seagram L~ Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35,39 (1966) (citing study 
concluding that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no 
significant effect upon the consumption of alcoholic beverages"). 
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in 
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees 
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456, 
579 P. 2d, at 493.1 5 In gauging this interest, the J'ourt .f'. t.., 
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim 
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair 
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small 
retailers. . . ." Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional 
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted 
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that 
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher ra.te of 
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth 
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade 
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94- 466, 94th Cong. , 1st Stf!:9ess., 
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair 5 
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. , 
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justi ca- ------tion to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com- -f,. tk 
petition among retailers." 21 Ca.l. 3d, at 457 579 P 2 ~ " 
494. The Court of Appeal · with respect ~ .. 
to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983. ~,..,_ 
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Cali-
fornia courts that the asserted state interests are less substan-
tial than the national policy in favor of competition. ? _::...:::._ 
evaluation of the · resale price maintenanc '1 5 
wine is reasonable · cited by the S ate __ _ 
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the recor m IS case ~ ~ • 
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small 1 \ .t 
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the S~e ~U-ff<Y'-~ ~ 
15 The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market condi- tU. e.¥-(~~ 
tions might "reduce excessive competition, thereby encouraging temper-
ance." 21 Cnl 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493 . The concern for temperance, 
how~v~ considered by the court as an independent state interest 
in resale price maintenance for liquor. 
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lr,i \ Attorney Gene~l has demonstrated that the program inhibits 
~ tl:le' consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not 
Y consider whether the legitimate state interests in temperance and the protection of small retailers ever could prevail against the undoubted federal interest in a competitive econom 
The unsubstantiated state concerns in this case 
simply are not of the same statu 
Sherman Act. 
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly 
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter 
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's 
wine pricing program.1.6 The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is 
Affirmed. 
16 Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief from the state court, 
there is no question before us involving liability for damages under 15 
tJ. s. c. § 15. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-97 
California Retail Liquor Deal-~ On Writ of Certiorari to the 
ers Association, Petitioner, Court of Appeal of Califor-
v. nia for the Third Appellate 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al. District. 
[February -, 1980] 
Mn. J usTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal1 Aluminum, Inc.J 
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge 
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting stat-
utes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is 
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act 
by eithrr the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 
U.S. 341 (1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
I 
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers must 
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.1 If 
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con· 
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that / 
1 The stnt,ule provides: 
"Etwh wi11c grower, wholesaler licem;ed to sell wine, wino rectifier, and 
rect.ifier shall: 
''(a) Po~1 , a schedule of selling pricl';; of wine to retailers or con;;umers 
for whirh hi:; rc:;a ll' price iA not governed by it fair trade coutra.ct made 
by the p(•rson who owns or controls the bmml. 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file n schedule of resale 
pric<'8, if he owns or coHtrols a brand of wine resold to retailers or / 
con,;umer~." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964) . _/ 
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producer's brands. /d., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine 
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price 
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair 
trade contract .... " Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979). 
The State is divided into three trading areas for adminis-
tration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade con-
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all whole-
sale transactions in that brand within a given trading area. 
/d., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly, 
state regulations provide that the wine prices posted by a 
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers 
in that area. Midcdl Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. .t\.pp. 
3d 979, 983- 984. 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 ( 1979). A licensee 
seling below the established prices faces fines, license suspen-
sion, or outright license revocation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§ 24880. 2 The State has no direct control over wine prices, 
and it does uot review the reasonableness of the prices set by 
wine dealers. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine 
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27 
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also 
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract 
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allega-
tions were true and that the State could fine it or suspend 
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midca.l then 
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for 
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction against 
the State's wine pricing system. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme 
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
2 Licen~re::; that sell wiuc below the prices specified in fair tr·ade con-
tract,::; or schedule,; al,.:o may be ~ubjcct to private damage suits for unfair 
competition. I d., § 24752, 
• 
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§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice 
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 
579 P. 2d 476 (1978). where the California Supreme Court 
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors. 
In that case, the court held that because the State played 
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v. 
Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the price maiutenance program before us, the state 
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The 
prices are established by the producers according to their 
own economic interests. without regard to any actual or 
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is re-
stricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers. 
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the 
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are 
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486. 
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric-
ing policies were protected by ~ 2 of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors 
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that 
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over 
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion 
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establish-
ments. The court emphasized that the California system 
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but 
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the 
program. mauy comparable brands of liquor were marketed 
at identical prices.~ Referring to congressional and state 
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main-
a Tho court cited record evidence tlmt in July 1976, five leading brands 
of gin each Hold in California for $4.~9 for a fifth of a gallon, a11d that 
five leacling brand:; of ~cotch whi:;key ,;old for either $8.a9 or $8.40 a fifth. 
Rice v. Alcohvlic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, ar1d 
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 1G (1978) • 
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or 
small retail stores. See pp. 14-15, infra. 
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the 
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984, 
153 Cal. Rptr .. at 760. The court ordered the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price 
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade. 
The Departmeut. which in Rice had not sought certiorari from 
this Court. did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion. an intervenor." The California Supreme Court declined 
to hear the case. aud the Dealers Association sought certiorari 
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979), 
and now affirm the decision of the state court. 
II 
The threshold question is whether California's plan for 
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled 
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 
373, 407 (1911). the Court observed that such arrangements 
are "desigm•d to maintain prices ... , and to prevent com-
petitioll among those who trade in [competing goods]." See 
Albrecht \'. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United 
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United 
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). For many 
ears owever, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the 
L"""""~t .. at~e"'s to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. 
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect~ 
1 Tho St.at<' a.l~o did not appeal the decit:ion in Capiscean C01·p. v. 
Alcoholic Beverage Cuntrul Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal. 
llptr. 49:Z ( 197H), whi<'h u~ed the anal~·si::; in Uice to invaliJ,ite Califomia's 
rc:oale priee mnintPJWJH'P ~ehemc for retail wine :;ale.- to con.-umcr~. 
5 The Califomia HPtail Liqnor Dealer;; At<l:iociation, a, trade associ<Ltion 
of indcp<'uuent. retail liquor dealer::; in California, claim::; over 3,000, 
members, 
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1:>tnall retail establishme11ts that Congress thought might other-
wise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume dis-
couBters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was 
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 
801, repealed the Miller-Tydi11gs Act and related legislation.<~ 
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price main-
tenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry 
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale 
price maintenanc(' in violation of the Shermau Act. Schwey-
mann Bros. '. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951); see 
Albrecht v. 'l'he Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & So11B, 340 U.S. 211 ( 1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. Park & So11s Co., supra. The wine producer holds the 
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices 
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out 
·u Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal c~
,-,--..'--1-o ~ · as effectively as if whol.e.wJOI2J\...S' 
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same 
restrictions . .. by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 
408.7 Moreowr, there call be no claim that the California 
program is simply intrastate regulation beyolld the reach of 
the Sherman Act. :::lee Schweyrnann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 
supra; Burke v. Ford, 089 U. S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
u The congn·:<~ional report~ tlreompauyiug the Consumer Goods Pricing 
A<"t of Hli5, 89 Stat. 801, notPd that. repPal of fair trade authority 
would not alt<'r whatC'v<'r ]JOW<'r the State~ hold under the Twenty-fir:;t 
Amendnwnt to eontrol liquor price:;. S. Rep. No. 94--!66, 94th Cong., 
l~<t SP,.;s., 2 (19i5): H. R. RPp. No. 94-:341, 94th Cong., M SPSS., :3, n. 2 
(Hii5). We con~idPr the effect of the Twenty-first Ampndment on this 
case in Part III, infra. 
7 In Rice, the Califoruia. Suprrmc Court found direct evidence that rpsale 
prire main1emuJe<> r<':;nltPd in horizontal pri<'e fixing. SE-e p. 3, supra, 
and u. 3. Although tlw Court of Appt>al made no such ~;pccific finding in 
thi:s ease, tiH-' <'OUrt. notE-d that tlw wine pricing sy:;tPm "rannot. bE' upheld 
for the S:.llll£'. reasons the rE'tail prire maintenance provi~;ion~ were dPc!ared 
iuvalid. in, Rice." P.!i~cal, Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice. 90 Cal. App. :3d 979,,. / 
983,15,1 C"l. Hptc. '''· 760 (1979). / 
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in 
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish au titrust 
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That 
immunity for state regulatory programs is gromtded in our 
federal structure. "In a dual system of govemmeut in which, 
under the Constitution, the states arc sovereign. save only as 
Congress may coustitutionally subtract from their authority, 
au unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's coutrol over its 
officers and ageuts is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 
ld., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court fouud in the 
Sherman Act no purposf' to nullify state powers. Because the 
Act is directed against "individual and not state actiou," the 
C'ourt concluded that state regulatory programs could not 
violate it. I d. , at H52. 
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul-
tural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organiza-
tion of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the 
ra1sm crop. Th€· Court emphasized that the Advisory Com-
mission. ·which was appointeu by the governor. had to approve 
cooperative polici<'s following public hearings: "It is the state 
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate 
program. . . . lll t is the state, acting through the Commis-
sion, which adopts the program and enforces it ... . " !d., at 
852. In viPw of this exte11sive official oversight, the Court 
wrote, the Sherma11 Act did not apply. \Yithout such over-
sight. the result could have been different. The Court ex-
pressly noted. "a state does not give immunity to those who 
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, 
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ... " !d., a.t 351. 
Several rece11t decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In 
Goldfarb Y. Viryiuia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 ( 1975). the Court 
concluded that feP schedu.les enforced by a state bar associa-
tion were not mamlated by ethical standards established by the 
Atate Supreme Court. T'he fee schedules therefore were uot 
unmune from antitrust attack.. "r t is Hot enough that .... 
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auticompetitive COJH1uct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as sovereign." /d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor 
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579 ( 1976) , a majority of the 
Court found that 110 antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In 
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held 
immune from Rherman Act challeuge because they "reflect [ ed] 
a clear articulatio11 of the State's policy with regard to pro-
fessioual behavior" ami were "subject to pointed re-examiua-
tion by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in 
e11forcemeut proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U. S. 350. 362 (1977). 
Only last Term, this Court found antitrust immunity for a 
California program requiring state approval of the location of 
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Yehicle Bd. of Calif. 
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 1!. S. 96 (1978). That ro ram 
provided that the State would hold a hearing fan automobile 
franchisee protested~ the establishment or relocation of a com-
peting dealership. I d., at 103. In· view of the State's active 
role, the Court held, the program was not subject to the 
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered 
business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relo-
cation of automobile dealerships." !d., at 109·. 
These decisious establish two staJ](]ards for antitrust immu-
nity uuder Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint 
must be ''one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively super-
vised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of _/ 
BRENNAN, J .).~ The California system for wiue pricing satis-/ 
8 SPe Norman's On the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley , 44 F. 2d 1011, 1018 
(CA3 1971) ; Asheville 'l'obacco !3d .. v. F'f'C, 263 F. 2d 50:2., 509-510 (CA4. 
/ 
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly 
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte-
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. .The State simply author-
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private 
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the 
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate 
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not moni-
tor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamina-
tion" of the program.0 The national policy in favor of 
competition caunot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy 
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private 
price-fixing arrangellH~llt. As Parker teaches. "a state does 
not give immunity to those v.·ho violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizi11g them to violate it, or by declaring that their action 
is lav.-ful. . .. " 317 U. S., at 351. 
III 
Petitioner contends that eveu if California's system of wine 
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amend-
ment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Sec-
tion 1 of that Amendme11 t repealed the Eighteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition ou the manufacture, sale or transportation 
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain 
power to regulate traffic in liquor: "The transportation or . 
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the/ 
1\150); Notr, htrkl:'r v. Bmtcn RrviHitl·u: The Statr Action Doctrine After 
Ouldfarb. Cantor, and Bates. 77 Colum. L. Rrv. 898, 016 (1977) . 
9 The Califomia program eo11tra~ts with the approach of tho;;c Statrs 
thcLt complf•tely control thl' di~trib11tion of liquor within their l>oundariCJ:!. 
H. (f ., Va. Code§§ 4-15, 4-:2.S (Repl. Vol. 1979). Such ('Ompn·hen~ive reg-
ulatiou would be imnnuw from the Slwrma.n Act under Parker \' , Brmt•n, 
317 U. S. :Hl (Hl-!:l), :::ince the 8tt<tr> would "di~place unfettered bu~iness 
frC'f'dom'' with it" own }lOwer. New Motor Vehicle Bd. r. Orrin W. Fox 
Co., 439 U. S. 9() , 109 (1978) ; ::;ee State Board v. Young's Market Co.), / 
299 U.S. 5D, 63 (HJ;)li) . / 
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicatiug 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 
The remaining question before us is whether § 2 permits 
California to countermand the congressio11al policy-adopted 
under the commerce power-In favor of competition. 
A 
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focused primarily 011 the language o.f the 
provision rather than the history behind it. Sta.te Board v. 
Young's Market Co. , 299 U. S. 59, 63-04 (1936). 1 '> In terms, 
the Amendment gives tlw States control over the "transporta-
tion or importation' ' of liquor into their territories. Of course, 
I .-
such control logically entails considerablP regulatory power ~ 
not strictly limited to importipg and transporting alcohol./ 
10 The approach is ~upportrd b~· !:'Ollnd ranon~ of con~titutional int.er-
pretation and dPmon~tratl'c< a. wi~P rdnetanee to wade .into the complex 
C'lll'l'eut~ beneath thr c·ongre~"ional re"olntion 1hat proposed the Amend-
nwnt. and the :;tatt·. (·onveutions that ratifircl it. The Senate ~ponsor 
of tho resolution ,;aid t h<· purpo"e of § 2 wa" " to re~torc to the State::; .. . 
ah"olute control in pffr('t. ovrr inter::<ta.tl' comnwrcp affecting intoxi-
t"ating liquor:-: .. . . " 76 C'ong. H(•c. 414:3 (IU;n) (remarks of Sen. 
Blainr) . Y ·et he al~o made :>tateltlf'llt"' c<upporting Midcal '~ elaim that 
--~~IIJI••••..._ wa ~ fh·~igned only to cn~Hre t.hat ' 'dr~· " Skt:t<·"' could not 
r------:---"'7'~-11' ll.!;l.,lfQ;OI~·(::•e5!Jd o wrmit. the ~alt• of liqu~>r. St>e id., at. -!140-41 1. The ~ketchy 
L.. -ft.,_ f:e.£.~ reeords of the ~tate couventionc< rf•t!ect 110 coiJ:;<'II"U" on the thrust of 
- J § 2, although dell'ga.t<·s at :;evt•r:d ronn•iJLion~ cxpn·~"'e<:l th<' ir hope thut 
~+ slate regulation ol' liquo1· t raJ!ic would lwgin immediately. E. Brown, 
Jht iftcation of thr Tw<'llty-fi r:,;t. Amendmcn1. t.o the Con~titutiou 104 
(19:~8) (Wil~on, l're~ideJJL of 11H· Idaho Convcnt.ion); id ., a.t 191-192 
(Darnall. Prt>1<idcn t of ~Lar~'iand Convrnt.ion); 'id., at 247 (G1 ylord, Chair-
man of ..\Ii::;::;otlri Con1·<·ution) ; ·irl., at 4p9-47:3 (re~olution adopted at 
·wa:;hington Com·<'nt.ioJJ C1tlli11g for ,;:tate a.etion "to regulate the liquor 
lrnffic"). S<>e genemlly 'N·ot<·, The 'Effeet of the Twenty-fir~1 . Amendmeut 
Oll St.:Lte Authority to Co.utrol lutoxi<'ating Liquor:;, 75 Cohun. L. Rev. 
1578, 1580 (1975) ; XotP, Eeonomie Locali:;m in State .-\lcoholic Beverage 
Lawtl-Experience Under the Twenty-fir~t Amendment, 72 Harv. L. llev. 
1145, 11-±7 (1959) . 
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ZijJri·n, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should 
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority. 
This Court's early decisions ou the Twenty-first Amend-
ment recognized that each State holds great powers over the 
importatio11 of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar-
lcet, supra, co11cemed a liceuse fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types 
of liquor that could be imported from other Sta.tes, Mahoney 
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others 
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States 
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States. Pinch & 
Co. v. NicKittr'ick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Ind-ianapolis Brewing 
Co. v. Liquor eontrol Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The 
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case, 
largely ou the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importation alld transportatiou '' of intoxicating liquors. Yet 
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of 
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2 
"freed the States frow all restrictions upon the police power 
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's 
Market, supra, 229 ·u. S .. at 64. 
Subsequcu t clecisiOilS have given "wide latitude" to state 
liquor regulation, Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 
42 ( HW6), but they also have stressed that important federal 
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported 
liquor in violation of the Export-Import Clause. Departrn.ent 
of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor 
can they insulate the liquor industry from the Fourteenth 
Ameudment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976), and due process, Wis-
. consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970). 
More difficult to define, however, is the exte11t to which 
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce 
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the 
/ 
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Court has held that tht' Federal Government retains some 
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court 
found no violation of the Tweuty-first Amendment in a 
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alco-
hol Administration Act. 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Ziffrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of licensing liquor haulers unt' · atisfied that the 
state program was reasonable. , at 139. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were 
sharpened in Hostetter\', Idlewild Liquor Corp. , 377 U. f:l. 324, 
331- 332 (1 !:){)4) 0 
"Tu draw a conclusiou ... that the Tweuty-first 
Amenchnent has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Com-
merce Clause wherever regulatiou of intoxicating liquors 
is eouccrned would, however, be au absurd oversimplifi-
eatioll . If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
'repeaJPd, ' theu Congress would be left with no regulatory 
power owr interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. ~uch a conclusion would be patently bizarre and 
is d<'monstrably incorrect." 
The Court add eel a siguificant, it' elementary, observation: 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
an' parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of 
the Constitution. each must be considered in the light of the 
othe.r, and in the context of the issues aud interests at stake/ 
in any concrete case." !d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
U. S. 190, 20() (1976).n 
u in Nippert , .. C'ity of Richmond, 627 U. S. 416 (1946) , the Court · 
conlliH'llte<l in a footuote: 
"rEJven tJw <·omm<'J'Ce in int.oxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-fir~t 
AnH•ndnu·nt. gives the StatE'~ tlw highest. dPgrce of control, is not alto-
gc·t.lH·r bcyoud the reach of tlw federal commerce power, at any rate when 
the Stut e'-: rPgulation ~q1111.rE'ly conflict:; with regulation imposed br Con-
gre;:;:; . .. ," !d .. at; 425, 11. J5. 
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This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers 
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held 
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not man-
dated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagr.am & 
Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort 
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a 
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to com-
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a pro-
gram similar in many respects to the California system at 
issue here. The Court held thattthe Loms1ana statute could 
not be enforced ag·ainst the distributor Is ' t · ' · 1 H 1 
Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sher-
man Act challenge to a X ew York law requiring liquor dealers 
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest 
price" charged anywhere in the Uuited States. Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con-
cluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible ecouomic 
pressure> on the [ dealersJ to violate the Sherman Act in order 
to comply,'' but it also cautioned that "[n]othing ·in the 
Twenty-first Amendment. of course, would prevent the en-
forcement of the Sherma11 Act'' against au i11terstate con-
spiracy to fix liquor prices. !d., at 45--46. See Burke\'. Ford, 
389 U. S. ::320 ( HH37) (per curiam). 
These decisions demo11strate that there is uo bright line 
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twenty-
first Amendme11t grants the States virtually complete control 
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how 
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States 
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tions, those eontrols may be subject to the federal com-
merce power in appropriate situations. The competing state 
and federal inter€'sts ca11 be reconciled only after careful scru-
tiny of those concc·rns iu a "concr€'te case.'' Hostetter v. Idle-
wild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332, 
• 
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B 
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor 
of competition is both familiar and substantial. 
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They 
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
a11d our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fuudamental personal freedoms." 
United States v. 'Popco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). JL__ 
St'c Northern Pacific Ry. \. l'n·ited States, 356 U. 8. 1, 4/ - " 
( Hl58). Although this federal interest is expressed through 
a statute rather than a constitutional provision . Congress 
"exercisr edj all the power it possessed" under the Commerce 
Clause when it approved the Shermau Act. Aaantic Clean-
ers & Dyers v. Un-ited States, 286 U. S. 427. 4a5 (1932); see 
City of La,fayette v. Lo·uisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. R., 
at 398. ·we must acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
procomJwtition policy. 
The state interests protected by California's resale price 
maiutenance system were identified by the state courts in this 
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in 
Hice v. Alcoholic Beverage Contml Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d, 
at 451, 579 P. 2d. at 490.'2 Of course, the fiHdings and 
conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court . ------
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the/ 
1 " A::; thr 111111~ual po::;ture of thi~ ca~c reAt>cts, the State of California 
hn,; shown le~:,; than an enthu~ia~tie inlere~t in it~ wine pricing system. 
A~ we noted, thr ~tate agrncy rr~pon~iblr for administering the program 
did not appt•al thr drcision of the Californin Court of Appeal. See p . 4, 
snpm; Tr. of Om! Aqz:. 20. ln:stead, thi" action has bren maintained by 
the Cnlifornia Liquor Dealer" A:s;;ociation, <L prviatr illtl'rvenor. But 
neither thr iutrrvenor nor thr Statr Attornry Genrral, who filed a brief 
amicus ruriae in tmpport of the legi~Jativr schrmc, has sprcifird any state 
interc~t::; protrrt('([ by llw resalr pric(' maintenance system othrr than. 
thot>e notrd in thr ~tate court opinion c:itecl in text, 
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of 
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court 
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views 
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana 
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we 
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the 
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of 
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the rea-
soning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [supm] ." 
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we 
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in 
resale price mai11tenance for distilled liquors. 
In R-ice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind 
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and 
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d. at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 
490.1;; The court foulld little correlation between resale price 
maiuteuauce aDd temperance. It cited a state study showing 
a 42~ increase in per capita liquor consumption in California 
from 1950 to ID72. while resale price maintenance was in effect. 
!d., at 457-458. 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California. Dept. of 
Finance, Alcohol a.11d the State: A Reappraisal of California's 
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the 
court wrote. "at the very lea.st raise a doubt regarding the 
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote 
temperance." lbid.11 
t 3 Th<• California Court of Appeal found no additional ~>tate interests in 
the inHtaut ea~e . 90 Cal. Ap11 . 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761. 
That court rejeeted the suggestion t.hat the wine price program was de-
signed to protec t t he StatP's wine induHtry, pointing out that the statutes 
"do not di;;tingui.-ill between California wines and imported wines." Ibid. 
H Se(• Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter. :~84 U.s. a5, 39 (HJfl6) (citing study 
concludiug that rE'~alo price maintenance in New York State had "nq 
·ignifieatJt effect upon the coiJsumption of alcoholic bevrrage;;") . · 
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in 
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing l small licensees 
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456, 
579 P. 2d, at 493. '" In gauging this interest, the court 
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled ou the claim 
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair 
trade laws were 11ecessary to the economic survival of small 
reta.ilers .... " Ibid. The ageucy relied on a congressional 
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted 
Ultder the Miller-Tycliitgs Act. ThP study revealed that 
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of 
finn failures than ·free trade states. and the rate of growth 
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade 
laws." lb·id., citing 8. Rep. No. 94-466. 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
3 (1975). PoiHting to the congressional abandonment of fair 
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. 5, 
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justifica-
tion to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com-
petition among retailers." 21 Cal. 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at 
494. The Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with 
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983. 
·we have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Cali-
fomia courts that the asserted state interests are less substan-
tial than the uational policy iu favor of competition. That 
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is 
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State 
Supreme Court in Rice. NothiHg in the record in this case 
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small 
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State 
10 The Califomia Supn·mr Court. abo stn.led that orderly market' concli-
tionH might. "rrduce <'X<'<'<l~ivr romprtit.ion, t.herrby encouraging temper-
ntH'<'." 21 Cal. :{d, nt. 4511, 579 P. 2d. at 49il. The concern for t.emp<·nmee, 
howrvcr, wa:; com;iciNPd by thr court ns an indrpendent .-tate interest 
in re~ale price maintenance for liquor. 
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Attorney General in his amicus brief has demonstrated that 
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Cali-
fomians. We need not consider whether the legitimate state 
interests in temperance and the protection of small retailers 
ever could prevail against the undoubted federal interest in a 
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concerns 
~t forward in this case simply are not of the same statuJ"e-as-. --
th~goals of the Sherman Act. 
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly 
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter 
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's 
wiHe pricing program.'n The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is 
JG 8i11ce Midcal requested 
there i::; no que::;tion before 
u.s. c.§ 15. 
Affirmed, 
only injunctive relief from t.he state court, 
"'involving liability fo< damng" w•d/ 
~o: Th ~ ChiAf Justice 
! ,.. t . l' ' Bnmnan 
•· r . T .. .,0 Ste·tart 
,, '! .'.'"11 te 
I' ; . • 1 :·shall 
r\, 1 t i L:~ T31ackwun 
7 ' . ~ i ,;e Rahnquist l«r. J\. ,~ice Stevena 
2-25-80 From: Mr. Justice Powell 
Stylistic Changes Throughout. Circulated: ______________ _ 
2nd DRAFT 'Recirculated: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-97 
California Retail Liquor Deal-~ On Writ of Certiorari to the 
ers Association, Petitioner, Court of Appeal of Califor-
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc .. , 
a. wine distributor. presented a successful antitrust challenge 
to California's resale price maintE'uance and price posting stat-
utes for the wholesa1e wine trade. The issue in this case is 
whether those state 1aws are shie1ded from the Sherman Act 
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 
U. S. 341 (1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
1 
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers must 
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.1 If 
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con-
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that 
1 The statute provides: 
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and 
rectifier shall: 
"(a) Post a :;chedule of selling prier;; of wme to retailer~ or ron::mmers 
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contmct made 
by the person who owns or controls the brand. 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of re:;ale 
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to ret.'iilers or 
consumers." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964). 
• 25 1980 
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producer's brands. !d., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine 
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price 
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair 
trade contract .. . . " !d., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979) . 
The State is divided into three trading areas for adminis-
tration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade con. 
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all whole-
sale transactions in that brand within a given trading area. 
!d., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly, 
state regulations provide that the wine prices posted by a 
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers 
in that area. Midcctl Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 
3d 979. 983-984. 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 (1979'). A licensee 
seling below the established prices faces fines, license suspen-
sion, or outright license revocation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§ 24880. 2 The State has no direct control over wine prices, 
and it does not review the reasonableness of the prices set by 
wine dealers. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine 
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27 
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also 
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract 
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipu1ated that the allega-
tions were true and that the State could fine it or suspend 
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midcal then 
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for 
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction against 
the State's wine pricing system. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme 
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
2 Licen~ees that ,;ell wine below the price:; specified in fair trade con-
tracts or ~chedule. · also may be l:lUbjcct t.o private damage ~uits for uufair 
'competition. I d., § 247 52, 
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§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice 
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court 
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors. 
In that case, the court held that because the State played 
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v. 
Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state 
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The 
prices are established by the producers according to their 
own eco11omic interests, without regard to any actual or 
potential anticohlpetitive effect; the state's role is re· 
stricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers. 
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the 
state to insure that the policiPs of the Sherman Act are 
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2cl , at 486. 
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric-
ing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amend~ 
ment, which insulates state regula.tion of intoxicating liquors 
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that 
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over 
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion 
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establish-
ments. '!"he court emphasized that the California system 
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but 
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the 
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed 
at identical prices.3 Referring to congressional and state 
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main-
8 The court cited record evidence tlmt. iu July 1976, five leading brand::. 
of gin each sold in California for $4.89 for a. fifth of a gallon, and that, 
five leading brands of scotch whiske~' sold for either $8.39 or $8.40 tL fifth . 
Rice ' . Alcoholic Beverage Control Appealli Bd., 21 CaL 3d 431, 454, and 
mm.l4, 16, 5:n! P.2d 476, 491-492, and m·n. H,1o (1978). 
79-97-0PINION 
4 CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM 
tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or 
small retail stores. See pp. 14--15, infra. 
In the instant case, the ·state Court of Appeal found the 
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984, 
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price 
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade. 
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from 
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion, an intervenor.5 The California Supreme Court declined 
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari 
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U. S. - (1979), 
and now affirm the decision of the state court. 
II 
The threshold question ·is whether California's plan for 
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled 
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 
373, 407 (1911) , the Court observed that such arrangements 
are "designed to maintain prices . . . , and to prevent com-
petition among those who trade in [competing goods]." See 
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United 
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United 
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). For many 
years, however, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the 
States to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. 
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect 
4 The State also did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp . v, 
Alcoholic Bevemge Control Appeals Bel., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 492 (1979), which u~ed the analysi~ in Rice to invalidate Califomia's 
resale price maintenance scheme for retail wine ~ales to consumers. 
G The California Retail Liquor Dealer:; A::;sociation, a trade a:;sociation 
of independent retail liquor dealer;:; in California, claim::; over 3,000 
members. 
79-97-0PINION 
CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM '5 
'Small retail establishments that Congress thought might other-
wise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume dis-
counters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was 
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 
801, repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation.6 
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price main-
tenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry 
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale 
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see 
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the 
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices 
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out 
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competi-
tion as effectively as if wholesalers "formed a combination 
and endeavored to establish the same restrictious ... by 
agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 408.7 Moreover, 
there can be no claim that the California program is simply 
intrastate rPgulation beyoud the reach of the Sherman Act. 
See Schwegnwnn Bros. Y. Calvert Corp., supra; Burke v. Ford, 
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
6 The congressional reports accompanymg the Consumer Goods Pricing 
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that repeal of fair trade authority 
would not alter wh.ttever power the States hold under the Twenty-first 
Amendment to control liquor price~. S. Hep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 2 (1975) ; H. R. Hep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2 
(1975). We con~ider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this 
case in Part III, infra. 
7 In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that re~ale 
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. 3, supra, 
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in 
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing sy~tem "cannot be upheld 
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provisions were declared 
invalid in Rice." Midcal Al-uminum, Inc . v Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 
983, 153 Ca.!. Rptr. 757, 760 (1979) . 
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement iJ?. 
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust 
immunity under Parker v. BtoWn, 317 U.S. 34:1 (1943). That 
immunity for state reguiatory pfograms is grounded in out 
federal structure. "In a duai system of government in which, 
under the Constitution, the states at~ sovereign, save only aS 
Congress may constitutionaliy sub~rap~ froin their authority, 
an unexpressed purpose to 11Uii.ify a sta~e's control over i~s 
officers and agents is not lightiy to be attributed to Cougress:'; 
id., at 351. In Paricer v. Brown, this Court foui1ci in the 
~herman Act no purpose to nuiiify st~te powers. Because the 
Act is directed against "indivi(iu~=tl a11d not state action," the 
Court concluded that state iiegJ.!li'J-tqry prograius could nof 
violate it. !d., at 352. . · . _ 
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul .. 
tural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organiza,,. 
tion of local cppperatives to develop_ marketing pQlicies for the 
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Com .. 
mission, which was apJ~ointed by. the goveruor, had to approve 
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state· 
which has created the machinery for establishing. the prorate 
program. . . . [I It is the state , actiug through the Commis .. 
!'ion, which adopts the program an.cl enforces it .... " I d., at 
352. In view of this ext(ei!sive officjal oyersight, the Court 
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. With.o.ut such over, 
sight. the result could have been different. The Court ex-
pressly noted, "a state do~s not give iinniunity to those who 
violate the Sherman Act by autho(izing them to , violat~ i~, 
or by declaring that their actioi1 is lawful. . . ." I d., at 351 , 
. Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In 
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court 
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state ba.r associa ... 
tion were not mandated by ethical standards established by the 
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were not 
• ·~ . .,. .. ,, ' ...- "'\_ '" . • - f • ' ~ ~ 
immune from antitrust attack. "It is not enough that , , , 
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as sovereign." Id., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor 
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579 ( 1976), a majority of the 
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In 
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer adverti1?ing were held 
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reftect[ed] 
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to pro-
fessional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examina-
tion by the policymaker- the Arizona Supreme Court--in 
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
u. s. 350, 362 (1977). 
Only last Term, this Court found antitrust immunity for a 
California program requiring state approval of the location of 
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif. 
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program 
provided that the State would hold a hearing if au automobile 
franchisee protested the establishment or relocation of a com-
peting dealership. !d., at 103. Iu view of the State's active 
role, the Court held, the program was not subject to the 
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered 
business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relo-
cation of automobile dealerships." I d., at 109. 
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immu-
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint 
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy" ; second, the policy must be "actively super-
vised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. , 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of 
BRENNAN, J.) .8 The California system for wine pricing satis .. 
8 See Norman's On the Water/runt, Inc . v. Wheatley, 4 F . 2d 1011, 1018 £./ 
(CAS 119'(1) ~ 4-sheville Tobacco Bel~. v. llTC, 2.o3 F . 2d 502, 509-510 (CA4 
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly 
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte-
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply author-
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private 
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the 
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate 
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not moni-
tor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamina-
tion" of the program.\) The national policy in favor of 
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy 
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private 
price-fixing arrangement. As Parl~er teaches, "a state does 
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action 
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351. 
III 
Petitioner contends that eveu if California's system of wine 
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amend-
ment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Sec-
tion 1 of that Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition 011 the manufacture, sale or transportation 
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain 
power to regulate tra.ffic in liquor: "The transportation or 
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the 
1959); Note, Parker v. Brown Rt>vbited: The State Action Doctrine After 
Goldfarb, Cantor, and BateN, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 (1977) . 
9 The California program contra~:~ts with the approach of those States 
that completely control the di~trii.Jution of liquor within their bounclariel:i. 
E. g., Va. Code §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Such comprehen~ive reg-
ulation would be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943), since the State would "di~place unfettered bu~in~s 
freedom" with its own power. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox 
Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) ; see State Board v. Young's Market Co .• 
Z_99 U.S. 59, 63 (1936). 
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 
The remaining question before us is whether § 2 permits 
California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted 
under the commerce power-in favor of competition. 
A 
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the 
provision rather than the history behind it. State Board v. 
Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1936). 10 In terms, 
the Amendment gives the States control over the "transporta-
tion or importation" of liquor into their territories. Of course, 
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power 
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol. 
10 The approach is supported by sound canons of constitutional inter-
pretation and demonstrates a wise reluchmce to wade into the complex 
currents beneath the eongresr;ional rrt>olution that proposed the Amend-
ment and the ~:;tate conventions that ratified it. The Senate ~:;ponsor 
of the resolution said the purpose of § 2' was " to restore to the State ' .. . 
absolute coni rol in effect O\'er inter::;tate commerce affecting intoxi-
cating liquors . ... " 76 Cong. Rec . 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen. 
Blaine). Yet he abo madr ~tatement~ ~upporting .Ylideal's claim that§ 2 
was drsignecl only to ensure that "dry" Statrs could not. be force by the 
Federal Government to permit the ~:;a l e of liquor. See id., at 4140-4141. 
The sketchy recordt> of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the 
thrust. of § 2, although drlegates ut. ~everal convrntions expres::;rd their hope 
that state rrgulation of liquor traffic would brgin immediately. E. Brown, 
Ratification of the Twenty-fin;t Amendment to the Com;titution 104 
(1938) (Wibon, President of the Idaho Convention); id., at 191-192 
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chair-
man of Missouri Convention); id., a.t 469-473 (resolution adopted at, 
Washington Convention c~llling for state action "to regulate the liquor 
traffic") . See generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment 
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquor:;, 75 Colt1m. L. Rev. 
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Localit>m in State Alcoholic Beverage 
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Uev, 
1145, 1147 (1959). 
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S~ 132, 138 (1939). We should 
not, however, lose sight of the e~plicit grant of authority, 
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amend-
ment recognized that each State holds great powers over the 
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar .. 
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types 
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney 
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two other~ 
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States 
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch & 
Co. v. McKittriclc, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing 
Co. v. Liquor Control Cornrn'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The 
Court upheld the ch!1llenged state authority in each case, 
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet 
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of 
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2 
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power 
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's 
Market, supra, 229 U.S., at 64. 
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state 
liquor regulation, Sea(Jrarn & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 
42 (1966) , but they aiso have stressed that important federal 
interests in liquor ·matters survived the ratincation of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported 
liquor in violation of the E){port-Import Clause. Department 
of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 D. S. 341 (1964). Nor 
can they insulate the liquor industry fro!n the Fourteenth 
Amendment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976), and due process, Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970). 
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which 
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce 
powet. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the 
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some 
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court 
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amend1pent in a 
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alco-
hol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 ( 1935). And in Ziffrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the 
state program was reasonable. 308 U. S., at 139. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were 
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 
331-332 (1964). 
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Com-
merce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors 
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplifi-
cation. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory 
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and 
is demonstrably incorrect." 
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation: 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of 
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the 
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake 
in any concrete case." Id. , at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
u. s. 190, 206 (1976).11 
11 In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court 
commented in a footnote: 
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Tweuty-first 
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not, alto-
gether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when 
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation impo::;rd by Con-
gress ..•. " !d., at 425, n. 15. 
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This pragmatic effort to hannonize state and federal powells 
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held 
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not man-
dated by a S~te. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & 
Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort 
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945) . In Schwegman,_ 
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a 
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a. distributor to ~om:: 
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a pro-
gram similar in many respects to the California system at 
issue here. The Court held that because the Louisiana stat-: 
ute violated the Sherman Act, it could not be enforced against 
the distributor. Fifteen years later, the Court rejected aSher:-
man Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers 
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest 
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con .. 
eluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic 
pressure on the [ deaiers] to vioiate the Sherman Act in order 
to comply." but it also cautio11ed that "[n] othing in the 
Twenty-first Ame11dment, of course. would prevent the en .. 
forcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate con-
spiracy to fix liquor priers. i d., at 45---46. See Burke v. Ford, 
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line 
between federai and state powers over liquor. The Twenty~ 
first Amendment grants the States virtuaily compiete control 
over whether to permit importation oi; saie of iiquor and how 
to structure the iiquor distribution system. Although States 
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tions, those controls may be subject to the federal com-
merce power in appropriate situations. The competing state 
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scru-
tiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idle-. 
wild ·Liquor Corp., 377 u. s.l at 332, 
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B 
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor 
of competition is both familiar and substantial. 
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They 
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." 
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972). 
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 456 U. S. 1, 4 
( 1958) . Although this federal interest is expressed through 
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress 
"exercis[ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce 
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Clean-
ers & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see 
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S., 
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
procompetition policy. 
The state interests protected by California's resale price 
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this 
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in 
Rice v. Alcoholic Bevemge Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d, 
at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 490.12 Of course, the findings and 
conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court 
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the 
12 As the unusual posture of this case reflects, the State of California 
has shown less than an enthusiastic intere,t in its wine pricing system. 
As we noted, the state agency re:;ponsible for administering the program 
did not appeal the decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p. 4, 
supra; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Instead, this action has been maintained by 
the California Liquor Dealers As:;ociation, a prviate intervenor. But 
neither the intervenor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a brief 
amicus curiae in support of the legi~laJive scheme, has specified any stato 
interests protected by the rc:;ale price maintenance system other than 
those noted in the si:.o't.te court opinions cited in text, 
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of 
Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court 
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views 
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana 
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we 
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the 
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 314 U.S. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of 
the State's system of winP pricing was "·controlled by the rea-
soning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [s'Upm] ." 
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we 
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in 
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors. 
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind 
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and 
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 
490.1 3 The court found little correlation between resale price 
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing 
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California 
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect. 
Id., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of 
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's 
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 ( 1974). Such studies, the 
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the 
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote 
temperance." lbid.14 
18 The California Court of Appeal found no additional state interests in 
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 15:3 Cal. Rptr., a.t 760-761. 
That court rejcctrd the sugge:;tion that the wine price program was de-
signed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the ;,iatutes 
"do not distingullih between California winrs and imported wim•:::. " Ibid. 
14 See Seagram & So11s v. Hoiitetter, 384 U. S. 35,39 (1966) (citing study 
concludii1g that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no 
slgnifica11t effect upon the cousmnption of alcoholic beverage~"). 
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in 
orderly JJlarket conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees 
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456, 
579 P. 2d, at 493.' 5 In gauging this interest, the court 
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim 
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair 
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small 
retailers .... " Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional 
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted 
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that 
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of 
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth 
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade 
laws." Ibid. , citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair 
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. 5, 
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justifica-
tion to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com-
petition among retailers." 21 CaL 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at 
494. The Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with 
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983. 
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Cali-
fornia courts that the asserted state interests are less substan-
tial than the national policy in favor of competition. That 
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is 
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State 
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the record in this case 
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small 
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State 
15 The California Supreme Court al:so stated that orderly market condi-
tions might ''reduce excrssive competition, thrrrby encouraging temper-
ance." 21 Cal. :-kl, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance, 
however, was considerrd by the court a::; an independent state interest 
in resale price maintenance for li4uor. 
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Attorney General in his am·icus brief has demonstrated that 
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Cali-
fornians. We need not consider whether the legitimate sta:w 
'interests in temperance and the protection of small retail~r~ 
ever could prevail against the undoubted feder;:tl interest in a 
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concerns 
put forward in this case simply ar~ not of the same stature a~ 
the goals of the Sherman Act, 
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly 
decided that the Twenty,.first Amendment provides no shelter 
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's 
wine pricing program.16 The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is 
Affirmed, 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN did not take part in the considera .. 
tion or decision of this case, 
1 6 Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief from the state court, 
there is no quillltJOn before tus involving liability for damages under 15, 
u.s. c.§ 15. 
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MR. JusTICl!: PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc .. , 
a wine distributor, presented a. successful antitrust challenge 
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting stat-
utes for the wholesa1e wine trade. 'The issue in this case is 
whether those state 'laws are shie1ded from the Sherman Act 
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 
U.S. 341 (1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
3 
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers must 
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.1 If 
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con-
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that ~ 
1 The statute pro~·ide : 
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensrcl t.o sell wine, wine rectifier, and 
rectifier shall: 
"(a) Post a t:;chedule of selling pricel:l of wine to retailerM or consumers 
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made 
by the person who owns or controls the bmnd. 
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of l'el:lale 
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or 
consumers." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (We t 1964). 
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producer's brands. !d., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine 
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price 
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair 
trade contract .... " !d., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979) . 
The State is divided into three trading areas for adminis-
tration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade 'COn-
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all whole-
sale transactions in that brand within a given trading area. 
!d., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly, 
state regulations provide that the wine prices posted by a 
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers 
in that area. Midcctl Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 
3d 979. 983-984. 153 Cal. Rptr. 757. 762 ( 1979). A licensee 
seling below the established prices faces fines, license suspen-
sion. or outright license revocation. CaL Bus. & Prof. Code 
§ 24880.2 The State has no direct colltrol over wine prices, 
and it does not review the reasonableness of the prices set by 
wine dealers. 
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine 
in South em California. In July 1978, the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27 
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department a.lso 
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract 
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allega-
tions were true and that the State could fine it or suspend 
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midca.l then 
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for 
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction against 
the State's wine pricing system. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme 
restrains trade in violation of tlw Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.~ 
2 Licem;ees that ::;ell wine below the pril'et> ~:>1Jecifird in fair trade con-
tracts or schedule;; al::;o may be ::;ubjrct to private dmnage ;:;UJts l'or unfair 
'competition. I d., § 24752, 
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§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in R 'ice 
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court 
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors. 
In that case, the court h~ld that because the State played 
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v. 
Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state 
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The 
prices are established by the producers according to their 
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or 
potential an ticompetitive effect; the state's role is re· 
stricted to enfm•ciug the prices specified by the producers. 
There is no control, or 'pointed l'e-examination,' by the 
state to insute that the policies of the Sherman Act are 
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2cl, at 486. 
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric-
ing policies were protected by ~ 2 of the Twenty-first Amend~ 
ment, which insulates state regula.tion of intoxicating liquors 
from many federal restrictions. 'I'he court determined that 
the natioual policy in favor of competition should prevail over 
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion 
of temperance and the pteservation of small retail establish-
ments. '1'he court emphasized that the California system 
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers but 
also frequently resulted in horizontal price xing. nder the 
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed 
at identical prices.3 Referring to congressional and state ~ 
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main- / 
8 The court cited record evidence tlwt in July 1976, five leadmg brands 
of gin each ;;old in California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and that, 
five leading brand;; of scotch whil'!ke~ · ~old for either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth . 
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bel., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and 
mlll.14, 16, 519 P .2d 476,491- 492, and :un. H,lo (1978) . 
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or 
5mall retail stores. See pp. 14--15, infra. 
In the instant case, the ·state Court of Appeal found the 
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984, 
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the 'Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price 
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade. 
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from 
this Court, did not appea.J. the ruling in this case.4 An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa~ 
tion, an intervenor.5 The California Supreme Court declined 
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari 
from this Court. We granted the writ, - U. S.- (1979), 
and now affirm the decision of the state court. 
II 
The threshold question is whether California's plan for 
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled 
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 
373, 407 (1911) , the Court observed that such arrangements 
are "designed to maintain prices ... , and to prevent com~ 
petition among those who trade in [competing goods]." See 
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United 
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United 
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). For many 
years, however, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the 
States to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. 
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect 
4 The State also did not appeal the decitlion in Capiscean Corp. v. 
Alcoholic Bevemge Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 492 (1979) , which u::;ed the analysi" in Rice to invalidate California's 
resale price maintenance ::;cheme for retail wine ::;ale; to con::;umer~. 
5 The California Retail Liquor Dealer::; A~ociation, a trade a~ociation 
of independent retail liquor dealer::! in California, claim::; over 3,000 
members. 
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-small retail establishments that Congress thought might other-
wise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume dis-
counters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was 
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 
801, repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation.u 
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price main-
tenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry 
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale 
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schweg-
rnann Bra::;. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951); see 
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the 
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices 
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out 
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competi-
tion as effectively as if wholesalers "formed a combination 
and endeavored to establish the same restrictions ... by 
agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 408.7 Moreover, 
there can be no claim that the California program is simply 
intrastate regulation b0yotHJ tht• reach of the Sherman Act. 
See Schwegmann Bros. Y. Calvert Corp., supra; Burke v. Ford, 
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam) . 
6 The congre.:;~ioual report::; accompanying the Consumer Goods Pricing 
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that repeal of fair trade authority 
would not alter whatever power the State,:; hold under the Twenty-first 
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Se.:;s., 3, n. 2 
(1975). We con::;ider the effect of the Twenty-fir::;t. Amendment on this 
case in Part III, infra. 
7 In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that re~ale 
price maintenance rc:sulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. 3, sup1'a, 
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in 
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing sy::;t.em "cannot be upheld 
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provision~ were declared 
invalid in Rice." Midcal Al-uminum, Inc . v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 
983, 153 Cal. Rptr. 7.57, 760 (1979 ). 
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement i~ 
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitJ:"ust 
immunity under Parker v. Btowri, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That 
immunity for state reguiatory programs is grounded in out 
federal structure. "In a duai system of government in whiei~ 1 
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only a.S 
Congress may constitutionaliy sub~rap~ from their au~hority, 
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a sta~e's control over ips 
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress/; 
ja., at 351. In Paricer v. Brown, this Court found in the 
Sherman Act no purpose to nuiiify stflte powers. Because the 
Act is directed ~gainst "indivi(iu11l a11d not state action," the 
Court concluded that state iiegjll11-tQry prograins could nof; 
violate it. !d., at 352. . · . . 
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul .. 
tural Prorate Advi~:>ory Commission authorized the organiza.. 
tion of local cppperatives to develop_marketing pQlicies for the 
raisin crop. The Coui:t emnhasized that the Advisory Com .. 
mission, which was aPl~ointed by_the govet:uor, had to approve 
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state· 
which has created the inachinery for establishing. the prorate 
program. . . . [I] t is the state. acting through the Commis-
~ion, which adopts the pt:ogram an.d enforces it .... " Id., at 
352. In view of this ext.e11sive officjal oyersight, the Court 
wrote, the Shetman Act did not apply. With.o.ut such over,. 
sight, the result could have been different. The Court ex-
pressly noted, "a state do~s not give imn1unity to those who 
violate the Sherman Act by autho~izing them to. violatE} i~, 
or by declaring that their actioi1 is lawful. ... " T d., at 351, 
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In 
Goldfarb v. Viryin,ia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) , the Court 
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar associa-
tion were not mandated by ethical standards established by the 
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were no: / 
iiiiiUUne frOm imtiiiust attack. "It iS nO~ enoUgh thai , • / 
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as sovereign." ld., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor 
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a majority of the 
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In 
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held 
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect[ed] 
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to pro-
fessional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examina-
tion by the policymaker-the Arizolla Supreme Court-in 
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizo·na, 433 
U. S. 350, 362 (1977). 
Only last Term, this Court found antitrust immunity for a 
California program requiring state approval of the location of 
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif. 
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program 
provided that the State would hold a hearing if an automobile 
franchisee protested the establishment or relocation of a com-
peting dealership. I d., at 103. In view of the State's active 
role, the Court held, the program was not subject to the 
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered 
business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relo-
cation of automobile dealerships." I d., at 109. 
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immu-
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint 
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively super-
vised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of ../ 
BRENNAN, J.).8 The California system for wine pricing satis .. /. 
8 See Norman's On the Waterfl'anl, Inc . v. Wheatley, 4~ 
(CA3 l9'U) ~ 4.shllville 'l'obacco Bd~. v. ll'l'C, 2.63 F. 2rl-502, 509-510 (CM 
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly 
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte-
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply author-
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private 
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the 
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate 
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not moni-
tor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamina-
tion" of the program.\) The national policy in favor of 
tition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy 
of state involvement over what is essentially a private 
p e xing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does 
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action 
is lawful. ... " 317 U.S., at 351. 
III 
Petitioner contends that even if California's system of wine 
pricing is not protected state action , the Twenty-first Amend-
ment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Sec-
tion 1 of that Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amend-
ment's prohibition on the manufacture, sale or transportation 
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain 
power to regulate traffic in liquor: "The transportation o: / 
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of thy 
1959); Note, Parker v. Brown Revi~:~ited : The State Action Doctrine After 
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. R.ev . 898,916 (1977) . 
9 The California program coutrai:its with the approa~h of those States 
that completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries. 
E. g., Va. Code§§ 4-15, 4-28 (Repl. Vol. 1979) . Such comprehcn;;ive reg-
ulation would be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943), since the State would ''displace unfettered bu~:~iness 
freedom" with its own power. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Pox 
Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) ; see State Board v. Young's Market Co .,. / 
Z.99 U .. S. 59, 63 (1936). ~ 
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 
The remaining question before us is whether § 2 permits 
California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted 
under the commerce power-in favor of competition. 
A 
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the 
provision rather than the history bf'hind it. State Board v. 
Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1936). 10 In terms, 
the Amendment gives the States control over the "transporta-
tion or importation" of liquor into their territories. Of course, 
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power ~ 
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol./ 
10 The approach is supported by sound canons of constitutional inter-
pretation and demonstrates a wise reluctance to wade into the complex FH..o ~~ .J ..f 
urrent:> beneath the congrE-ssional t,he Amend-
ment and t H' :>tate conventionil The SenatE' ;,;ponsor 
of th esolution said the purpo:>e of § 2· wn:s "to rE-store to the 
a solute control in effect O\'er interstate commerce affecting intoxi-
cating liquors .. .. " 76 Cong. Rec . 414-3 (1933) (remarks of Sen. 
Blaine). 'frt he abo made ~tHtf'nwnt :s ~:;upporti11g :Vfidr~tl's claim that§ 2 
was designed only to ensure that "dry"' Sta.tes could not be force by the 
Federal Governme>nt to permit thr :sale of liquor. See id., at 4140-4141. 
The sketchy record::; of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the 
thrust of§ 2, although delegates at ::;everal conventions exprcs::wd their hope 
that. state rcgnlation of liquor traffic would brgin immediately. E. Brown, 
Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment. to the Con::;titution 104 
(1938) (Wilson, Pre::;ident of the Idaho Convention); id., at. 191-192 
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., nt 247 (Gaylord, Chair-
man of Mi;;souri Convention); id., a.t 469-473 (resolution adopted at 
Wa;;hingt.on Convent,ion ~tiling for &i<Lte action "to regulate the liquor 
traffic"). SPe generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-fir;;t Amendment 
on State Authority to Control lntoxiculmg Liquor;;, 75 Cohm1. L. Rev. 
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Loculil:lm in State Alcoholic Beverage 
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-fir«t Amendment, 72 Harv. L. HI:JV, 
1145, 1147 (1959). ~ 
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S: 132, 138 (1939). We should 
not, however, lose sight of the e~plicit grant of authority, 
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amend .. 
ment recognized that each State holds great powers over the 
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar ... 
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types 
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney 
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others 
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States 
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch & 
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing 
Co. v. Liquor Control Cornrn'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The 
Court upheld the chnJlenged state autho't'ity in each case, 
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importation and transpol'tation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet 
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of 
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2 
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power 
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's 
Market, supra, 229 U.S., at 64. 
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state 
liquor regulation, Seagram&: Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 
42 ( 1966), but they aiso have stressed that important federal 
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported 
liquor in violation o£ the Export-Import Clause. Department 
of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U. B. 341 (1964). Nor 
can they insulate the liquor industry fro!n the Fourteenth 
Amendment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976) , and due process, Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970) . 
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which 
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce 
powet. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the 
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some 
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court 
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendrpent in a 
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alco-
hol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 ( 1935). And in Ziffrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the 
state program was reasonable. 308 U. S., at 139. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were 
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp ., 377 U.S. 324, 
331-332 (1964) . 
"To draw a conclusion ... that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Com-
merce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors 
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplifi-
cation. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory 
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and 
is demonstrably inconect." 
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation: 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of 
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the 
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake 
in any concrete case." ld., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
u. s. 190, 206 (1976).11 
11 In Nippel't v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court 
commented in a footnote : 
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Tweuty-fir~t 
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not alto-
gether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when 
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation imposed by Con-
gress ..•. " ld., at 42,1), n. 15. 
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This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powe:r;s 
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held 
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not man-: 
dated by a St?-te. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagmm & 
Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort 
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945) . In Schwegman'fl, 
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a 
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a. distributor to com~ 
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a pro-
gram similar in many respects to the California system at 
issue here. The Court held that because the Louisiana stat-: 
ute violated the Sherman Act, it could not be enforced against 
the distributor. Fifteen years later, the Court rejected aSher-
man Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers 
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest 
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram &, 
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con .. 
eluded that the statute exerted "nD irresistible economic 
pressure on the [deaiers] to vioiate the Sherman Act in order 
to comply," but it also cautio11ed that "[njothing in the 
Twenty-first Amendment, of course, would prevent the en .. 
forcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate con-
spiracy to fix liquor prices. id., at 45--46. See Burke v. Ford, 
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam) . 
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line 
between federai and state powers over liquor. The Twenty~ 
first Amendment grants the States virtuaily compiete control 
over whether to permit importation or saie of iiquor and how 
to structure the iiquor distribution system. Although States 
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tions, those controls may be subject to the federal com-
merce power in appropriate situations. The competing state 
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scru-
tiny of those concerns in a "conc~·~te case." Hostetter v . ldle"' / 
wild ·Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332, ~ 
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B 
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor 
of competition is both familiar and substantial. 
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They 
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." 
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972). 
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 456 U. S. 1, 4 
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through 
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress 
"exercis[edj all the power it possessed" under the Commerce 
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Clean-
ers & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see 
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Powe1' & Light Co., 435 U. S., 
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
procompetition policy. 
The state interests protected by California's resale price 
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this 
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr. , at 761 and in 
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d, 
at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 490.1 ~ Of course, the findings and 
conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court ~ 
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the/ 
12 As the unusual posture of this casE' refiects, the State of California 
has shown less than an enthn~iaHtic intRrP<'t in its wine pricing system. 
As we noted, the state agency rrtiponsible for administering the program 
did not appeal the decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p. 4, 
supra; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Instead, this action has been m::untain d 
the alifornia Liquor Dealers A:;.-;oeJation, a p ,t e mtervenor. But 
neither the intervenor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a. brief 
amicus c·uriae in support of the legi~lative ~<Cherne, has specified any state 
interest· protected by the resale price maintenance system other tha.ij 
those noted in the :sta.te court opinions cited in text. 
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of 
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court 
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views 
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana 
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we 
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the 
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 314 U. S. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of 
the State's system of winP pricing was "·controlled by the rea-
soning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [s·upra] ." 
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we 
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in 
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors. 
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind 
liquor resale price maintenance : "to promote temperance and 
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 
490.1 3 The court found little correlation between resale price 
maintenance aHd temperance. It cited a state study showing 
a 42 % increase in per capita liquor consumption in California 
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect. 
Id., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of 
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's 
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the 
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the 
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote 
temperance." Ib·id.14 
13 The California Court. of AppE>al found no additional stale interests in 
the instant caHe. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761. 
That court rejectE>d the :;ugge:;tiou that the wine price program wal:i de-
signed to protect the St<~te's wine iuduHtry, pointing out that the ,;tatutes 
"do not dhltingnllih between Califomia wines and imported wine.:." Ibid. 
14 See Seagram & Sous v. Flo8tetter, 384 U. S. 35, 39 (1966) (citing study 
concluding that re:;ale price maintenance in New York State had "no 
slgnificatlt effect upon the cotnnnption of alcoholic beverage~"). 
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in 
orderly :p1arket conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees 
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456, 
579 P. 2d, at 493.15 In gauging this interest, the court 
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim 
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair 
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small 
retailers. . . ." Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional 
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted 
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that 
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of 
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth 
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade 
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
3 ( 1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair 
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. 5, 
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justifica-
tion to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com-
petition among retailers." 21 Cal 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at 
494. The Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with 
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983. 
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Cali-
fornia courts that the asserted state interests are less substan-
tial than the national policy in favor of competition. That 
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is 
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State 
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the record in this case 
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small 
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State 
15 The California Supreme Court al~o stated that orderly market condi-
tions might "reduce excessive competition, thereby encouraging temper-
ance." 21 Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance, 
however, was considered by the court a::; an independent state interest 
in resale price maintenance for liquor. 
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Attorney General in his amicus brief has demonstrated that 
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Cali-
fornians. We need not consider whether the legitimate sta:t~ 
'interests in temperance and the protection of small retail{{rs 
ever could prevail against the undoubted federfl,.l interest in a 
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concerns 
put forward in this case simply ar!OJ not of the same stature as 
the goals of the Sherman Act, 
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly 
decided that the Twenty,.first Amendment provides no shelter 
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's 
wine pricing program.16 The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is 
Affirmed, 
MR. JusTICE BnENNAN did not take part in the considera~ 
tion or decision of this case, 
16 Since Midca.l requested only injunctive relief from tl1e sta,te court, 
there is no que;:;tion before u:s involving liability for damages under 15, 
u.s. c.§ 15. 
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Midc~tl Aluminum, Inc., et al. District. 
[March -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 
a wine distributor. presented a successful antitrust challenge 
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting stat-
utes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is 
whether thosE' state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act 
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 
U. S. 341 ( 1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
I 
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, arid rectifiers must 
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.1 If 
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con-
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that 
1 The statute provides: 
"Each wine grower, wholc~tialer licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, arid 
rectifier shall: 
"(a) Post a tiChedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers 
for which his rE'~ale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made 
by the person who owns or controls the brand. 
"(b) Make aml file a. fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale 
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or 
consumers." Cal Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964) . 
1~tl0 
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producer's brands. Id., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine 
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price 
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair 
trade contract .... " Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979). 
The State 1s divided into three trading areas for adminis-
tration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade 'Con-
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all whole-
sale transactions in that brand within a given trading area. 
!d., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly, 
state regulations provide that the wine prices posted by a 
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers 
in that area.. Jlidcal Alwninurn, tnc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 
3d 979, 98a-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 (1979). A licensee 
seling below tlH' established prices faces fines, license suspen-
sion, or outright license revocation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 
§ 24880." The State has no direct control over wine prices, 
and it does not review the reasonableness of the prices set by 
wine dealer~. 
Midcal AlumiHum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine 
in Southem California. In July 1978, the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27 
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price 
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also 
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract 
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allega-
tions were true and that the State could fine it or suspend 
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midcal then 
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for 
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction against 
the State's wine pricing system. 
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme 
restrains tratle in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. 
2 Licensees that srll wine below the prices specified in fair trade con-
tracts or ~chedule~ al~o may be ~ubject to private damage ~uits for unfair 
competition. ld ., 24752. 
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§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice 
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 43i, 
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court 
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors. 
In that case, the court held that because the State played 
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v. 
Brown immunity for the program. 
"In the pric€' maintenance program before us, the state 
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The 
prices arc established by the producers according to their 
O\Vll <'COIIomic interests. without regard to any actual or 
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is re .. 
stricted to pnforcing the prices specified by the producers. 
Tlwrc is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the 
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are 
not 'unncc<'ssarily subordinated' to state policy." 21 
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486. 
Rice also r<',kctf'd the claim that California's liquor pric-
ing policies w<>re protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors 
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that 
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over 
the state i11terests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion 
of temp<'ranee and the preservation of small retail establish-
ments. The court emphasized that the California system 
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but 
also frequently resulted iu horizontal price fixing. Under the 
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed 
at identical prices.3 Referring to congressional and state 
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main-
8 The court ('itE'd record evidence that in .July 1976, five leading brands 
of gin each ::;old in California for $4.8!:) for a fifth of a gallon, and that 
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth. 
Rice v. Alcohohc Beverage Control Appeals Bel., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and 
Dn. 14, 16, 579 P . 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978) . 
• 
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or 
small retail stores. See pp. 14--15, infra. 
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the 
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984, 
153 Cal. Rptr. , at 760. The court ordered the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price 
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade. 
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from 
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal 
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa-
tion, an intervenor.5 The California Supreme Court declined 
to hem the case, and tlw Dealers Association sought certiorari 
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979), 
and no\\ affirm the decision of the state court. 
II 
The thrrshold question is whether California's plan for 
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled 
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains 
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S . 
373, 407 (1911), the Court observed that such arrangements 
are "(lesign<'d to maintain prices ... , and to prevent com-
petition among those who trade in [competing goods]." See 
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United 
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United 
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). For many 
years, however, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the 
States to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. 
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect 
4 The State al,:o did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v .. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal.. 
Rptr. 492 (1979), which u::;ed the analysis in Rice to invalidate California's 
resale pricP maintenance ::;cheme for retail wine sales to consumers. 
5 The California. Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association 
of independent retail liquor dealers in California, claim:; over 3,{)()()J 
members. 
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small retail establishments that Congress thought might other~ 
wise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume dis-
counters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was 
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 
801, repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation.6 
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price main-
tenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry 
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity. 
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale 
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schweg-
mann Bros. r . Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see 
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. 
Seagram & Sam;, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the 
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices 
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out 
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competi-
tion as effectively as if wholesalers "formed a combination 
and endeavoreJ to establish the same restrictions ... by 
agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 408.7 Moreover, 
there can br no claim that the Califomia progTam is simply 
intrastate regulation beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. 
See Sch weyrnantl Bros. v. Calvert Corp., supra; Burke v. Ford, 
389 U.S. 320 (1H67) (per curiam). 
6 The congre;~ional reports accompanying the Consumer Goods Pricing 
Act of 1975, 89 Stnt. 801, noted that repeal of fair trade authority 
would not alt.er whatever power the States hold under the Twenty-first 
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess., 2 (1975): H. R. Rep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2 
(1975) . We con,;ider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this 
case in Part III, infra. 
7 In Rice, the Cahfornia Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale 
price maintf'nancc resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. 3, supra, 
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in 
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld 
for the same reasons th(' retail price maintenance provisions were declared 
invalid in Rice." Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 
983, 153 Cal. Rptr 757, 760 (Hl79). 
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in 
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust 
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That 
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our 
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which, 
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as 
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, 
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its 
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 
/d., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the 
Sherman Act uo purpose to nullify statf' powers. Because the 
Act is direch•d against "individual and not state action," the 
Court concluckd that state regulatory programs could not 
violate It. I d. , at 352. 
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul-
tural Proratr Advisory Commission authorized the organiza-
tion of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the 
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Com-
mission, whiCh was appointed by the governor, had to approve 
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state 
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate 
program. . . . f Tlt is the state, acting through the Commis-
sion, whieh adopts the program and enforces it .... " I d., at 
352. In viPw of this extensive official oversight. the Court 
wrote. the ~herman Act did not apply. Without such over-
sight, the result could have been different. The Court ex-
pressly noted. "a state does not give immunity to those who 
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, 
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ... " I d., at 351. 
Several recellt decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In 
Goldfarb v. Viroinia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 ( 1975), the Court 
concludf'd that fee schedules enforced by a state bar associa-
tion were uot mandated by f'thical standards established by the 
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were not 
immune from aut,itrust attack. "It is not enough that .•• 
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, 
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the 
State acting as sovereign." I d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor 
v. D etroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) , a majority of the 
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when 
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In 
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held 
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect[ed] 
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to pro-
fessional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examina-
tion by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in 
enforcemeut proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U. S. 350, 362 (1977). 
Only last T<'rm, this Court found antitrust immunity for a 
California program requiring state approval of the location of 
new au tomobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif. 
V; Orrin W. Pox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program 
provided that the ~tate would hold a hearing if an automobile 
franchisee protested the establishmeut or relocation of a com-
peting dealership. ld., at 103. In view of the State's active 
role, the Court held , the program was not subject to the 
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered 
business freedom i.u the matter of the establishment and relo-
cation of automobile dealerships." I d. , at 109. 
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immu-
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint 
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed 
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively super-
vised" by the State itself. Cdy of Lafayette v. Louisiana 
Power & Light Co ., 435 U. S. 389, 410 ( 1978) (opinion of 
BRENN AN, J.) .8 The California system for wine pricing sa tis-
8 Se0 Norman's On th~: Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F . 2d 1011, 1018' 
(CA3 t971) ; Asheville Tobacco Bd. v. F.TC, 293 F. 2.d &02, 509-510 (CA4: 
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly 
.stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte~ 
p.ance. The program, however, does not meet the second 
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply author~ 
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private 
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the 
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate 
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not moni-
tor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamina-
tion" of the program.n The national policy in favor of 
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy 
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private 
price fixing, arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does 
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing thetu to violate it, or by declaring that their action 
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351. 
III 
Petitioner con tends that even if California's system of wine 
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amend-
ment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Sec-
tion 1 of that Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amend-
ment's prohibitioH Oll the manufacture, sale or transportation 
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain 
power to rPgulate traffic in liquor: "The transportation or 
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the 
1959); Note, Parke1' v. Brown Revi::;ited: The State Action Doctrine After 
Goldfarb, Cautor, and Bates. 77 Colum . L. Hev. 898,916 (1977). 
u The California. program contra::;ts with the approach of those States 
that completely control the di~tribution of liquor within their boundaries. 
E. g., Va. Code§§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Such comprehen~ive reg-
ulation would bE' imm\lll(~ from the Slwrrnan Act unde1· Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. :Hl (1 P43), ~ince the State would "di~place unfettered business 
freedom" wtth it::; own power. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox 
Co., 4:~9 F . S. 9(), 109 (1978); ::;ce State Board v. Young's Market Co., 
299 u.s. 59, 63 {1\136). 
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 
The remai11ing question before us is whether § 2 permits 
California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted 
under the commerce power-in favor of competition. 
A 
In determimng state powers under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the 
provision rather than the history behind it. State Board v. 
Young's lvfarket eo., 299 U.S. 59. 63-64 (1936)."> In terms, 
the Amendllleut gives the States control over the "transporta-
tion or importation" of liquor into their territories. Of course, 
such control lugieally en tails considerable regulatory power 
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol. 
10 Tlw approa('h 1" .,upportetl by sound canons of constitutional inter-
pretation and drmonstrate:; a wi:;e reluctance to wade into the complex 
I 
current<~ ben<'alh llw eougrf',;~ional proposal of the Amendmeut and 
it<~ mtificatiou in 1 h<' Rial<' eonvPntion~. The Senate spom;or of the Amend-
ment resolutiOn ,-<nid the purpo,;e of § 2 wa::; "to restore to the States ... 
absolute eontrol iu rffect o\·er inter::;tate commerce affecting intoxi-
cating liquor:-:. . ·· 71i Coug. Rcc. 4143 (193:3) (remarks of Sen. 
Blaine). Yet he al~o made stntrnwnts HUpporting Midcal'::; elaim that§ 2 
was designed only to <'n:<uw thai ·'dry" Sla.te:; could not be force by the 
Federal Oovrmnu•ut to permit. the sale of liquor. See id., at 4140-4141. 
The sketchy record,.; of the statt' conventions reflect no consensus on the 
thrust of§ 2, althou~h delegates at seventl convent ions expressed their hope 
that state regulation of liquor traffic would begin immediately. E. Brown, 
Ratification of the Twenty-first. Amendment to the Constitution 104 
(1938) (Wilson, Pre,.;ident. of the Idaho Convention); id., at 191-192 
(Darnall, Prrsidcnt of .:\Inryland Convention); id., at 247 (Oa.ylord, Chair-
man of Mis,;ouri Couwntion); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at 
Washington Com·eution calling for state action "to regulate the liquor 
traffic"). See geiH'J'ally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment 
on State Authority t.o Control lntoxieating Liquors, 75 Colurn. L. Rev. 
1578, 1580 ( 1975) ; ~ otc, Eronomic Locali~m in State Alcoholic Beverage 
Laws-Expenenee Puder the Twf'nty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 
1145, 1147 (1959) . 
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. R eeves, 308 U. S. 132, 138 (1939). We should 
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority. 
This Court's earrly decisions on the Twenty-first Amend-
ment recognized that each State holds great powers over the 
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. · Young's Mar-
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of 
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types 
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney 
v. Joseph Triner Corp. , 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others 
involved "retaliation'' statutes barring imports from States 
that proseribrd shipme11ts of liquor from other Sta tes, Finch & 
Co. v. McKittnck, :305 U. R. 395 (1939) ; Indianapolis Brewing 
Co. v. Liquor Control Cornm'ti, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The 
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case, 
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the 
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet 
even when thP States had acted uuder the explicit terms of 
the Amendment. the Court resisted the contention that § 2 
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power 
to be fo und in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's 
Market, supra, ~29 r. S .. at 64. 
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state 
liquor regulation, Seagram & Son s Y. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 
42 ( 1966). but they also have stressed that important federal 
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported 
liquor in violation of the Export-Import Clause. Department 
of Revenue v. James Bearn Co., 377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor 
can they insulate the liquor industry from the Fourteenth 
Amendment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976), and due process, Wis-
consin v. Co nstantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970) . 
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which 
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate com.merce . 
power. Although that power is directly qualified by . §.2, .the 
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some 
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v. 
Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court 
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a 
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alco-
hol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Zifjrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's 
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the 
state program was reasonable. 308 U. S., at 139. 
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were 
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324, 
331-332 (1964). 
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first 
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Com-
merce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors 
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplifi-
cation. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto 
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory 
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating 
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and 
is demonstrably incorrect." 
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation: 
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause 
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of 
the Constitution. each must be considered in the light of the 
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake 
in any concrete case.'' I d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429 
u. s. 190, 206 (1976).11 
11 In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court 
commented in a footnote: 
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquor:;, over which the Twenty-first 
Amendment gives the State:; the highest degree of control, is not alto-
gether beyond the roach of the federal commerce power, at a.ny rate when 
the State's regulation ::;qua.rely confiicts with regulation imposed by Con-
gress .... " !d., at 425, u. 15. 
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This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers 
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held 
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not man-
dated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & 
Sons, 340 F. S. 211 (1951); United Btates v. Frankfort 
Distilleries, l11c., 324 U. ·s. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann 
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a 
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to com-
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a pro-
gram similar in many respects to the California system at 
issue here. The Court held that because the Louisiana stat-
ute violated the 1::lherman Act, it could not be enforced against 
the distributor. Fifte<'n years later, the Court rejected aSher-
man Act challen~p to a New York law requiring liquor dealers 
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest 
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram & 
Sons v. Hostetter, :384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con-
cluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic 
pressure on the [dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order 
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n]othiug in the 
Twenty-first Ameudmeut, of course, would prevent the en-
forcement of tlw ~herman Act" against an interstate con-
spiracy to fix liquor prices. !d., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford, 
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam). 
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line 
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twenty-
first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control 
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how 
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States 
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regula-
tions, those controls may be subject to the federal com-
merce power in appropriate situations. The competing state 
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scru-
tiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idle-. 
wild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332. 
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B 
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor 
of competition is both familiar and substantial. 
"Antitrust Jaws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They 
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom 
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to 
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." 
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972). 
See Northern Pacific Ry v. United States, 456 U. S. 1, 4 
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through 
a statute ratht>r than a constitutional provision, Congress 
"exercis[ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce 
Clause wlwn 1t approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Clean-
ers & Dyers L [ 7nited States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see 
City of Lafayette v. Louisian£L Power & Light Co., 435 U. S., 
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's 
procompetition policy. 
The statf' in tt>rests protected by California's resale price 
maintellancf' tSystem were identifie<.l by the state courts in this 
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in 
Rice v. Alcoholtc Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d, 
at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 490.n Of course, the findings and 
conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court 
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the 
12 As the unu~ual posture of this case reflects, the State of California 
has shown le&; than an enthm:;ia,;tic interef't in its wine pricing system. 
As we noted, the ~:<tate agency r~ponsible for administering the program 
did not appe;Ll the deri;;ion of the California Court of Appeal. See p. 4, 
supra; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Iu~tead, this action ha,; been maintained by 
the Ca.liforma HP1ttil Liquor Dealer:; As~ociation, a private intervenor. But 
neither the intervl'nor nor the State Attorney General, who filed. a brief 
amicus curiae in support of thE' lrgit'\lative :;chemc, has specified any state 
interests protectrd h)· tho n•;;ale price maintenance system other than 
those noted in t.lu• ~t:~te court opinion::; cited in text. 
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. 
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of 
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court 
accords "respectful considera.tion and great weight to the views 
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana 
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938), and we 
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the 
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v. 
Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952). 
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of 
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the rea-
soning of the l Califomia] Supreme Court in Rice [supra]." 
90 Cal. App. 0cl, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we 
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in 
resale price mamtenanCl' for distilled liquors. 
In R-~ce , th<' State Supreme Court found two purposes behind 
liquor reHale pnce maintenance: "to promote temperance and 
orderly market conditions.'' 21 Cal. 3d, a.t 451, 579 P. 2d, at 
490.1 a The eourt found little correlation between resale price 
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing 
a 42 %- incrrase in per capita liquor consumption in California 
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect. 
Id. , at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of 
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's 
Alcohol Co11trol Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the 
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the· 
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote 
temperance." lbid.14 
13 The Califorma Court of Appeal found no additional state interests in· 
the instant <'a::;e. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761. 
That. court. rejected the ::;uggestion that, the wine price program was de-
signed to protect. the Sta.te's wine industry, !)Ointing out that the statutes 
"do not dil:!tinguish between California wines and imported wines." Ibid~ . 
H See Seagram & Sons v. Ilostette1', 384 U.S. 35, 39 (1966) (citing study· 
concluding that rc:;ale price mn,intenanre in New York State had "nOJ 
~ignificant effert upon the consumP.tion of alcoholic beverages"). 
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in 
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees 
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." !d., at 456, 
579 P. 2d, at 493.[5 In gauging this interest, the court 
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic 
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim 
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair 
trade laws were ne()essary to the economic survival of small 
retailers. . . " lb'id. The agency relied on a congressional 
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted 
under tlw Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that 
"states with fan· trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of 
firm failurPs than free trade stat<>s, and the rate of growth 
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and 
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade 
laws. '' Ibid., eiting S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair 
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. 5, 
supra, the Htate Supreme Court found no persuasive justifica-
tion to colltmue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com-
petition among retailers." 21 Ca.!. 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at 
494. Tlw Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with 
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983. 
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Cali-
fornia courts that the asserted state interests are less substan-
tial than the national policy in favor of competition. That 
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is 
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State 
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the record in this case 
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small 
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State 
15 The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market condi-
tions might ''rrdure excessive competition, thereby encouraging temper-
ance." 21 CaL 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, nt 493. The concern for temperance, 
however, was considrred by the court as an independent state interest 
in resale prier maintt'nance for liquor. 
.. 
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Attorney General in his amicus brief has dem.on!')trated that 
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Cali-
fornians. We need not consider whether the legitimate state 
interests in temperance and the protection of small retailers 
ever could prevail against the undoubted federal interest in a 
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concern~ 
put forward in this case simply are not of the same stature as 
the goals of the Sherman Act. 
We conclude that the C~tlifornia Court of Appeal correctly 
decided that the Twenty,.first Amendment provides no shelter 
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's 
wine pricing program.16 The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is 
Affirmed . 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN did not take part in the considera.. 
tion or decision of this case. 
16 Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief from the state court. 
there is no question before u:s involving liability for damages under Hi 
u.s. c.§ 15. 
